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ABSTRACT 
Psychopathic individuals have widely and persistently been depicted as prolific and 
masterful liars within the clinical lore and the popular media. However, the paucity of research in 
this area has generally contradicted the claim that such individuals possess a superior ability, 
compared to nonpsychopathic individuals, in deceiving others. The present research examined 
the sound but largely untested hypothesis that psychopathic individuals’ apparent success at 
lying may simply be a function of their prolific pursuance of such behaviour. That is, the mere 
possibility that psychopathic individuals may pursue lying behaviour more frequently than 
nonpsychopathic individuals could explain why they appear to be more successful at lying over 
time, even if their rate of successful lying is unremarkable (Billings, 2004). Lying frequency was 
measured using a non-zero-sum game originally developed by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 
(1995), which was modified in the present research to allow participants a number of 
opportunities to lie or to tell the truth, prospectively with their decisions affecting their chances 
of winning a prize. In addition to lying frequency, lying severity was also examined. Further, 
both of these variables were examined across males and females and across different types of 
social interactions (i.e., playing the game after having met/seen [Exposure Condition] compared 
to not having met/seen [Non-Exposure Condition] the other person). Psychopathy was measured 
using the Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) and 
the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). 
Machiavellianism, a construct that is similar, or overlapping with Psychopathy, as some have 
argued (McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998), was measured using the Mach-IV scale (Christie 
& Geis, 1970; McHoskey et al., 1998). Overall, the results suggested that lying frequency and 
lying severity were related to psychopathy when participants were able to see and interact with 
their opponents prior to playing the game but not when they were not provided with the 
opportunity to do so. No significant differences in lying frequency and lying severity were found 
between males and females across the two types of social interactions. The results on a post-
experiment self-report measure also suggested that psychopathy was related to certain 
characteristics of self-perceived lying behaviour, though the latter was not related to lying 
behaviour in the modified non-zero-sum game. These findings have important implications for 
professionals within clinical and forensic settings, as they suggest that psychopathic individuals 
may not lie as indiscriminately as generally perceived. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Lying, the intentional provision of misinformation to an unforwarned other (Ekman, 
2009) is a relatively common phenomenon (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996) 
that is generally considered to be morally objectionable. When one engages in a lie, or some 
other form of deceptive behaviour, with the intent of influencing another to behave in a way that 
he or she otherwise would not, without his or her knowledge and usually to one’s own 
advantage, this is referred to as manipulation (Buss, Gomes, Higgins, & Lauterbach, 1987; 
Seabright & Moberg, 1998). Although research has found lying and manipulation to be 
ubiquitous (Buss et al., 1987; DePaulo et al., 1996), it has also found that our ability to detect lies 
or deceit1 in everyday interactions is only slightly better than chance (Billings, 2004; Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Kraut, 1980), suggesting that our ability to get away with lying is superior to our 
ability to detect lies. However, there exists a distinct subpopulation of individuals who are not 
only considered to be especially good at lying but also particularly willing to do so, a group 
known clinically as psychopaths. 
Definition of Psychopathy 
Hare (1996) has described psychopathy as a “socially devastating disorder” (p. 25) that 
affects more than just the 1% of individuals within the general population who may be classified 
as psychopathic. Collectively, psychopaths commit an inordinate share of the more serious 
offences in every society surveyed (Hare, 1996). Consequently, they also comprise 15% to 25% 
of the prison population (Hare, 1996). Although the terms psychopathy and antisocial personality 
disorder (APD) are often used interchangeably, the two syndromes are not equivalent (Hare, 
1983; 1996). The DSM-IV criteria for APD focus almost exclusively on a set of observable 
behaviours, such as “destroying property, harassing others, stealing, or pursuing illegal 
occupations” (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000, p. 702). On the other hand, 
psychopathy is a clinical disorder brought to the public’s awareness in 1941 by Hervey Cleckley 
in his book The Mask of Sanity, which was based on his clinical experiences as a psychiatrist 
                                                
1 Some authors distinguish lying from deceit, as lying is a form of deceit (e.g., Jackson, 1991), while others use the 
terms interchangeably (DePaulo et al., 1996, Ekman, 2009, Lewis, 1993). I will hereafter adopt the latter approach 
in this document.  
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(Cleckley, 1976). As described by Cleckley and more recently adapted and modified by Hare 
(1970), the criteria for psychopathy focus primarily on a cluster of pejorative personality 
characteristics, including “irresponsibility,” “conning/manipulative,” “pathological lying” (Hare, 
1996), and “callous/lack of empathy,” the last of which is considered the essential feature of the 
disorder (Cleckley, 1976).  
The experience of empathy and other emotions, both moral (e.g., guilt and shame) and 
basic (e.g., fear), is considered critical for proper moral development (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 
2005; Gibbs, 2010; Lykken, 1957). Many have observed that psychopathic individuals are 
unable to experience the full spectrum or intensity of human emotion (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 
2003). Indeed, psychopaths have famously been described as “know(ing) the words but not the 
music” (Johns & Quay, 1962, p. 217). Blair (1995) argued that psychopathic individuals fail to 
become morally socialized due to a defective violence inhibition mechanism (VIM). He 
described the VIM as a cognitive mechanism, which in normal development, is activated in an 
observer (e.g., a bystander or an aggressor) by the presence of distress cues in others, such as sad 
or fearful facial expressions and screaming or crying. These cues may all function as submission 
responses in aggressive or threatening situations. The activation of the VIM prompts a 
withdrawal response from the observer (e.g., a bystander or the aggressor in the situation), as the 
submission responses are experienced as aversive, and over time individuals become socialized 
to dislike the pain of others. However, due to an impaired VIM, psychopathic individuals do not 
experience distress cues as emotionally aversive, and thus may continue to attack rather than 
withdraw from an aggressive situation. Lykken (1957), on the other hand, proposed that 
psychopathic individuals fail to become morally socialized due to a deficiency in experiencing 
fear in response to punishment. More recently, Blair et al. (2005) have integrated the VIM and 
the fear dysfunction theories to produce the integrated emotions systems (IES) model to explain 
the emotional impairments associated with psychopathy. The authors suggested that the 
amygdala, which is involved in the processing of emotionally laden information and thus is 
essential to moral socialization, is dysfunctional in psychopathic individuals. 
Despite the existence of several theories regarding the etiology of the emotional 
impairment observed in psychopathic individuals, the central idea behind these theories appears 
to be that psychopathic individuals’ deficiency in experiencing emotions, particularly moral 
emotions, prevents them from undergoing proper or normal moral development. Consequently, 
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they are at higher risk for engaging in morally objectionable behaviours such as, manipulating, 
defrauding, or lying to others. Nevertheless, it is clear that laypersons and experts alike presume 
that psychopathic individuals possess a proclivity toward using their superior ability to deceive 
and manipulate, causing harm to others (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1991a, 1993, 2003; Hare, Forth, 
& Hart, 1989). 
The Lying Behaviour of Psychopaths as Depicted in the Clinical Literature and Media 
Within the popular media, examples are rife with how real-life criminals deemed to be 
psychopaths cunningly and callously lied to and manipulated their victims. For example, Ted 
Bundy, the notorious American serial killer, was noted to have duped unsuspecting female 
strangers into helping him transport heavy items into his car by wearing his arm in a phony cast 
and sling in order to appear injured and vulnerable (Michaud & Aynesworth, 1999). Christopher 
Rocancourt, another alleged psychopath, defrauded numerous members of the Hollywood elite 
out of millions of dollars by assuming various false identities (e.g., the nephew of Sophia Loren, 
etc.) and promising them significant returns on loans, which he never intended to repay (Leung, 
2003). In interviews, Rocancourt has consistently appeared to show little remorse for his actions. 
Rather, he has rationalized them by projecting blame onto his victims, believing that he did not 
in fact steal from any of these individuals, whom he has described as being “not that bright,” but 
merely borrowed from them (Leung, 2003; Taibbi, 2008).  
Similarly, in the clinical realm, psychopaths are described as particularly devious. For 
example, according to the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) - a measure that 
is considered to be the current gold standard in the assessment of psychopathy in adult forensic 
populations – arguably, the two items most relevant to psychopathic individuals’ purported 
proficiency in deception are: Pathological Lying and Conning/Manipulative. In terms of the 
former, the PCL-R description for the item is as follows:  
… an individual for whom lying and deceit are a characteristic part of his 
interactions with others. He is capable of fabricating elaborate accounts of his 
past even though he knows that his story can easily be checked. His readiness to 
lie, and the apparent ease with which he carries it off (even with people who 
know him well), can be quite remarkable… Moreover, even after repeatedly 
breaking his promises and commitments to someone he still finds it easy to 
make new ones on “his word of honor.” He often lies for obvious reasons, but 
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deceiving others also appears to have some intrinsic value for him. He may 
freely discuss and take pride and pleasure in his ability to lie (p. 37). 
In terms of the latter (i.e., Conning/Manipulative), the description for the item is as follows:  
… the use of deceit and deception to cheat, bilk, defraud, or manipulate others. 
The use of schemes and scams, motivated by a desire for personal gain (money, 
sex, status, power, etc.) and carried out with no concern for their effects on 
victims… Some of these operations are elaborate and well thought out, whereas 
others are quite simple; in each case they are carried off in a cool, self-assured, 
or brazen manner (p. 37). 
Thus, both of these items describe psychopaths as individuals who choose to and derive 
enjoyment in using their alleged exceptional skills in lying and manipulation to benefit 
themselves at the expense of others, even with those to whom they are close.  
The Lying Behaviour of Psychopaths as Depicted in the Research Literature 
The above descriptions represent the prototypical notions of both clinicians and 
laypersons alike with respect to the abilities of psychopaths to deceive. However, despite the 
abundant media portrayals and rich clinical accounts (e.g., Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1993) that 
depict psychopaths as especially prolific and skilled liars and manipulators, there exists a dearth 
of empirical studies that have systematically examined this claim. Indeed, fundamental questions 
about the nature of lying and manipulative behaviours in this population have yet to be answered 
within controlled experimental settings. Rather, given the aforementioned destructiveness that 
results from the dishonesty of psychopaths, it is perhaps not surprising that the few extant 
empirical investigations in this area have focused primarily on deception detection, specifically 
on identifying nonverbal indicators of deception. The rest have examined the ability of 
psychopaths to tell successful lies under prescribed circumstances. 
Non-Verbal Indicators of Deception in Psychopathic Individuals 
The first group of studies can be further divided into those that have examined the 
physiological responses of psychopaths and those that have examined the behavioural 
presentation (viz., body language) of psychopathic individuals while engaged in deception.  
Physiological indicators. In terms of the former, a few studies have employed the 
polygraph to compare the autonomic responses of psychopathic and nonpsychopathic individuals 
while lying. Although some of these studies have found that psychopathic individuals evidence 
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reduced autonomic reactivity compared to nonpsychopathic individuals on measures of heart-rate 
(Raskin & Hare, 1978) and skin conductance (Verschuere, Crombez, De Clercq, & Koster, 
2005), these differences did not diminish the detection accuracy of polygraph examinations 
(Raskin & Hare, 1978; Patrick & Iacono, 1989; Verschuere, Crombez, Koster, & De Clercq, 
2007). That is, these studies found that lying psychopaths were no more likely to escape 
detection on the polygraph than lying nonpsychopaths. 
Body language. In terms of the latter, the writer could find only two studies that have 
examined the behavioural presentation of psychopathic individuals while lying. One of these 
studies examined the relationship using a sample of 45 male offenders (Klaver, Lee, & Hart, 
2007). In the study, participants were asked to produce a true statement about their current 
offense and a fictional elaboration of a crime they had viewed on video. Each of these conditions 
was taped and each allowed participants to discuss the aforementioned topics for a maximum of 
five minutes. Participants’ level of psychopathy was assessed using the PCL-R. Participants’ 
taped statements were later examined and coded by research assistants for nonverbal behaviours. 
Overall, with the exception of increased head movements in psychopathic offenders while lying, 
results did not indicate significant differences in nonverbal presentation between psychopathic 
and nonpsychopathic offender groups while engaged in deception. The researchers noted that the 
limited differences observed between groups may have been a result of the small sample size 
used.  
The other study that has examined the relationship between behavioural indicators of 
deception and psychopathy was conducted by Billings (2004). This study, similarly, did not find 
many significant differences between individuals who scored high compared to those who scored 
low on psychopathic tendencies. In the study, participants were 60 undergraduates, who were 
rated on three separate psychopathy measures (i.e., Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version 
(PCL: SV); Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Short Form (PPI: SF); and the Collateral Rating 
of Psychopathy (CRP). In the first experimental session, participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire regarding their views on 12 current controversial topics. After this, the researcher 
selected participants’ four strongest opinions and instructed them to present these views in 
succession while being videotaped during a second experimental session. Participants were 
instructed to provide their true opinion on two of the four topics and to present the opposing 
view as their own on the other two topics. Their taped presentations were later coded for 
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nonverbal behaviour by trained raters. Results did not indicate any significant differences in 
nonverbal behaviour between individuals who evidenced higher, compared to those who 
evidenced lower, levels of psychopathic tendencies. The researcher hypothesized that the non-
significant results may have been a result of the sample used (i.e., university students, who may 
evidence lower levels of psychopathy compared to an offender sample) and the conditions 
imposed by the experiment (e.g., the pressure of being videotaped). 
Studies Investigating the Alleged Superior Lying Ability of Psychopathic Individuals  
The second grouping of studies within the psychopathy and deception literature pertains 
to those that have examined the alleged lying proficiency of psychopathic individuals either by 
observing whether such individuals are able to tell convincing lies to others or malinger 
successfully on psychometric tests. 
Lying about personal experiences and views. Cogburn (1993) studied the ability of 
psychopaths to tell convincing lies in a sample of 29 male offenders. Participants took part in a 
mock job interview that was videotaped. Prior to the interview, participants completed a card-
sorting task indicating misdeeds and prosocial acts in which they had previously engaged. After 
this, the researcher selected four of these choices, half pertaining to past misdeeds and half 
pertaining to previous prosocial acts, to be used in the interview. Participants were instructed to 
tell two types of lies during the interview (Lie Condition): one where they stated that they had 
committed a prosocial act that they had not in fact done and one where they stated that they had 
not committed a misdeed that they had in fact committed. Participants were also instructed to tell 
two kinds of truths during the interview (Truthful Condition): one where they stated that they 
had committed a prosocial act that they had in fact done and one where they had committed a 
misdeed that they had in fact committed. Psychopathy was assessed using the PCL (Hare, 1980). 
Later, undergraduate students were asked to view the interviews and rate, on seven-point scales, 
the degree to which they believed the participant in the interview was speaking candidly. Results 
did not support the common notion that psychopaths are masterful liars. Overall, Cogburn found 
that higher scores on the PCL were in fact associated with lower ratings of truthfulness. As well, 
she found that individuals who scored higher on Factor 2 (i.e., antisocial/deviant behaviours) but 
not Factor 1 (i.e., psychopathic personality characteristics such as, lack of empathy, 
conning/manipulative, etc.) were more likely to be perceived as dishonest in both the Lie and 
Truthful Conditions. More recently, Klaver, Lee, Spidel, and Hart (2009) employed a nearly 
 7 
identical experimental design to investigate this issue and found results that mirrored those of 
Cogburn (1993; i.e., that psychopathic male offenders were rated by student judges as less 
plausible than nonpsychopathic offenders when recounting fabricated versions of crimes). 
In addition to examining the nonverbal behaviours of students who rated high and low on 
psychopathic tendencies while lying, Billings (2004), described above, also examined the ability 
of the students to tell convincing lies. As aforementioned, 60 participants were asked to make 
presentations on four contentious issues. On two of these issues, they were instructed to 
truthfully report their views (Truthful Condition) and on the other two issues they were 
instructed to lie about their views (Pretend Condition). All four presentations were videotaped 
and later reviewed by 150 undergraduate student raters. In contrast to Cogburn (1993), prior to 
providing their ranking of the perceived truthfulness of each presentation, on a four-point scale 
(i.e., 1 = Most Truthful; 4 = Least Truthful), student raters in Billings’ study were informed that 
the presenters had offered their actual views in two of the presentations (Truthful Condition) and 
their opposing views in the other two presentations (Pretend Condition). Results indicated that 
higher scores on measures of psychopathy, whether measured using the PCL-SV (r = .32), PPI (r 
= .28), or CRP (r = .32), were significantly correlated with being successful at deception. 
Malingering. Other studies that have investigated the claim that individuals with 
psychopathic tendencies are unusually adept at deception have focused specifically on their 
ability to malinger, that is, their ability to feign mental illness. When explicitly instructed to 
malinger in laboratory experiments, individuals scoring high on psychopathic tendencies as 
measured by the PPI both in offender and nonoffender samples have not been found to possess a 
greater capacity for malingering than those scoring low on psychopathic tendencies on a variety 
of psychometric measures (Edens, Buffington, & Tomicic, 2000; MacNeil & Holden, 2006; 
Poythress, Edens, & Watkins, 2001), although they may report an increased willingness to 
engage in such behaviour (Edens et al., 2000).  
Overall, with the sole exception of the study by Billings (2004), research generally 
contradicts the widely accepted notion that individuals who are high on psychopathic tendencies 
possess a greater capacity to deceive and manipulate others than those who are low. 
Interestingly, a separate subpopulation of individuals known to researchers as Machiavellians 
(Machs) has garnered somewhat more empirical support than psychopaths as a group with a 
superior ability and propensity to lie. 
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Machiavellianism versus Psychopathy 
Machiavellians are a group of individuals who, similar to psychopaths, are considered to 
possess a manipulative style and to lack regard for and emotional involvement with others in 
their interpersonal interactions (Christie & Geis, 1970). Indeed, Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy have been considered by some researchers to be identical concepts. For example, 
McHoskey, Worzel, and Szyarto (1998) examined the relationship between psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism in a sample of undergraduates. Machiavellianism was assessed using the 
Mach-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), the most widely used measure of Machiavellianism. The 
measure consists of 20 statements to which participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). Psychopathy was assessed using the Primary and 
Secondary Psychopathy subscales of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; 
Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995), a 26-item scale designed to measure psychopathy in non-
institutionalized populations. Results across three separate studies indicated significant 
correlations between Machiavellianism and psychopathy ranging from r = .46 to r = .65 (ps < 
.001), leading McHoskey et al. (1998) to conclude that the two are overlapping constructs and 
that the MACH-IV is a global measure of psychopathy in nonforensic populations.  
 A more recent study by Paulhus and Williams (2002) examined the association amongst 
the constructs of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, or “the Dark Triad,” in a 
sample of 245 university students (159 female, 106 male). Machiavellianism was measured using 
the Mach-IV scale; narcissism was measured using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI); 
and psychopathy was assessed using the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP-II). The 
researchers found that these measures were moderately intercorrelated, with Machiavellianism 
and psychopathy correlated at r = .31 (p < .001), Machiavellianism and narcissism correlated at r 
= .25 (p < .001) and psychopathy and narcissism correlated at r = .50 (p < .001). As a way of 
further examining the relationship amongst these three constructs, the researchers also correlated 
participants’ scores on these measures with their scores on the Big Five Inventory (BFI), a paper-
and-pencil personality questionnaire designed to measure the following traits: extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. Results indicated that while 
individuals scoring high on psychopathy and Machiavellianism also scored low on 
conscientiousness, only those scoring high on psychopathy exhibited a low level of neuroticism. 
Narcissism and psychopathy were both significantly correlated with extraversion (r = .43 and 
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.34, respectively, ps < .05). As well, all three constructs were significantly negatively correlated 
with agreeableness (r = -.36 for narcissism; r = -.47 for Machiavellianism, and r = -.25 for 
psychopathy, ps < .05). Based on these results, Paulhus and Williams (2002) concluded that 
narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy are conceptually similar but not equivalent. 
The Lying Behaviour of Machiavellians as Depicted in the Research Literature 
 Given the comparability between Machiavellianism and psychopathy, especially with 
respect to the purported lying and manipulative tendencies of individuals from each of these 
groups, it is perhaps not surprising that researchers in each of these areas have posed and 
examined similar questions. Specifically, researchers conducting studies in Machiavellianism 
have examined whether high Machs are in fact more manipulative and better deceivers than low 
Machs. While findings in this area have been mixed, it is nevertheless worthwhile to compare the 
methodologies employed in the studies that have found evidence to support these claims with 
those that have not, as this may help to elucidate our understanding of the largely null findings of 
similar investigations within the psychopathy literature.  
One study that supports the notion that high Machs are better liars than low Machs was 
conducted by Geis and Moon (1981). They examined the lying ability of university students who 
were high and low on Machiavellianism, as measured using the Mach-IV scale, in a two-part 
study using the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG; described in greater detail in the section “Non-
Zero-Sum and Zero-Sum Games,” below). In the first part, participants were introduced to the 
researcher and three other participants, who were in fact confederates of the researchers. To 
begin, participants were informed that they would be competing against one another in teams of 
two (i.e., the participant and one confederate against the other two confederates) in the PDG, 
which required each team to come to independent decisions regarding cooperation or defection 
with the other. Possible outcomes in this case involved different dollar amounts depending on the 
eventual decisions of each team. Participants were also instructed to deliberate their decisions 
only within their teams and never with members of the opposing team. Teams were instructed to 
signal with a knock on their side of an anteroom door when they had reached their decision 
choice. When both teams had signaled, one of the team members would notify the researcher by 
knocking on the door of his room. Thus, the researcher was not privy to the actions of the 
participants in the anteroom. Once the researcher returned to the anteroom, he noted the 
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decisions of the two teams and distributed the appropriate payoff in actual dollar bills to the 
winning team or a preprinted IOU to the losing team.  
Several trials later, participants’ partners would mention to the participant that 
cooperation was more lucrative than defection. After this, the opposing team would propose that 
for mutual benefit both teams should always choose cooperation in the payoff matrix for the 
remainder of the experiment. However, during the next trial, the opposing team would renege on 
the agreement causing the participant and his partner to lose money ($4). In response, 
participants’ partners would either steal $4 from the confederate team’s pile of money, place it 
on their own pile, and instruct the participant to keep silent or simply state angrily that the other 
team owed them $4 without taking any money from the other team’s pile. During the next 
interaction in the anteroom, one member from the opposing team accused the participant’s team 
of stealing money from their pile. The accusation was designed to put pressure on the participant 
to respond and deny the occurrence of a theft. All participants responded and most denied the 
theft during the interaction, which was videotaped. 
In part two of the study, a new set of student participants were recruited to review the 
taped interactions and judge the credibility of the original participants’ denial of theft. Judges 
were instructed to rate the extent to which they believed that participants in the videos were lying 
or telling the truth on a 6-point Likert scale (1= Definitely Lying to 6 = Definitely Telling the 
Truth). Results revealed that judges believed the lies of high Machs (ratings averaged 3.55 on the 
Likert scale) more often than those of low Machs (ratings averaged 2.94 on the Likert scale).  
Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, and Gumpert (1970) found similar results in a study that 
examined success at lying in 24 male and 24 female university students. In the study, participants 
were partnered with a same-sex confederate and presented with decision-making tasks of 
increasing difficulty, which they were to solve cooperatively. Part way through the tasks, the 
researcher would exit the room to attend to an “important matter.” At this point, confederates 
would attempt to involve participants in looking up the answers for the impending tasks. Upon 
return, the researcher administered the remainder of the tasks and thereafter interviewed the pair 
to review how they had arrived at their responses. During the course of the interview, the 
researcher would appear skeptical and eventually accuse the pair of cheating, sparking an 
interrogation period whereby the participant could confess to or deny having cheated on the 
tasks. The entire interaction was video-recorded behind a one-way mirror and later reviewed and 
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content-coded by independent judges. Results revealed that high Machs denied cheating more 
often than low Machs. High Machs were also rated as more plausible in their denials than low 
Machs. 
Further evidence supporting the notion that Machiavellians possess a superior ability in 
lying to and manipulating others successfully has also been found in several studies using 
children as participants. These studies employed a simplified version of the Mach-IV scale (i.e., 
the Kiddie Mach scale; Nachamie, 1969 as cited in Christie and Geis, 1970) to measure degree of 
Machiavellianism in elementary-aged children. Results from these studies suggested that high 
Mach children were more successful at deceiving others at a bluffing game than low Mach 
children (Kraut & Price, 1976; Nachamie, 1969 as cited in Christie and Geis, 1970) and that high 
Mach children were also better at using deceit to convince another child to eat more quinine 
flavoured crackers than low Mach children (Braginsky, 1970). 
Despite the positive findings of the studies described above, other studies have found 
evidence that contradicts the claim that high Machs are better deceivers than low Machs 
(Epstein, 1969; Janisse & Bradley, 1980). Some researchers have suggested that a major reason 
for the discrepancy in results is because the studies that have found supporting evidence provided 
participants with the autonomy to decide the occasion and content of the lie, as well as sufficient 
motivation to engage in deception (Geis & Christie, 1970; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996). In 
contrast, those studies that have found conflicting evidence explicitly stipulated these aspects to 
participants, thereby possibly hindering participants’ capacity and motivation to lie convincingly 
(Geis & Christie, 1970; Wilson et al., 1996). This same reasoning can also be applied to 
understanding the rather consistent null findings in the psychopathy and lying research literature. 
Comparing Methodologies from the Psychopathy and Machiavellian Research Literatures 
Though lying ability has been examined in the Machiavellian and, to some extent, in the 
psychopathy literatures, a considerable proportion of the research within the latter has employed 
a nearly identical methodology. Similar to the participants in some of the Mach studies 
mentioned above, participants in psychopathy studies have not been placed in situations where 
they could choose to lie or tell the truth. Instead, they were told specifically when to lie and what 
to lie about. More specifically, researchers in this area have tended to instruct participants to 
invent and truthfully report on various topics (i.e., personal experiences or views) and then 
gauged participants’ level of trustworthiness either by using human judges or some instrument, 
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such as a polygraph test or paper-and-pencil measure. Not only does this type of design 
significantly diminish external validity, it also neglects potentially sound explications for 
psychopathic individuals’ seeming superiority at lying and manipulation, aside from the 
possibility that such individuals truly do possess an exceptional ability in this domain. 
Specifically, one fundamental but empirically overlooked explication for psychopathic 
individuals’ apparent success at lying and manipulating others is that it may simply be due to 
their perseverance in pursuing these behaviours. To clarify, perhaps the clinical observation that 
psychopaths are prolific liars (Cleckley, 1976) is what drives the common notion that they are 
masterful liars and manipulators, as “a low base-rate for ‘success at deception’ could result in a 
significant number of successes over the course of many trials” (Billings, 2004, p. 37).  
However, this fundamental question of how frequently psychopaths will lie when given 
the opportunity to do so has apparently never been examined empirically, with the exception of 
Klaver et al. (2007), who measured participants’ (i.e., 45 male offenders) self-reported lying 
frequency on a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., 0 = Never; 4 = Always) and found no association with 
PCL-R Total, as well as with Factor scores (i.e., PCL-R Total score, r = -.16, p = .29; Factor 1 
(i.e., Arrogant and Deceitful Interpersonal Style) score, r = -.16. p = .30; Factor 2 (i.e., Deficient 
Affective Experience) score, r = .01. p = .96; Factor 3 (Impulsive and Irresponsible Behavioral 
Style) score r = -.14, p = .38). Although the use of self-report measures represents an important 
initial step in the context of examining this issue, the employment of behavioural measures in 
future studies is necessary to achieve a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding. To this 
end, one promising approach that has been applied to the investigation of other research 
questions is the non-zero-sum game. Some researchers favour the use of non-zero-sum games in 
experiments because they elicit interactions between participants that closely approximate 
situations encountered in the real world. 
Non-Zero-Sum and Zero-Sum Games 
The term non-zero-sum game is derived from game theory and refers to a situation where 
the sum of the total gains and losses (treating the losses as negative values) of all interacting 
players or participants does not equal to zero (Rasmusen, 1989). One example of a non-zero-sum 
game is the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer, 2003). The game is usually 
played between two individuals, with one individual, the Investor, deciding how much of his/her 
initial “show-up fee” to give to the other player, the Trustee or Receiver. Prior to reaching the 
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Trustee, the sent amount is increased by some factor and then the Trustee decides how much of 
the received amount to divide with the Investor. According to economic models of behaviour, 
individuals are assumed to act in a self-interested manner and behaviour that digresses from self-
interest is seen as irrational (Berg et al. 1995). As such, according to theory, the rational outcome 
in the Trust Game is for the Investor or Sender to give nothing, as he or she assumes that the 
Trustee will not reciprocate. Interestingly, however, research has consistently found that a 
significant number of Investors will offer money and a significant number of Trustees will 
reciprocate, although the amounts offered and reciprocated vary from study to study. Researchers 
have proposed several explanations for the behaviour of Trustees in such situations, namely, 
moral obligation or altruism (McCabe, Rassenti, & Smith, 1998) 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG), mentioned earlier, is another well-known example 
of a two-player non-zero-sum game. The premise of the game is that police have captured two 
individuals, whom they suspect are responsible for committing a serious offense, but only 
possess sufficient evidence to convict them on lesser charges (Camerer, 2003). The two suspects 
are placed in separate interview rooms with no opportunity to communicate with the other. They 
are given the chance to confess with the payoff of being convicted of the lesser crime. The 
suspects (i.e., participants) are faced with the choice of cooperating with (i.e., remaining silent) 
or defecting against (i.e., confessing) the other player. As shown in Figure 1.1, when both 
players cooperate (i.e., remain silent), the outcome is CC, where each player receives 1 year in 
prison. CC is better than DD (e.g., 5 years in prison each), mutual defection (i.e., confessing or 
betraying the other player). However, when one player defects and the other cooperates, the 
outcome is DC or CD: the defector earns a payoff that is better than that of CC (e.g., immunity or 
zero years in prison), and the cooperator earns a payoff that is worse than that of DD (e.g., 10 
years in prison). Thus, in a non-zero-sum game, such as the PDG, there exists several possible 
outcomes (i.e., multiple winners, multiple losers, or a winner and a loser).  
In contrast to the above examples, a zero-sum game is a situation where the sum of the 
total gains and losses of all interacting players is equal to zero. In zero-sum games, such as 
Chess, there can only be one winner and one loser. Researchers (Camerer, 2003) argue that non-
zero-sum games more accurately represent the complex dynamics of the real world than zero-
sum games because they not only require us to anticipate others’ actions and to reflect upon what 
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     Player B 
         
        D(efect) 
 
Figure 1.1. Payoff Matrix for a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Adapted from Camerer (2003, p.45) 
 
others will infer from ours but also because the final outcome of such interactions tend to be 
unpredictable and complex. Thus, the use of non-zero-sum games may help to increase external 
validity while still achieving adequate experimental control. Consequently, many researchers 
have used non-zero-sum games to study a variety of social dilemmas and behaviours (e.g., trust 
and cooperation).  
Psychopathy and Non-Zero-Sum Games 
Within the psychopathy literature, non-zero-sum games, specifically Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
have been employed on a few occasions to investigate the concept of cooperation in 
psychopathic individuals. While conclusive results on the issue have yet to be achieved, recent 
investigations have tended to find significant associations between psychopathy and defection in 
the PDG within experimental settings. For example, Mokros et al. (2008) examined this 
relationship in 48 male participants. Half of the participants were psychiatric inpatients, who had 
been previously diagnosed with psychopathy (i.e., scores ranging from 20-36 out of a maximum 
total of 40) using the PCL-R. The other half of the participants consisted of “non-academic” 
males from the community. Level of psychopathy in this group was assessed using the 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory- Revised (PPI-R).  
In the study, participants played a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) on a 
computer over 40 trials, with a “computerized dummy” as the opponent. The computer opponent 
was programmed to use a “tit-for-two-tats” strategy, meaning that to begin the computer 
responds in a cooperative manner and continues to respond cooperatively until the participant 
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defects twice in a row (Novak, 2005). Once this occurs, the computer defects on the next round 
and on all subsequent trials. Cooperation by the computer opponent is restored if the participant 
returns to using a cooperative strategy. Results indicated that psychopathic individuals were 
significantly less cooperative than the nonpsychopathic individuals, with the odds of defecting in 
the game being 7.86 times higher in psychopaths compared to nonpsychopaths. More recently, 
Curry, Chesters, and Viding (2011) also found that individuals scoring high on certain subscales 
of the PPI-R (e.g., Machiavellian Egocentricity) were also less likely to be cooperative while 
playing several modified versions of the PDG than those scoring low. 
While the PDG allows researchers to examine cooperation in a controlled experimental 
setting, the Trust Game may be more ideally suited, with slight modification, toward 
examination of lying behaviour. The main reason for this pertains to the design of the two games. 
Specifically, players’ decisions in the PDG are made simultaneously while players’ decisions in 
the Trust Game are made in succession (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002). The 
exchange of information in the latter allows for an opportunity for players to provide 
misinformation to the other whereas there is no such opportunity for exchange in the PDG, 
without significant modification to the design of the game2. As well, the Trust Game, as the 
name implies, measures “pure trust” (Camerer, 2003, p. 85). Consequently, it is arguably more 
relevant to the study of lying and manipulation than is cooperation, which is frequently studied 
using the PDG. Unfortunately, to date, no one has used the basic structure of the Trust Game to 
examine lying behaviour in individuals with psychopathic tendencies.  
Machiavellianism and Non-Zero-Sum Games 
Non-zero-sum games have also not been used extensively with Machiavellian individuals 
within the psychological literature. However, they have been employed with Machs somewhat 
more extensively within the fields of business and economics over the last decade, primarily in 
studies of trust and cooperation rather than lying or manipulation. For example, Gunnthorsdottir 
et al., (2002) employed a version of the Trust Game to examine trust and reciprocity in 
undergraduates who scored high and low on Machiavellianism, as measured using the Mach-IV 
scale  (Christie & Geis, 1970). The specific Trust Game they employed is entitled the $10 Trust 
                                                
2 During the data analysis stage of the present research, the writer came upon a study by Curry et al. (2011), who 
developed and employed a significantly modified version of the PDG that allowed participants to make sequential 
decisions. A PDG modified in this way is comparable to the Trust Game (Camerer, 2003). 
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Game or the Investment Game and was devised by Berg et al. (1995). The game is played 
between two individuals, with one player designated as Player 1 (P1) and the other designated as 
Player 2 (P2). As is inherent in Trust Games, players are given an initial endowment or show-up 
fee. In this case, both players were each given a show-up fee of $10.  
The $10 Trust Game is depicted in Figure 1.2, with the boxes at the end of each decision 
node containing the final payoffs of each player (P1’s payoff is always shown above P2’s 
payoff). To begin, P1 decides whether or not to give any of his or her initial show-up fee to P2. If 
P1 decides not to give any money to P2, he or she moves to the right along the decision tree, thus 
ending the game with both players keeping their original $10 show-up fee. However, P1 may 
convey trust in P2 by selecting the riskier option of giving money to P2 (e.g., $10). Any sent 
amount then triples before it reaches P2 (e.g., $10 becomes $30). At this point P2 may decide 
either to split the tripled amount evenly with P1, resulting in both players finishing the game 
with more than their original $10 show-up fee (e.g., $15 for P1 and $25 for P2) or he or she may  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The $10 Trust Game devised by Berg et al. (1995). Figure adapted from 
Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002, p. 52). 
 
P1 
$10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
$0 (P1) 
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e.g., $10 becomes $30 
Cooperate 
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Not Cooperate 
Not Cooperate 
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decide to keep the entire tripled amount (e.g., $0 for P1 and $40 for P2). If P2 decides the 
former, he or she moves to the right along the decision tree. However, if P2 decides the latter, he 
or she moves down along the decision tree and retains the entire tripled amount. 
As aforementioned, according to economic behaviour theory, rational individuals are 
assumed to behave in a self-interested manner (Berg et al., 1995). By that assumption, most P1s 
will move to the right in anticipation of P2s defecting (i.e., moving down to obtain the entire 
amount of tripled money). However, most studies that have employed the $10 Trust Game have 
found that a significant number of P1s will entrust their opponent with at least some of their $10 
show-up fee and that most P2s will reciprocate at least some of the received tripled money (Berg 
et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003). These results were obtained in studies where the game was played 
only once (i.e., “one-shot games”) and anonymously between two individuals, thereby presenting 
no opportunity for retribution by either party for not cooperating (Berg et al., 1995). More 
specifically, one study by McCabe and Smith (2000), using undergraduate students as 
participants, found that 50% of P1s cooperated by moving down and that 75% of P2s 
reciprocated by moving right (see Figure 1.3). P1s who cooperated made somewhat more on 
average than P1s who did not cooperate ($11.25 vs. $10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Frequency of participants’ moves as Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2) in Berg et al. 
(1995). Reproduced from Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002, p. 52). 
P1 
12/24 = 50% 
3/12 = 25% 
9/12 = 75% 
P2 
12/24 = 50% $10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
$0 (P1) 
$40 (P2) 
$15 (P1) 
$25 (P2) 
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Returning to the study by Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002), these researchers examined 
whether differences in individuals’ levels of Machiavellianism could explain corresponding 
individual differences in trust and reciprocity using the $10 Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995). The 
game was played once with an anonymous opponent. Given that Machiavellians are described as 
manipulative, unemotional, and lacking regard for others’ well-being, the researchers 
hypothesized that high Machs would defect more often as P2s than low Machs. However, they 
did not make specific predictions about the behaviour of high Machs as P1s because high levels 
of Machiavellianism have been associated with both cynicism, which would prompt non-
cooperation, and risk-seeking, which would prompt the riskier decision of moving down (i.e., 
cooperation). Indeed, no significant differences were observed between average-low (AL) and 
high (H) Machs in their decisions as P1 (see results in Figure 1.4). In contrast, significant 
differences were found between the two groups in the P2 position, with 54.2% of the AL group  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Frequency of participants’ moves as Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2) in 
Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002). H = high and AL = average to low Mach-IV scores. Reproduced 
from Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002, p. 61). 
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choosing to cooperate (i.e., reciprocate) and 72.2% of the H group choosing to defect (i.e., keep 
all of the sent money). Thus, the authors concluded that the Mach-IV scale was able to predict 
trustworthiness or reciprocity but not trusting behaviour, with higher scores being associated 
with lower levels of trustworthiness. 
The Present Study 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As aforementioned, though psychopaths are described as unusually adept liars in the 
clinical literature and media, there exists a paucity of empirical data to support this claim and in 
fact the majority of the available empirical research tends to contradict it (Cogburn, 1993, Patrick 
& Iacono, 1989; Raskin & Hare, 1978; Verschuere et al., 2007). Other fundamental questions 
with respect to the nature of lying behaviour in psychopaths have yet to be explored empirically. 
Chief among these questions is whether psychopaths actually lie more often than 
nonpsychopaths, as claimed3 (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1991a; 1993; 2003; Hare et al., 1989). This 
is an important question to examine because the mere possibility that psychopaths pursue lying 
behaviour more frequently than nonpsychopaths could explain why they appear to be more 
successful at lying over time, even if their overall rate of successful lying is in fact unexceptional 
(Billings, 2004).  
The present study examined this question in individuals who were high and low on 
psychopathic tendencies using a modified version of the $10 Trust Game by Berg et al. (1995). 
Specifically, the $10 Trust Game was modified to allow participants the opportunity to choose to 
lie or tell the truth to an anonymous individual, resulting in an improvement upon methodologies 
used in previous studies in the psychopathy and lying literature, which tended to prescribe when 
participants could lie or tell the truth. Given the popular claim that psychopaths are prolific liars 
and manipulators, it was hypothesized that individuals scoring higher on psychopathic tendencies 
would lie more frequently than those who scored lower on psychopathic tendencies. 
Another important and fundamental question examined in the present study was: Whom 
do individuals who are higher on psychopathic tendencies attempt to deceive? More specifically, 
the present research investigated whether lying frequency changed in individuals who were 
                                                
3 This is also an issue that has garnered little empirical attention within the Machiavellian literature, with extant 
studies showing inconclusive findings. 
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higher on psychopathic tendencies in the modified $10 Trust Game as a result of having met 
compared to not having met their opponents. Both Hare (1991a; 2003) and Cleckley (1976) have 
claimed that psychopaths are compulsive liars, who will lie to strangers and acquaintances alike. 
However, this claim has also not been empirically investigated. Thus, based on clinical lore, it 
was hypothesized that the lying frequency of individuals who scored higher on psychopathic 
tendencies would be consistent whether they had had the opportunity to have met and interacted 
with an opponent or not. 
The third question addressed in the present research was whether individuals who were 
higher on psychopathic tendencies would be more likely to lie to a greater degree or severity than 
those who were lower on psychopathic tendencies. To date, there appears to be an absence of 
studies in the psychological literature that have examined this issue. On the other hand, the 
Machiavellian literature contains studies that have found that high Machs are more willing and 
more likely to fabricate bigger lies than low Machs (Geis, Christie, & Nelson, 1970). As well, 
high Machs have also been found to be more likely to steal greater amounts of money on average 
from a trusting compared to a visibly suspicious individual than low Machs (Harrel & Hartnagel, 
1976). Based on these findings and given the similarities between Machiavellian and 
psychopathic individuals as well as the clinical observation that psychopaths lack empathy and 
derive enjoyment from lying, it was hypothesized that individuals who were higher on 
psychopathic tendencies would lie to a greater degree than those who were lower on 
psychopathic tendencies.  
The fourth question examined in the present research was whether lying frequency and 
lying severity would change over the course of repeated interactions for individuals who were 
higher on psychopathic tendencies compared to those who were lower on psychopathic 
tendencies. Again, to date, this question has not been empirically investigated, though case 
studies have suggested that psychopathic individuals may make favourable initial impressions 
only to cause doubt and mistrust in others over the long-term (Babiak, 1995). Similarly, this 
question has not received any empirical attention within the Machiavellianism literature (Wilson 
et al., 1996). Wilson et al. (1996) argued that high Machs were less likely to succeed in long-
term interactions than low Machs given their propensity to deceive and thus would elicit distrust 
in others over time. Within the context of non-zero-sum games, they proposed that high Machs, 
armed with the knowledge about whether they would be playing a single versus repeated game, 
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would be more likely than low Machs to behave strategically different in the two situations. 
Specifically, they hypothesized that high Machs would defect in one-shot games but cooperate 
initially and defect on later trials in repeated games, while low Machs would be less likely to 
distinguish between the two situations and would cooperate in both. Thus, given that 
psychopathic individuals, like Machiavellians, are described as masterful liars and manipulators, 
it was hypothesized in the present research that higher scores on psychopathy measures would be 
associated with higher rates and a greater degree of lying in later but not initial interactions in a 
repeated game. 
 The fifth question examined in the present research was whether there would be sex 
differences in lying behaviour between those who were higher compared to those who were 
lower on psychopathic tendencies. Psychometrically speaking, males have consistently been 
found to be more Machiavellian (Christie & Geis, 1970; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002) and more 
psychopathic than females (Dollan & Völlm, 2009; Forth, Brown, Hart, & Hare, 1996) both in 
number and degree. Consequently, male participants have been the focus in the preponderance of 
Machiavellian and psychopathy research. Of the few existing studies in the psychopathy 
literature that have used non-zero-sum games, none have included female participants (Curry et 
al., 2011, Mokros et al., 2008, Rilling et al., 2006). Interestingly, sex differences in lying 
behaviour within the context of non-zero-sum games have been examined somewhat outside of 
the psychological literature, specifically within the field of economics, though results have been 
mixed. Specifically, Dreber and Johannesson (2008) found that males were significantly more 
likely than females to lie over competition for financial gain within anonymous interactions 
while Aoki, Akai, and Onoshiro (2010) did not. Thus, due to the lack of direct previous research 
from which to draw, it was difficult to hypothesize whether or not sex differences would emerge 
within the modified $10 Trust Game employed in the present study, though it was hypothesized, 
based on findings from previous research, that males would score higher on Machiavellianism 
and psychopathy than females. As well, it was difficult to hypothesize whether or not males who 
were higher on psychopathic tendencies would differ from females who were higher on 
psychopathic tendencies with respect to lying frequency overall and in the context of different 
types of interactions (i.e., having met compared to not having met their opponent). 
 Lastly, the present research examined whether certain characteristics of self-reported 
lying behaviour were related to behaviour within the modified $10 Trust Game, and to 
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psychopathy/Machiavellianism. Specifically, the relationships amongst self-perceived lying 
ability, lying frequency, affective responses after successful deception and lying in the game, as 
well as scores in psychopathy/Machiavellianism were examined. Given that grandiosity is 
described as a characteristic feature of psychopathy (Hare, 1996), it was hypothesized that 
individuals who were higher on psychopathic tendencies would be more likely to report higher 
levels of lying ability than those who were lower on psychopathic tendencies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Introductory Psychology participant pool at the 
University of Saskatchewan (U of S). All participants received credit towards their final course 
grade, as well as the opportunity to enter into a draw for an 8GB iPod music player. 
Apparatus and Design 
Two computer applications were created through a PHP (Hypertext Preprocessor) script 
to run a modified version of the $10 Trust Game on a laptop computer, one for the Player 1(P1) 
side of the game and the other for the Player 2 (P2) side. Each participant played 10 trials of the 
game first as P1 followed by another 10 trials as P2. This sequence was later repeated (i.e., they 
played the game again as P1 for 10 trials and as P2 for another 10 trials). Thus, they played 20 
trials in total as P1 and 20 trials in total as P2. Participants used the computer keyboard and 
mouse to enter and record their decisions.  
The $10 Trust Game used in the present study, which will hereafter be referred to as the 
Lying Game, was modeled on the game devised by Berg et al. (1995) with several modifications 
(see Figure 2.1). First, as mentioned, participants played the game over repeated trials with each 
opponent. This differed from Berg et al. (1995), in which the game was played over only one 
trial with each opponent. This change provided participants with ample opportunity to lie, 
thereby allowing for the observation of lying frequency and severity over time. 
Second, the game was modified to provide P1s with the opportunity to report honestly or 
dishonestly about the amount of money that they were giving to P2s, thus providing them with 
an opportunity to lie or tell the truth about the amount of money given. Participants were 
provided with $10 in virtual money at the start of each trial, which was displayed in the top 
portion of the computer screen. Participants were informed that each dollar accumulated by the 
end of the experiment would be equivalent to one entry into the draw for the iPod music player. 
Therefore, making more money in the game resulted in more entries, thereby increasing an 
individual’s chances of winning the draw. 
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The computer screen displays for P1s and P2s differed as these roles involved making 
different types of decisions. When participants assumed the role of P1, the initial screen display 
included two fields, one labeled “disclosed amount” and the other labeled “actual amount.” 
Participants could enter any dollar amount between $0 and $10 in each of these fields. They were 
instructed to enter the amount that they wished to tell P2s that they were giving to them in the 
“disclosed amount” and to enter the amount that they actually wished to give to P2s in the 
“actual amount.” Thus, these amounts could match, which meant that the participant was telling 
the truth or they could differ, which meant that the participant was lying. The difference between 
these two amounts represented the magnitude of lying severity (i.e., the greater the difference the 
greater the degree of lying). Any amount between $1 and $10 that was entered in the “disclosed 
amount” field would propel the game forward (i.e., moving down on the decision tree for P1 in 
Figure 2.1) while entering $0 in this field would end the trial resulting in both players retaining 
their original $10 (i.e., moving to the right on the decision tree for P1 in Figure 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A modified version of the $10 Trust Game (i.e., The Lying Game) designed for use in 
the present study. Figure adapted from Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002). 
 
P1 
$10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
Cooperate = Split 
P2 
Not Cooperate = 
“Disclosed Amount” is $0 
Can lie or tell truth about 
amount of $ given 
Decides to split tripled 
amount with P1 or not 
3($X) 
$10-X (P1) 
3($X) +10 (P2) 
3X/2 + (10-X) (P1) 
3X/2 + 10 (P2) 
Cooperate = 
“Disclosed Amount” is 
between $1 and $10 
Not Cooperate = Don’t Split 
*Note: X = The “Actual Amount” 
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When participants assumed the role of P2, the initial screen display included only P1s’ 
(i.e., the computer’s) “disclosed amount,” which was a randomly selected number between $1 
and $10. Participants were aware that P1s could lie or tell the truth about the offer made in the 
“disclosed amount” and that the “actual amount” would be revealed to them only after they had 
finalized their decision either to split evenly (i.e., cooperate; moving to the right on the decision 
tree for P2 in Figure 2.1) or keep (i.e., not cooperate or defect; moving down on the decision tree 
for P2 in Figure 2.1) the entire offered amount by P1. Participants were also aware that final 
calculations for each trial would be based on what had been entered by P1 in the “actual amount” 
multiplied by a factor of 3 (i.e., tripled) and not the “disclosed amount.”  
The third difference between the design of the present game and that of Berg et al. (1995) 
was that participants always played against a computer, although they were informed that each 
new opponent was another undergraduate Introductory Psychology student. The computer was 
programmed to use a dummy strategy (i.e., a pre-programmed strategy). Thus, when participants 
assumed the P1 role, P2 (i.e., the computer) responded in a standardized manner in accordance 
with P1’s actions (i.e., lie or tell the truth). Similarly, when participants assumed the P2 role, P1 
(i.e., the computer) responded in a standardized manner in accordance with P2’s actions (i.e., 
split or keep the money). This modification allowed for increased experimental control. 
Specifically, the computer employed a tit-for-two-tats strategy, as was the case in Mokros 
et al. (2008), described earlier, who used the same strategy in a computerized version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. That is, initially, the computer as P2 would cooperate (i.e., split the 
tripled amount) with participants in the P1 role, and would continue in this manner unless the 
participant lied (i.e., “disclosed” and “actual” amounts contained different values) twice in a row. 
If this occurred, the computer would defect (i.e., keep all of the tripled amount) on the next trial 
and on all subsequent trials until the participant told the truth (i.e., both “disclosed” and “actual” 
amounts contained the same values), at which point the computer would return to cooperating on 
the next trial until the participant again lied twice in a row. Similarly, when roles were reversed, 
the computer as P1 would initially tell the truth to participants in their role as P2 and would 
continue in this manner unless the participant defected (i.e., did not split the money) twice in a 
row. If this occurred, the computer would begin to lie (in which case, the “disclosed amount” 
would always be greater than the “actual amount”) on the next trial and on all subsequent trials 
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until the participant cooperated (i.e., split the money), at which point the computer would return 
to telling the truth until the participant again defected twice in a row. 
Tit-for-two-tats is a more liberal strategy (i.e., encourages more cooperation) than is tit-
for-tat, where the computer cooperates on the first trial and subsequently matches the previous 
move of the participant, because it does not immediately punish defection, thereby evading 
provocation of the participant. In this way, tit-for-two-tats discourages participants from entering 
into an endless succession of retributions or “an eye for an eye”-type play sequences, as is 
common in tit-for-tat (Kollock, 1993).  
Measures 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP). The LSRP (Levenson, Kiehl, & 
Fitzpatrick, 1995; see Appendix A) is a valid and reliable measure (Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith, & 
Newman, 2001; McHoskey et al., 1998) of psychopathic tendencies in nonforensic populations. 
It is a 26-item self-report measure to which individuals respond on a 4-point Likert scale, where 
1 = Disagree Strongly and 4 = Agree Strongly. It consists of two subscales, the primary 
psychopathy scale and the secondary psychopathy scale. The first scale was designed to assess 
the interpersonal aspects of psychopathy (e.g., selfishness, manipulativeness, etc.) and the second 
was designed to assess the behavioural aspects of psychopathy (e.g., impulsivity, irresponsibility, 
etc.). The LSRP has been found to correlate significantly with the PCL-R (r = .35; Brinkley et al. 
2001). 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R). The PPI-R (Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005) is a 154-item self-report measure designed to assess psychopathic tendencies in 
nonforensic populations. Participants respond by selecting the degree to which each statement 
applies to them (i.e., 1 = False; 2 = Mostly False; 3 = Mostly True; 4 = True). The measure 
consists of eight subscales (i.e., Machiavellian Egocentricity; Rebellious Nonconformity; Blame 
Externalization; Carefree Nonplanfulness; Social Influence; Fearlessness; Stress Immunity; and 
Coldheartedness). Poythress, Edens, and Lilienfeld (1998) found the original PPI, which 
consisted of 187 items, of which many are nearly identical to those of the PPI-R, to be 
significantly correlated with the PCL-R (r = .54). More recently, the PPI-R has been found to 
correlate significantly with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (2nd Edition; Hare, 1991b, as cited 
in Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) at r = .82 and r = .70 in college and offender samples, 
respectively. 
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 Mach-IV Scale. The Mach-IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) is the most widely used 
measure of Machiavellianism. It consists of 20 items to which individuals respond on a 5-point 
Likert scale, where 1 = Strongly Agree and 5 = Strongly Disagree (McHoskey et al., 1998; see 
Appendix B). The items were designed to measure a respondent’s tendency toward behaviours 
typically associated with Machiavellianism, such as, a propensity toward manipulative behaviour 
and cynicism. 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 1. The first part of this questionnaire was 
developed to serve as a manipulation check and to collect demographic information about 
participants to inform data analyses. Open-ended questions were posed to ascertain whether 
participants were aware of the true purpose of the study, that they had been playing against a 
computer program rather than another individual, and whether they had previously met any of 
the other participants (i.e., confederates) in the study (see Appendix C for the Pilot Testing 
version of the questionnaire).  
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 2. The second part of this questionnaire 
consisted mostly of questions directly drawn from Klaver et al. (2007). The questions were 
generally close-ended in nature and solicited participants’ self-perceived lying frequency and 
ability (see Appendix D for the Pilot Testing version of the questionnaire).  
Pilot Testing 
Pilot testing was initiated prior to conducting the main study in order to assess the 
feasibility of the study design and procedures, and whether further refinement of these aspects 
were necessary. Only female participants were recruited for the pilot testing (the reason for this 
is described in greater detail in the Procedure section below). 
Procedure 
Prior to data collection, ethical approval for the project was obtained from the University 
of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board. After this, a recruitment announcement 
was placed on the Introductory Psychology participant pool website via the Department of 
Psychology at the U of S. The announcement included information about the purpose of the 
study (i.e., that the study investigated the effects of gender and personality on decision-making; 
the actual purpose of the study was concealed until debriefing), what participation involved (i.e., 
about one hour of participation time, during which one would complete a computer task and 
several personality questionnaires) and how participants would be compensated for their time 
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(i.e., two research credits, equivalent to 2% of their final psychology course grade, and the 
opportunity to enter into a draw for an 8GB iPod music player). After reading the description, 
any interested individuals were instructed to contact the researcher by email to schedule a 
participation time. 
Given that sex differences in lying behaviour was being investigated in the present 
research, the sex of all confederates in the waiting room was kept consistent with that of the 
participants’ to circumvent the possible confounding effects of mixed-gender dynamics. Due to 
difficulties in enlisting male confederates, only female participants were recruited for the pilot 
testing. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants reviewed the consent form (see Appendix E) 
and were provided with the opportunity to ask questions. Following consent procedures, 
participants were presented with the instructions to the Lying Game (i.e., a modified version of 
the $10 Trust Game), described above. The researcher reviewed the instructions with the 
participant and clarified any uncertainties. As an incentive to completing the task, participants 
were also informed that each dollar they earned in the game by the end of the experiment would 
correspond to one entry into the draw for the iPod music player. 
The study consisted of two conditions. All participants were tested individually and 
partook in both conditions. Condition 1 will hereafter also be referred to as the Non-Exposure 
Condition while Condition 2 will hereafter also be referred to as the Exposure Condition. The 
order of the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions were counterbalanced across participants. 
Condition 1 – The Non-Exposure Condition. Once it was clear that participants 
understood the instructions of the game, the researcher exited the testing room and participants 
played the game over 10 trials as P1 (see Appendix F for instructions). They were informed that 
P2 was another undergraduate Introductory Psychology student playing the game in another 
room in the building. As aforementioned, P2 was, in reality, a computer employing a tit-for-two-
tats strategy. 
After the 10 trials were completed, participants were presented with a prompt on the 
computer screen instructing them to inform the researcher that they had completed the trials by 
opening the lab door and leaving it slightly ajar. Upon seeing this indication, the researcher 
entered the testing room and provided participants with the instructions to the game as P2 (see 
Appendix G). At that time, participants were informed that they would face a new opponent, a 
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different undergraduate Introductory Psychology student, who was again, in fact, a computer 
with pre-programmed responses. This information (i.e., that participants would play a new 
opponent) was intended to decrease participants’ inclination, if any, toward retribution against as 
well as any possible ingratiating behaviour (i.e., for offending) toward the same opponent.  
Once participants were clear on their role as P2, the researcher set up the P2 game 
application. Participants were instructed to notify their new opponent when they were ready to 
begin the game by clicking “OK” on the pop-up menu displayed on the screen. The researcher 
would then leave the room and participants played the game over 10 trials as P2. Again, 
participants were prompted to inform the researcher when they had completed the 10 trials by 
opening and leaving the lab door slightly ajar. When the researcher received this indication and 
returned to the room, participants were informed that they would be taken to a waiting room with 
other participants while the researcher set up the computer applications for the second part of the 
computer task (i.e., Condition 2 – the Exposure Condition; see Appendix H for researcher’s 
script). 
Condition 2 – The Exposure Condition. For participants starting with the Exposure 
Condition, once it was clear that they understood the game instructions for P1 (see Appendix I), 
they were informed that they would be taken to a room to wait with other participants while the 
researcher set up the computer applications for all of the participants in the study.  
In the waiting room, participants were introduced to three other participants (actually 
confederates; see Appendix J for researcher’s script) and informed which out of the three would 
be their opponent (i.e., P2) for the first game and which out of the remaining two would be their 
opponent (i.e., P1) for the second game. The third confederate was placed in the room to help 
convince participants that several games were being played simultaneously. Participants were 
provided with the opportunity to interact with their opponents for a period of five minutes. At the 
end of the five-minute period, the researcher returned to the waiting room to collect the 
participant and the participant’s first “opponent.” The researcher informed them that the 
computers were set up for the game and that the “opponent” should proceed to an upstairs testing 
room while the researcher continued to a different testing room with the participant. After 
waiting a couple of minutes with the participant to allow their “opponent” to get to the testing 
room and settle in, the researcher exited the room to allow the participant to play 10 trials of the 
game as P1. Upon completion, the researcher reviewed the P2 game instructions (see Appendix 
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K) with participants and set up the game. Participants were again informed that they would play 
10 trials of the game with one of the other “participants” that they had met in the waiting room.  
Once all computer trials were completed, participants filled out the LSRP, PPI, and 
Mach-IV scale. The order of these measures was randomized to offset any order effects. After 
this, participants completed the Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 1 followed by the Post-
Experiment Questionnaire – Part 2. After all measures were completed, participants were 
debriefed on the purpose of the study (see Appendix L for Debriefing Form) and provided with 
the opportunity to ask questions.  
Main Study 
 To resolve issues that arose during the pilot testing, several changes to the methodology 
were implemented in the main study. These changes are reported below.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Introductory Psychology participant pool at the U of 
S. All participants received credit towards their final course grade, as well as the opportunity to 
enter into a draw for an 8GB iPod music player.  
As a result of the disproportionate number of female compared to male students enrolled 
in Introductory Psychology courses, male students at the U of S outside of the Introductory 
Psychology participant pool were also recruited for the present study. All participants received 
the opportunity to enter into a draw for an 8GB iPod music player or two football tickets to 
watch a game involving the Canadian Football League team based in the province, which was 
approximately of equivalent value to the iPod. 
Apparatus and Design 
 All aspects of the apparatus and design described above remained unchanged in the main 
study. However, due to the aforementioned difficulty in securing the assistance of male 
confederates, as well as problems in coordinating the schedules of female confederates, the 
waiting room scenario was replaced with pre-recorded video greetings of confederates. 
 Two male and two female confederates each recorded short personal greetings on a 
webcam. The structure of the greeting included the individual’s first name, city of origin (i.e., 
Saskatoon), year and program of study (i.e., first year of Arts and Science), and a favourite past 
time (e.g. playing the violin, running, etc.). The two male confederate video greetings were 
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employed and presented in the same order for all male participants and the two female 
confederate video greetings were employed and presented in the same order for all female 
participants. 
Measures 
 The measures employed in the main study were identical to that of the pilot testing, 
although a couple of questions in the Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 1 (see Appendix M) 
were slightly revised to accommodate the change in design. As well, several questions were 
added to collect additional information about participant demographics. 
Procedure 
Due to the modifications in the study design and procedures, ethical approval for the 
revised protocol was obtained from the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics 
Board prior to data collection. After this, a recruitment announcement containing a description of 
the study was placed on the Introductory Psychology participant pool website via the Department 
of Psychology at the U of S. After reading the description, any interested individuals were able to 
sign-up for available study timeslots directly on the website. In addition to recruitment from the 
participant pool, male students were also recruited from various academic departments on 
campus. Specifically, recruitment flyers containing similar information as on the website were 
placed in visible locations in the Arts, Business, Kinesiology, Computer Science, and Computer 
Engineering departments, as well as other high-trafficked areas across the university.  
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants reviewed the (slightly revised) consent form 
(see Appendices N and O) and were provided with the opportunity to ask questions. Following 
consent procedures, the researcher reviewed the instructions to the modified $10 Trust Game 
with participant and clarified any uncertainties. As an incentive to completing the task, 
participants were also informed that each dollar they earned in the game by the end of the 
experiment would correspond to one entry into the draw. 
The study consisted of two conditions, Non-Exposure and Exposure, which were 
introduced earlier. All participants were tested individually and partook in both conditions, the 
order of which was counterbalanced across participants. 
Condition 1 – The Non-Exposure Condition. The procedure in this condition remained 
primarily the same from the above. One exception was that while explaining the game to 
participants, the researcher emphasized that they would be playing individuals from different 
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participant pools (i.e., not from the Introductory Psychology participant pool). This change was 
made due to one participant expressing suspicion that there was only one available time slot 
available per hour for sign-up on the participant pool website when participants were supposedly 
playing a number of different opponents in the study. The other change in the procedure from the 
pilot testing was that after participants had completed the 20 trials of the game (i.e., as P1 and as 
P2), the researcher delivered a slightly modified introduction to the next part of the study due to 
the procedure changes in the Exposure Condition (i.e., Condition 2; see Appendix P for 
researcher’s script) 
Condition 2 – The Exposure Condition. As in the Non-Exposure Condition, during the 
course of reviewing the game instructions in the Exposure Condition, the researcher emphasized 
that participants would be playing individuals from different participants pools (i.e., not from the 
Introductory Psychology participant pool). Once it was clear that participants understood the 
game instructions, they were presented (see Appendix Q for researcher’s script) with a personal 
video greeting from their opponent (i.e., a same-sex confederate). Participants were then 
instructed to record their own personal greeting on a webcam to share with their opponent. They 
were advised to disclose whatever and however much information they were comfortable with 
their opponent knowing about them. After this, the researcher left the room while participants 
recorded their greetings. After the video was recorded and reviewed together by the participant 
and researcher, the participant was instructed to wait several minutes before clicking “Ok” to 
start the game, as this would provide the researcher with sufficient time to reach the other 
individual (i.e., confederate) and show them the participant’s video greeting. This ruse was 
intended to add credibility to the account that participants were playing other individuals and not 
a computer program. After several minutes, the researcher returned to ensure that participants 
had started the game before leaving them to finish the 10 trials as P1. Once participants had 
completed the trials, they were prompted via a computer message to notify the researcher, again 
by opening and leaving the lab door slightly ajar. When the researcher returned, participants 
were presented with another personal video greeting from a different opponent (also a same-sex 
confederate) and told that this opponent had already viewed their previously recorded greeting. 
After this, participants played the game again, this time as P2.   
Upon completing both conditions, participants filled out the three personality measures, 
the order of which were randomized across participants. This was followed by completion of the 
 33 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 1 and the Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 2. As an 
additional manipulation check, participants were briefly interviewed after the paper-and-pencil 
measures. They were asked 1) how they had found the study generally, 2) whether they believed 
that they had received all of the information at the start of the study, 3) whether they had found 
the other participants (i.e., their “opponents”) to be honest, and 4) whether they had found the 
researcher to be honest. These questions were intended primarily to verify that participants had 
not realized that they had been playing a computer program. After this, participants were 
debriefed on the true purpose of the investigation, informed about the use of deception in the 
study, the rationale for its use (see Appendix L for Debriefing Form, which was the same one as 
in the pilot testing), and provided with the opportunity to ask questions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Pilot Testing 
Descriptive Analyses 
Participants. Due to difficulties in recruiting male confederates for the waiting room 
scenario and the need to maintain gender congruence between participants and confederates, 
only females were included in the pilot study. In total, 14 female participants were recruited via 
the University of Saskatchewan (U of S) Introductory Psychology participant pool website. 
Participants ranged in age from 17 to 45 years old, with a mean age of 22.71 years (SD = 7.07). 
Other demographic information was not collected in this sample. 
Psychopathy and Machiavellianism Measures. In terms of the means for the PPI-R, 
LSRP, and Mach-IV Totals, these were 318.36 (SD = 35.98), 45.71 (SD = 8.774), and 52.21 (SD 
= 8.182), respectively. These data were added to the questionnaire data from the main study and 
the combined data were compared to existing norms, which are reported in the section below.  
The Lying Game. As a result of computer error, data from the game were lost and thus 
could not be reported. 
Main Study 
Prior to statistical analyses, data were cleaned and checked in accordance with 
procedures outlined in Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). Z-scores for skewness and kurtosis were 
calculated to assess normality for all analyses and these values were determined to be within 
acceptable limits. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. As well, Cohen’s (1988) 
general guidelines were used for the reporting of small (d = 0.20), medium (d = 0.50), and large 
effect sizes (d = 0.80). 
Descriptive Analyses 
Participants. 150 undergraduate students from the U of S, 87 females and 63 males, 
participated in the main study. The majority of participants were in their first year of university 
studies (70,7%; second year = 11.3%; third year = 9.3%; fourth year = 4.7%; fifth year or higher 
= 4.7%) in the Arts and Science program (70.7%; Business = 9.3%; Other = 20%), and 
Caucasian (71.3%; Asian = 22.7%; Other = 6%).  
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Psychopathy and Machiavellianism Measures. A series of independent-samples t-test 
comparisons were computed to determine whether any differences existed on the self-report 
psychopathy and Machiavellianism measures between female participants in the pilot testing and 
those in the main study. After controlling for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni 
correction (! = 0.0125), no significant differences were found between the two samples on 
Mach-IV and LSRP total scores, t(96) = - .389, p = .70 and t(96) = - 1.18, p = .24, respectively. 
However, independent-samples t-test analyses were also computed for the PPI-R total scores 
based on age and one significant difference was found between the two groups of participants 
falling within the 25 - 29 age range, t(4) = -.786, p = .001. As such, the two female participants 
in the pilot testing falling within this age range were excluded from further analyses. 
Additionally, one participant falling within the 40 - 49 age range from the pilot testing was also 
removed from further analyses due to a lack of an age-matched counterpart for comparison in the 
main study. The rest of the self-report data from the pilot testing were combined with those from 
the main study.  
Once the questionnaire data were combined, further analyses led to the exclusion of data 
from another 10 participants, five for high scores on the Inconsistent Responding subscale of the 
PPI-R (i.e., three males and two females) and another five for disclosing their suspicion that they 
were playing a computer program rather than other undergraduate students during the computer 
task (i.e., four males and one female). Thus, a total of 151 participants, 95 females and 56 males, 
were included in the analyses of the PPI-R data. The total number of female participants included 
in the analyses of the Mach-IV and LSRP data was the same. However, the total number of male 
participants on these two measures decreased by one due to an administration error (i.e., 150 in 
total, 95 females and 55 males). Further, the amount of missing data for each participant was 
calculated and determined to be within acceptable limits (i.e., less than 5%). Participants with 
missing data were excluded from analyses on a pairwise (i.e. analysis-by-analysis) basis. 
In order to assess the psychometric properties of the measures, correlations between the 
psychopathy and Machiavellianism measures, as well as the intercorrelations between subscales 
on the LSRP and PPI-R were conducted prior to the main analyses and are displayed in Table 
3.1. As can be seen, the three measures were all significantly and positively correlated between  
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Table 3.1. Correlations Between All Measures and Intercorrelations Between Subscales 
Measure/ 
Scale 
Mach-IV 
Totala 
LSRP 
Totala PP SP 
PPI-R 
Total ME RN BE CN SOI F STI 
LSRP Total .645** -           
PP .650** .898** -          
SP .347** .713** .332** -         
PPI-R Total .391** .523** .473** .368** -        
ME .549** .749** .784** .357** .507** -       
RN .224** .338** .201* .404** .697** .220** -      
BE .357** .445** .266** .530** .420** .316** .295** -     
CN .291** .512** .254** .692** .551** .294** .553** .351** -    
SOI -.036 -.043 .068 -.200* .498** .143 .219** -.010 -.070 -   
F .072 .098 .107 .038 .643** .114 .490** .102 .130 .416** -  
STI -.022 -.107 -.023 -.191* .404** -.057 .104 -.280** .021 .233** .301** - 
C .408** .442** .504** .145 .429** .407** .078 .052 .304** -.059 .056 .243** 
Note. PP = Primary Psychopathy; SP = Secondary Psychopathy; ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; 
BE = Blame Externalization; CN = Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = 
Coldheartedness. 
n = 151 except for an = 150. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 level. 
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the LSRP and Mach-IV r = .645; between the PPI-R and Mach-IV r = .391; and between the 
PPI-R and LSRP r = .523 (all ps < .01). The two subscales on the LSRP were also significantly 
correlated with r = .332, p < .01. The intercorrelations between the eight PPI-R subscales ranged 
from -.059 to .553. While a few were negatively correlated, the large majority of the 
intercorrelations between PPI-R subscales were significant and positive, and fell within the small 
to moderate range. 
The internal consistencies (Cronbach’s Alpha) of all measures and subscales are 
displayed in Table 3.2. Cronbach’s alphas for the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Total scores 
ranged from .76 to .90. The two subscales, Primary Psychopathy and Secondary Psychopathy, of 
the LSRP had coefficient alpha estimates of .83 and .70, respectively, while the eight subscales 
on the PPI-R were also all internally consistent, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .80 to .90. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Internal Consistencies of All Measures and Subscales 
 
Measure No. of Items Cronbach’s ! 
Mach-IV Total 20 .76 
LSRP Total 26 .82 
LSRP Primary Psychopathy 16 .83 
LSRP Secondary Psychopathy 10 .70 
PPI-R Total 154 .90 
Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) 20 .82 
Rebellious Nonconformity (RN) 16 .84 
Blame Externalization (BE) 15 .85 
Carefree Nonplanfulness (CN) 19 .84 
Social Influence (SOI) 18 .90 
Fearlessness (F) 14 .85 
Stress Immunity (STI) 13 .87 
Coldheartedness (C) 16 .80 
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Table 3.3 displays the mean total scores overall, as well as for males and females 
separately, on the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R. The maximum possible scores on the Mach-IV, 
LSRP, and PPI-R were 100, 78, and 616, respectively. Consistent with expectations, males 
scored higher than females on the Mach-IV, t(92) = - 3.89, p < .001, d = .680; LSRP, t(86) = -
2.11, p = .019, d = .374; and PPI-R, t(149) = -5.05, p < .001, d =  .851 (all p values one- tailed), 
thus indicating higher levels of Machiavellianism and psychopathic tendencies in males than in 
females.  
To place these results into context, they were compared to results from previous studies. 
Specifically, McHoskey et al. (1998) used the Mach-IV and found overall mean Mach-IV Total 
scores ranging from 54.7 to 55.7 across three separate university samples consisting of both male 
and female participants while Billings (2004) found an overall mean of 51.68 (SD = 8.51) also 
using a mixed male and female university sample; these means are comparable to the overall 
mean of 52.67 (10.09) that was found in the present study. For the LSRP, Poythress et al. (2010) 
used the measure with an offender sample (80% male and 20% female) and found a mean of 
55.84 (SD = 11.69), which, as would be expected, is somewhat higher than the overall mean of 
47.35 (SD = 9.32) that was found in the present sample of university students. 
 
Table 3.3. Mean Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Totals 
 
Measure Females (SD) (n = 95) 
Males (SD) 
(n = 55) 
Overall (SD) 
(n = 150) 
Mach-IV Total 50.20a**    (8.64) 56.93b**  (11.03) 52.67 (10.09) 
LSRP Total 46.03a
*      (7.88) 49.62b*    (11.11) 47.35   (9.32) 
PPI-R Total 305.52a
** (31.43) 332.16b** (31.21) 315.40 (33.81) 
Note. Means in the same row with different subscripts differ significantly at *p < .05 or **p < 
.001 (one-tailed). 
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Table 3.4 further summarizes mean total scores for males and females on the PPI-R by 
age group4. Consistent with the above PPI-R Total result, males in the 18 - 24 age range scored 
significantly higher on the PPI-R overall than their female counterparts, t(134) = -4.75, p < .001 
(one-tailed), d = .851. While males in the 25 – 29 age range also scored higher on the PPI-R 
overall compared to age-matched females, this difference was not statistically significant, which 
may be due in part to the small group sizes within this age range, t(9) = -.79, p = .226 (one-
tailed), d = .559. 
 
Table 3.4. Mean PPI-R Totals by Age Group 
 
Age Group 
Females (SD) 
(Present Study) 
Males (SD) 
(Present Study) 
Females (SD) 
(Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005) 
Males (SD) 
(Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005) 
18 – 24 305.07a
*  (31.85) 
(n = 87) 
331.88b* (31.18) 
(n = 49) 
276.75 (31.14) 
(n = 394) 
301.06 (31.26) 
(n = 235) 
25 - 29 320.25     (9.36) (n = 4) 
334.14   (33.84) 
(n = 7) 
271.52 (32.22) 
(n = 33) 
300.65 (32.83) 
(n = 34) 
30-39 300.50   (38.21) (n = 4) --- 
261.94 (31.91) 
(n = 62) 
289.66 (34.23) 
(n = 56) 
Note. Means in the same row with different subscripts differ significantly at *p < .001 (one-
tailed). 
 
As indicated by the moderate intercorrelations between subscales on the PPI-R and on the 
LSRP in Table. 3.1, psychopathy is a heterogeneous construct. As such, further analyses were 
performed on the PPI-R and LSRP subscales to further examine possible differential associations 
between males and females on the different features of psychopathy. Means on the two LSRP 
subscales for the total sample as well as for males and females individually are displayed in 
Table 3.5. The first subscale, Primary Psychopathy, is comprised of 16 items with a maximum 
possible score of 48. Consistent with the LSRP Total score, males, on average, scored 
significantly higher than females on this subscale (M = 29.95, SD = 8.29 and M = 26.69, SD = 
5.71, respectively), t(84) = -2.58, p = .012, d = .458. The overall mean on this subscale was 
                                                
4 For the purpose of comparison, results for all 17-year-old participants were combined with those of participants 
falling within the 18 - 24 age group, as the majority of these individuals were turning 18 within a month of 
participating in the study. 
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27.89 (SD = 6.92). The other subscale, Secondary Psychopathy, is comprised of 10 statements 
with a maximum possible score of 30. While males, on average, scored slightly higher than 
females on the subscale (M = 19.67, SD = 5.20 and M = 19.34, SD = 3.81), this difference was 
not significant, t(88) = -.419, p = .676, d = .072. The overall mean on this subscale was 19.46 
(SD = 4.35). 
 
Table 3.5. Mean LSRP Subscale Totals 
 
LSRP Subscale 
Females (SD) 
(n = 95) 
Males (SD) 
(n = 55) 
Overall (SD) 
(n = 150) 
Primary 
Psychopathy 26.69a (5.71) 29.95b (8.29) 27.89 (6.92) 
Secondary 
Psychopathy 19.34    (3.81) 19.67  (5.20) 19.46 (4.35) 
Note. Means in the same row with different subscripts differ significantly at p < .05. 
 Table 3.6 displays the means of each of the eight PPI-R subscales by age group. In the 18 
- 24 age group, males, on average, scored higher than females on seven of the subscales. Of these 
differences, the following five were statistically significant: Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME), 
t(78) = -3.07, p = .003, d = .578; Carefree Nonplanfulness (CN), t(140) = -2.09, p = .039, d = 
.337; Fearlessness (F), t(140) = -2.63, p = .010, d = .491; Stress Immunity (STI), t(140) = -5.26, 
p < .001, d = .900; and Coldheartedness (C), t(80) = -3.66, p < .001, d = .605 while the 
remaining two were not: Rebellious Nonconformity (RN), t(85) = -1.58, p = .118, d = .333 and 
Social Influence (SOI), t(140) = -.748, p = .255, d = .162. On the other hand, females, on 
average, scored slightly higher than males on the Blame Externalization (BE) subscale but this 
difference was not significant, t(140) = .294, p = .769, d = -.059.  
In the 25 - 29 age group, males, on average, scored higher than females on five of the 
eight subscales. Of these differences, only one was statistically significant: Coldheartedness (C), 
t(9) = -2.31, p = .047, d = 1.541 while the rest were not: Rebellious Nonconformity (RN), t(9) = -
.273, p = .791, d = .191; Carefree Nonplanfulness (CN), t(9) = -1.12, p = .292, d = .792; Social 
Influence (SOI), t(9) = -.593, p = .567, d = .355; and Stress Immunity (STI), t(9) = -.301, p = 
.771, d = .205. While females, on average, scored higher than males on the remaining three 
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Table 3.6. Mean PPI-R Subscale Totals by Age Group 
 
Age Group 
 18 – 24 years 25 – 29 years 30-39 years 
Subscale 
Females (SD) 
(n = 87) 
Males (SD) 
(n = 49) 
Females (SD) 
(n = 4) 
Males (SD) 
(n = 7) 
Females (SD) 
(n = 4) 
Males (SD) 
(n = 0) 
ME 38.97a**  (6.74) 43.92b** (10.06) 41.50  (7.14) 40.43   (7.02) 41.50  (6.66) - 
RN 31.74      (7.30) 34.57       (9.54) 33.75  (4.65) 35.43 (11.57) 28.00  (3.56) - 
BE 29.31      (7.93) 28.86      (7.41) 33.25  (4.99) 32.57 (10.25) 31.00  (4.24) - 
CN 32.51a*   (6.88) 34.96b*   (7.63) 30.75  (4.79) 39.57 (15.01) 29.50  (6.81) - 
SOI 45.16    (10.12) 46.84    (10.56) 39.00 (11.75) 42.71   (8.98) 47.00  (2.58) - 
F 32.83a**  (9.08) 37.08b**  (8.22) 37.00   (2.45) 36.14   (9.75) 26.25  (7.54) - 
STI 28.39a*** (6.68) 34.84b*** (7.62) 33.00  (4.69) 34.43   (8.68) 32.75 (11.59) - 
C 26.99a*** (5.58) 31.14b*** (7.94) 26.25a* (3.78) 33.86b* (5.87) 28.50  (5.72) - 
Note. ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; BE = Blame Externalization; CN = Carefree 
Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = Coldheartedness. 
Means within the same row and age group with different subscripts differ significantly at *p < .05, **p < .01 or ***p < .001.
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subscales, these differences were not significant: Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME), t(9) = .242, 
p = .814, d = -.151; Blame Externalization (BE), t(7) = .122, p = .905, d = -.084; and 
Fearlessness (F), t(9) = .169, p = .869, d = -.121. 
The Lying Game. In addition to the lost computer data from the pilot testing, computer 
data from the first 14 participants run in the main study were similarly lost due to the same 
computer error. Thus, a total of 127 participants (78 females and 49 males) were included in the 
analyses of the game data.  
Mean lying frequencies and lying severities are displayed in Table 3.7. These values 
represent the average values of lying frequency and severity across 10 trials. Thus, the possible 
range of values for lying frequency were 0 (i.e., never lied on a trial) to 10 (i.e., lied on all trials) 
and the possible range of values for lying severity (i.e., the difference between the actual and 
disclosed amounts) were 0 (i.e., no difference between actual and disclosed amounts on all trials) 
to 100 (i.e., a difference of $10, which is the maximum per trial, between actual and disclosed 
amounts on all trials). As can be seen in the table, on average, females lied slightly more than 
males in both the Exposure and Non-Exposure Conditions. However, these differences were not 
significant, t(116 ) = .08, p = .94, d = -.067 and t(116 ) = 1.37, p = .18, d = -.220, respectively. 
With respect to lying severity, males, on average, lied to a greater degree than females in both 
the Exposure and Non-Exposure Conditions, though these differences were also not significant, 
t(116) = -1.14 , p = .26, d = .176 and t(116) = -.39, p = .70, d = .109, respectively. 
 
Table 3.7. Mean Lying Frequencies and Severities 
 
 
Females (SD) 
(n = 78) 
Males (SD) 
(n = 49) 
Overall (SD) 
(n = 127) 
Lying Frequency 
(Non-Exposure Condition) 3.97   (3.24) 3.27   (3.11) 3.70   (3.19) 
Lying Frequency 
(Exposure Condition) 3.69   (3.27) 3.47   (3.32) 3.61   (3.27) 
Lying Severity 
(Non-Exposure Condition) 14.87 (14.38) 16.57 (16.79) 15.53 (15.32) 
Lying Severity 
(Exposure Condition) 14.58 (14.10) 17.31 (16.83) 15.63 (15.20) 
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Correlations 
Correlations between the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Total scores and the dependent 
measures are displayed in Table 3.8. Participant sex was dummy coded to examine sex 
differences (0 = female, 1 = male). As can be seen, there were significant positive correlations 
amongst the three measure totals (as previously reported) and amongst the dependent measures. 
Exposure Lying Frequency was positively and significantly related to the Mach-IV Total and the 
LSRP Total, r = .236, p = .008 and r = .249, p = .005, respectively. As well, Exposure Lying 
Severity was positively and significantly related to the Mach-IV Total and the LSRP Total, r = 
.266, p = .003 and r = .250, p = .005, respectively. As expected, Participant Sex was significantly 
and positively related to all three measures (i.e., males were more likely to score higher on the 
measures than females). However, Participant Sex was not significantly correlated with any of 
the dependent variables. Interestingly, Participant Age was negatively related to all of the 
dependent measures, the Mach-IV Total, and Participant Sex, and positively related to the LSRP 
and PPI-R Total scores, though none of these correlations reached significance. 
 Table 3.9 displays the correlations between the measure subscale totals and the 
dependent measures. Intercorrelations amongst subscales were previously reported in Table 3.1 
and thus will not be discussed further here. The majority of the correlations between subscale 
totals and the dependent variables were non-significant, of small magnitude, and in some cases, 
negative. Notably, the Primary Psychopathy (PP) subscale of the LSRP was significantly 
correlated with all four dependent variables (with Non-Exposure Lying Frequency, r = .180, p = 
.044; with Exposure Lying Frequency, r = .298, p = .001; with Non-Exposure Lying Severity, r 
= .192, p = .031; and with Exposure Lying Severity, r = .312, p = .000). Also, the Machiavellian 
Egocentricity (ME) subscale was significantly and positively correlated with Exposure Lying 
Frequency (r = .200, p = .024) and Exposure Lying Severity (r = .242, p = .006). As expected, 
Participant Sex was significantly and positively related to most of the subscale totals (males were 
more likely to score higher on the subscales than females). A mix of negative and positive 
correlations were found between Participant Age and the subscale totals, though the majority of 
these were of small magnitude and non-significant, with the exception of the relationship 
between Participant Age and the Stress Immunity subscale, which was significantly and 
positively related, r = .173, p = .033.
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Table 3.8. Correlations Between All Measure Totals and Dependent Variables 
 Mach-IV 
Total 
LSRP 
Total 
PPI-R 
Total 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Severity 
Exposure 
Lying Severity 
Participant 
Sex 
LSRP Totala .645**a -     
  
PPI-R Totala .391**a .523**a -    
  
Non-Exposure 
Lying Frequency .101
b .126b -.061 -   
  
Exposure 
Lying Frequency .236
**b .249**b .060 .566** -  
  
Non-Exposure 
Lying Severity .088
b .126b .007 .847** .523** - 
  
Exposure 
Lying Severity .266
**b .250**b .144 .461** .892** .467** - 
 
Participant Sex .323**a .186*a .382**c -.109 -.033 .054 .088 - 
Participant Age -.014a .016a .092c -.117 -.127 -.121 -.121 -.110 
n = 127 except for an = 150, bn = 126, cn = 151. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.9. Correlations Between All Subscale Totals and Dependent Variables 
Measure/Scale PP SP ME RN BE CN SOI F STI C 
SP .332**a -         
ME .784**a .357**a -        
RN .201*a .404**a .220** -       
BE .266**a .530**a .316** .295** -      
CN .254**a .692**a .294** .553** .351** -     
SOI .068a -.200*a .143 .219** -.010 -.070 -    
F .107a .038a .114 .490** .102 .130 .416** -   
STI -.023a -.191*a -.057 .104 -.280** .021 .233** .301** -  
C .504**a .145a .407** .078 .052 .304** -.059 .056 .243** - 
Participant Sex .227**a .037a .254** .177* -.014 .202* .064 .230** .377** .321** 
Participant Age -.050a .113a -.034 .134 .061 .115 -.012 -.025 .173* .067 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequencyb .180* -.019 .019 -.017 .059 -.046 -.079 -.142 -.157 .041 
Exposure Lying Frequencyb .298** .056 .200* .037 .147 .025 -.032 -.079 -.133 .100 
Non-Exposure Lying Severityb .192* -.040 .040 .026 -.034 .011 -.010 .120 -.019 .045 
Exposure Lying Severityb .312** .034 .242** .092 .132 .075 .002 -.021 -.066 .159 
Note. PP = Primary Psychopathy; SP = Secondary Psychopathy; ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; BE = Blame 
Externalization; CN = Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = Coldheartedness. 
n = 151 except for an = 150 and bn = 127. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Hierarchical Regressions 
An a priori power analysis was conducted using N = 104 + m, (where m represented the 
number of independent variables) and it was determined that a minimum sample size of 108 
would be required to detect a medium effect size (Green, 1991). 
Lying Frequency. One of the main hypotheses proposed in the present research was that 
participants who were higher on psychopathic tendencies would lie more frequently than those 
who were lower. Another proposed hypothesis was that participants who were higher on 
psychopathic tendencies would lie as frequently to opponents they had met relative to those they 
had not. Additionally, no initial hypotheses were made with respect to sex differences on lying 
frequency in the game. Accordingly, two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to 
determine whether the psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures and participant sex were related 
to lying frequency, one for each condition (i.e., Non-Exposure and Exposure). 
In the first regression, lying frequency from the Non-Exposure Condition was entered as 
the dependent variable, while gender was entered as a predictor variable in step 1. Due to the 
moderate correlations (i.e., below .70) found amongst the three measures (reported in Table 3.1.), 
it was expected that entering all three measure variables into the regression equation 
simultaneously would provide a better estimate of lying frequency than entering these variables 
separately (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus, the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Totals were 
entered as predictor variables in step 2. Lastly, the interactions: sex x Mach-IV, sex x LSRP, and 
sex x PPI-R were entered as predictor variables in step 3. As shown in Table 3.10, participant sex 
did not account for a significant proportion of the variance in lying frequency. The greatest 
change in R2 occurred in step 2 (i.e., R2change = .035), with participant sex and the totals from each 
of the three measures entered into the regression equation. However, this change was not 
significant, with the overall statistic for the model (step 2) being R2 (3, 121) = .045, p = .221. 
Thus, these variables were not found to be significant predictors of lying frequency in the Non-
Exposure Condition. 
In the second regression, lying frequency from the Exposure Condition was entered as the 
dependent variable, with the same predictors and order of entry as in the first regression. Results 
from this analysis are displayed in Table 3.11. As in the first regression, participant sex did not 
account for a significant proportion of the variance in lying frequency. The greatest change in R2 
occurred in step 2 (i.e., R2change = .090), with sex and Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R totals entered 
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into the equation. This time, however, the change was significant, with the overall statistic for 
the model (step 2) being R2 (3, 121) = .092, p = .009. Thus, the three measures in combination 
were found to be significant predictors of lying frequency in the Exposure Condition, accounting 
for 9% of the variation in lying frequency. Interestingly, while the overall model (step 2) was 
significant, no single predictor on its own was found to make a significant contribution to the 
prediction of lying frequency (as indicated by the non-significant beta values). 
 
Table 3.10. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Lying 
Frequency in the Non-Exposure Condition (N = 126) 
 
Variables R !R2 !F B SE B ! 
Step 1 .098 .010 1.203    
Participant Sex    -.641 .584 -.098 
Step 2 .212 .035 1.489    
Participant Sex    -.780 .658 -.119 
Mach-IV Total    .025 .037 .078 
LSRP Total    .054 .042 .159 
PPI-R Total    -.010 .010 -.108 
Step 3 .216 .002 .079    
Participant Sex    -2.876 6.897 -.440 
Mach-IV Total    .021 .052 .066 
LSRP Total    .040 .063 .117 
PPI-R Total    -.010 .013 -.104 
Sex x PPI-R    .002 .022 .083 
Sex x Mach-IV    .010 .077 .087 
Sex x LRSP    .021 .087 .171 
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Table 3.11. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Lying 
Frequency in the Exposure Condition (N = 126) 
 
Variables R !R2 !F B SE B ! 
Step 1 .041 .002 .209    
Participant Sex    -.276 .604 -.041 
Step 2 .304 .090 4.019*    
Participant Sex    -.839 .660 -.125 
Mach-IV Total    .056 .038 .173 
LSRP Total    .069 .043 .197 
PPI-R Total    -.005 .010 -.055 
Step 3 .312 .005 .230    
Participant Sex    -3.437 6.903 -.511 
Mach-IV Total    .065 .052 .201 
LSRP Total    .036 .063 .103 
PPI-R Total    -.005 .013 -.052 
Sex x PPI-R    .002 .022 .110 
Sex x Mach-IV    -.017 .077 -.149 
Sex x LRSP    .058 .087 .449 
Note. *p < .01 
 
Post hoc analyses were conducted in order to clarify which combination of measures 
accounted for the most amount of variance in the final model for the Exposure Condition. 
Specifically, three hierarchical regressions were conducted pairing each of the three measures in 
turn. Results revealed that when the PPI-R Total was paired with each the Mach-IV and the 
LSRP separately, the overall model remained significant, R2 (2, 122) = .073, p = .011 and R2 (2, 
122) = .075, p = .009, respectively. As well, the Mach-IV and LSRP were each found to be 
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significant individual predictors of lying frequency (i.e., beta values were significant), t(122) = 
2.931, p = .004 and t(122) = 2.994, p = .03, respectively, while the PPI-R was not. However, 
when the Mach-IV and LSRP were paired together, their significant individual contributions 
disappeared, t(122) = 1.530, p = .129 and t(122) = 1.535, p = .127, respectively, though the 
overall model was still found to be significant, R2 (2, 122) = .090, p = .003. 
Given that the PPI-R is a fairly heterogeneous measure (as indicated by the modest 
subscale intercorrelations), an additional regression was conducted with all of the subscales 
entered in step 2 (step 1 included the variable of participant sex). In this case, the overall model 
was not significant, R2 (8, 117) = .080, p = .0272, and none of the subscales were found to be 
significant individual predictors of lying frequency. 
Further, given that the Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) subscale correlated highest with 
lying frequency compared to the other subscales on the PPI-R, the same regression analyses that 
were conducted with the PPI-R Total were also conducted using the ME subscale in its place. 
Results using the ME subscale were comparable to those using the PPI-R Total, with the 
exception of the regression pairing it with the LSRP. In this case, the final model was significant, 
R2 (2, 122) = .074, p = .011, however the LSRP was found to be only a marginally significant 
predictor of lying frequency on its own, t(122) = 1.814, p = .072. 
In addition, given that the Primary Psychopathy (PP) subscale of the LSRP correlated 
significantly with lying frequency in both the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions, two 
additional regression analyses, one for each condition, were conducted using the PP subscale in 
place of the LSRP Total and the ME subscale in place of the PPI-R Total. Again, Participant Sex 
was entered as a predictor variable in step 1 while the Mach-IV, PP subscale, and ME subscale 
were entered as predictor variables in step 2. The overall model for the Exposure Condition was 
significant, R2 (3, 121) = .116, p = .002. As well, the PP subscale was found to be a significant 
individual predictor of lying frequency, t(121) = 2.177, p = .031. Interestingly, the overall model 
for the Non-Exposure Condition was also significant, R2 (3, 121) = .087, p = .019. Additionally, 
the PP subscale and the ME subscale were found to be significant individual predictors of lying 
frequency in this condition, t(121) = 2.740, p = .007 and t(121) = -2.052, p = .042, respectively. 
Overall, the results partially support the hypotheses that individuals who scored higher on 
the psychopathy/Machiavellian measures would lie more than those who scored lower and would 
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do so whether they had met their opponent or not in that these measures predicted lying 
frequency in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition. 
Lying Severity. Two hierarchical regressions were run, one for the Non-Exposure 
Condition and one for the Exposure Condition, in order to assess the hypothesis that participants 
scoring higher on psychopathic tendencies would lie to a greater degree or severity than those 
scoring lower. While the participant sex variable was also examined, no initial hypotheses were 
generated with respect to its relation to lying severity. 
In the first regression, lying severity from the Non-Exposure Condition was entered as 
the dependent variable, while Participant Sex was entered as a predictor variable in step 1. Due 
to the moderate correlations (i.e., below .70) found amongst the three measures (reported in 
Table 3.1.), it was expected that entering all three measure variables into the regression equation 
simultaneously would provide a better estimate of lying severity than entering these variables 
separately (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus, the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Totals were 
entered as predictor variables in step 2. Lastly the interactions: sex x Mach-IV, sex x LSRP, and 
sex x PPI-R were entered as predictor variables in step 3. As shown in Table 3.12, Participant 
Sex did not account for a significant proportion of the variance in lying severity. The greatest 
change in R2 occurred in step 2 (i.e., R2change = .018), with gender and the totals from each of the 
three measures entered into the regression equation. However, contrary to expectation, this 
change was not significant, with the overall statistic for the model (step 2) being R2 (3, 121) = 
.022, p = .537. Thus, these variables were not found to be significant predictors of lying severity 
in the Non-Exposure Condition. 
In the second regression, lying severity from the Exposure Condition was entered as the 
dependent variable, with the same predictors and order of entry as in the previous regression. 
Results from this analysis are displayed in Table 3.13. As in the previous regression, Participant 
Sex did not account for a significant proportion of the variation in lying severity. The greatest 
change in R2 occurred in step 2 (i.e., R2change = .076), with Participant Sex and the totals from the 
Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R entered into the regression equation. This time, however, the change 
was significant, with the overall statistic for the model (step 2) being R2 (3, 121) = .082, p = .021. 
Thus, the three measures in combination were found to be significant predictors of lying severity 
in the Exposure Condition, accounting for 7.6% of the variation in lying severity. Interestingly, 
while the overall model (step 2) was significant, no single predictor on its own was found to 
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Table 3.12. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Lying 
Severity in the Non-Exposure Condition (N = 126) 
 
Variables R !R2 !F B SE B ! 
Step 1 .065 .004 .527    
Participant Sex    2.043 2.814 .065 
Step 2 .148 .018 .728    
Participant Sex    1.986 3.197 .063 
Mach-IV Total    -.004 .182 -.003 
LSRP Total    .253 .207 .155 
PPI-R Total    -.038 .050 -.084 
Step 3 .197 .017 .690    
Participant Sex    -36.830 33.260 -1.173 
Mach-IV Total    -.129 .252 -.085 
LSRP Total    .170 .301 .104 
PPI-R Total    -.046 .065 -.101 
Sex x PPI-R    .059 .107 .633 
Sex x Mach-IV    .297 .370 .560 
Sex x LRSP    .068 .420 .114 
 
 
make a significant contribution to the prediction of lying severity (as seen by the non-significant 
beta values). 
Post hoc analyses were conducted in order to clarify which combination of measures 
accounted for the most amount of variance in the final model for the Exposure Condition. 
Specifically, three hierarchical regressions were conducted pairing each of the three measures in 
turn. Results revealed that when the PPI-R Total was paired with each the Mach-IV and the
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Table 3.13.Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Lying 
Severity in the Exposure Condition (N = 126) 
 
Variables R !R2 !F B SE B ! 
Step 1 .078 .006 .766    
Participant Sex    2.444 2.791 .078 
Step 2 .287 .076 3.353*    
Participant Sex    -.697 3.074 -.022 
Mach-IV Total    .281 .175 .187 
LSRP Total    .209 .199 .130 
PPI-R Total    .007 .048 .014 
Step 3 .295 .004 .186    
Participant Sex    7.783 32.185 .250 
Mach-IV Total    .392 .244 .261 
LSRP Total    .087 .292 .054 
PPI-R Total    .013 .063 .029 
Sex x PPI-R    -.023 .104 -.251 
Sex x Mach-IV    -.245 .358 -.465 
Sex x LRSP    .257 .407 .432 
Note. *p < .05 
LSRP separately, the overall model remained significant, R2 (2, 122) = .074, p = .013 and R2 (2, 
122) = .063, p = .028, respectively. As well, the Mach-IV and LSRP were each found to be 
significant individual predictors of lying severity (i.e., beta values were significant), t(122) = 
2.696, p = .008 and t(122) = 2.393, p = .018, respectively, while the PPI-R was not. However, 
when the Mach-IV and LSRP were paired together, their significant individual contributions 
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disappeared, t(122) = 1.689, p = .110 and t(122) = 1.217, p = .226, respectively, though the 
overall model was still found to be significant, R2 (2, 122) = .082, p = .008. 
Given that the PPI-R is a fairly heterogeneous measure (as indicated by the modest 
subscale intercorrelations), an additional regression was conducted with all of the subscales 
entered in step 2 (step 1 included the Participant Sex variable). In this case, the overall model 
was not significant, R2 (8, 117) = .084, p = .296, and none of the subscales were found to be 
significant individual predictors of lying severity. 
Further, given that the Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) subscale correlated highest with 
lying severity in the Exposure Condition compared to the other subscales, the same regression 
analyses that were conducted with the PPI-R Total were also conducted using the ME subscale in 
its place. Results using the ME subscale were comparable to those using the PPI-R Total, with 
the exception of the regression pairing it with the Mach-IV. In this case, the final model was 
significant, R2 (2, 122) = .083, p = .007, however the Mach-IV was found to be only a marginally 
significant predictor of lying frequency on its own, t(122) = 1.858, p = .066. As well, when ME 
was paired with the LSRP, the final model was significant, R2 (2, 122) = .068, p = .019, though 
LSRP was no longer a significant individual predictor of lying severity, t(122) = 1.210, p = .229. 
In addition, given that the Primary Psychopathy (PP) subscale of the LSRP correlated 
significantly with lying severity in both the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions, two 
additional regression analyses, one for each condition, were conducted using the PP subscale in 
place of the LSRP Total and the ME subscale in place of the PPI-R Total. Again, Participant Sex 
was entered as a predictor variable in step 1 while the Mach-IV, PP subscale, and ME subscale 
were entered as predictor variables in step 2. The overall model for the Exposure Condition was 
significant, R2 (3, 121) = .106, p = .005. As well, the PP subscale was found to be a marginally 
significant individual predictor of lying severity in this condition, t(121) = 1.762, p = .081. 
Interestingly, the overall model for the Non-Exposure Condition was also significant, R2 (3, 121) 
= .069, p = .043. Also, the PP subscale was found to be a significant individual predictor of lying 
severity in this condition, t(121) = 2.782, p = .006, while the ME subscale was found to be a 
marginally significant individual predictor, t(121) = -1.942, p = .054. 
Overall, the results partially support the hypotheses that individuals who scored higher on 
the psychopathy/Machiavellian measures would lie to a greater degree than those who scored 
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lower and would do so whether they had met their opponent or not in that these measures 
predicted lying severity in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition. 
Mixed ANOVAs 
In order to extend the results of the correlational analyses and the hierarchical 
regressions, three 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVAs were run comparing level of 
psychopathy/Machiavellianism (i.e., high or low on Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R), as the 
between-subjects factor, by Condition (i.e., Non-Exposure and Exposure), as the within-subjects 
factor, with lying frequency as the dependent variable. Another three 2 x 2 mixed design 
ANOVAs were run comparing level of psychopathy/Machiavellianism (i.e., high or low on 
Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R), as the between-subjects factor, by Condition (i.e., Non-Exposure 
and Exposure), as the within-subjects factor, with lying severity as the dependent variable. The 
psychopathy and Machiavellianism variables were dichotomized using a median split. 
Lying Frequency. For lying frequency, based on the results from the correlational 
analyses and the hierarchical regressions, it was expected that individuals scoring high on the 
Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R would lie more frequently than those scoring low on these measures 
in the Exposure Condition but not in the Non-Exposure Condition. Mixed design ANOVAS were 
run for each of the three measures in turn.  
For the Mach-IV, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, 
overall, participants lied as frequently in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 124) = .351, p = .555, partial !2 = .003. There was a marginally significant main 
effect of Machiavellianism, indicating that high Machs averaged higher on lying frequency than 
low Machs, F(1, 124) = 3.164, p = .078, partial !2 = .025. The interaction effect was not 
significant, F(1, 124) = .762, p = .384, partial !2 = .006, indicating that the effect of Condition on 
lying frequency was the same for low Machs as it was for high Machs. These results are 
displayed in Figure 3.1. 
For the LSRP, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, overall, 
participants lied as frequently in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure Condition, F(1, 
124) = .411, p = .522, partial !2 = .003. There was a marginally significant main effect of 
psychopathy, indicating that high scorers on the LSRP averaged higher on lying frequency than 
low scorers, F(1, 124) = 3.428, p = .066, partial !2 = .027. The interaction effect was significant,
 55 
Figure 3.1. Lying Frequency by Machiavellianism (Mach-IV) and Degree of Exposure to 
Opponent 
 
 
F(1, 124) = 4.113, p = .045, partial !2 = .032, indicating that the effect of Condition on lying 
frequency was different for low scorers on the LSRP than it was for high scorers. The nature of 
this effect is displayed in Figure 3.2. As can be seen, while, on average, high scorers on the 
LSRP lied more frequently than low scorers in both conditions, this difference was rather small 
in the Non-Exposure Condition. Interestingly, on average, low scorers on the LSRP lied less in 
the Exposure Condition than in the Non-Exposure Condition while high scorers, on average, lied 
more in the Exposure Condition than in the Non-Exposure Condition.  
 Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying frequency due to Conditions were 
marginally significant for participants scoring low on the LSRP, t(59) = 1.769, p = .082, d = 
.228, indicating that these participants trended towards lying marginally less in the Exposure 
Condition compared to the Non-Exposure Condition. On the other hand, there was no significant 
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difference due to Conditions for participants scoring high on the LSRP, t(65) = -1.047, p = .299, 
d = -.131, indicating that these participants did not lie significantly more in the Exposure 
Condition relative to the Non-Exposure Condition. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of psychopathy on lying frequency was significant 
for the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(124) = -2.571, p = .011, d 
=  -.458 and t(124) = -.715, p = .476, d = -.125, respectively. These results indicate that low 
scorers on the LSRP did not statistically differ from high scorers in the Non-Exposure Condition 
but did statistically differ in the Exposure Condition, with high scorers lying more than low 
scorers. 
 
Figure 3.2. Lying Frequency by Psychopathy (LSRP) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
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For the PPI-R, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, overall, 
participants lied as frequently in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure Condition, F(1, 
125) = .253, p = .616, partial !2 = .002. There was also no significant main effect of 
psychopathy, indicating that, on average, high scorers on the PPI-R lied as frequently as low 
scorers, F(1, 125) = .001, p = .978, partial !2 = .000. The interaction effect was significant, F(1, 
125) = 4.235, p = .042, partial !2 = .033, indicating that the effect of condition on lying 
frequency was different for low scorers on the PPI-R than it was for high scorers. The nature of 
this effect is displayed in Figure 3.3. As can be seen, contrary to expectations, low scorers on the 
PPI-R, lied more frequently, on average, than high scorers in the Non-Exposure Condition while 
high scorers, on average, lied more frequently than low scorers in the Exposure Condition. As 
with the LSRP, on average, low scorers on the PPI-R, lied less in the Exposure Condition than in 
the Non-Exposure Condition while high scorers lied more, on average, in the Exposure 
Condition compared to the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Simple effect analyses revealed that differences in lying frequency due to Conditions did 
not occur for low scorers or high scorers on the PPI-R, t(58) = 1.597, p = .116, d = .194 and t(67) 
= -1.255, p = .214, d = -.152, respectively. These results indicate that lying frequency for low 
scorers on the PPI-R did not statistically differ in the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions; 
the same was also found for high scorers. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of psychopathy on lying frequency was not 
significant for the Non-Exposure Condition nor for the Exposure Condition, t(125) = .984, p = 
.327, d = .175 and t(125) = -.911, p = .364, d = -.162, respectively. These results indicate that 
low scorers on the PPI-R did not statistically differ from high scorers in the Non-Exposure 
Condition nor did they statistically differ in the Exposure Condition. 
Additionally, given that the Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) subscale of the PPI-R 
correlated significantly with Lying Frequency in the Exposure Condition and the Primary 
Psychopathy (PP) subscale of the LSRP correlated significantly with Lying Frequency in both 
the Exposure and Non-Exposure Conditions, two 2 X 2 mixed design ANOVAs, one involving 
the ME subscale and the other involving the PP subscale, were also conducted. Specifically, 
level of psychopathy/Machiavellianism was the between subjects factor (i.e., high or low on the 
ME and PP subscales, dichotomized using a median split) and Condition (i.e., Non-Exposure and 
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Figure 3.3. Lying Frequency by Psychopathy (PPI-R) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
 
Exposure) was the within-subjects factor, with lying frequency as the dependent variable. Mixed 
design ANOVAs comparing level of psychopathy (high vs. low) by Condition were conducted 
on the remaining subscales and these results can be found in Appendix R. 
For the ME subscale, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, 
overall, participants lied as frequently in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 125) = .204, p = .652, partial !2 = .002. There was also a non-significant main 
effect of Machiavellianism, indicating that, on average, high scorers on the ME subscale lied as 
frequently as low scorers, F(1, 125) = 2.074, p = .152, partial !2 = .016. The interaction effect 
was not significant, F(1, 125) = 1.926, p = .168, partial !2 = .015, indicating that the effect of 
Condition on lying frequency was the same for low scorers and higher scorers on the ME 
subscale. These results are displayed in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4. Lying Frequency by Psychopathy (ME Subscale) and Degree of Exposure to 
Opponent 
 
For the PP subscale, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, 
overall, participants lied as frequently in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 124) = .227, p = .635, partial !2 = .002. There was a marginally significant main 
effect of psychopathy, indicating that high scorers on the PP subscale trended towards higher 
rates of lying than low scorers, F(1, 124) = 3.740, p = .055, partial !2 = .029. The interaction 
effect was significant, F(1, 124) = 4.989, p = .027, partial !2 = .039, indicating that the effect of 
Condition on lying frequency was different for low scorers on the PP subscale than it was for 
high scorers. The nature of this effect is displayed in Figure 3.5. As can be seen, while, on 
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average, high scorers on the PP subscale lied more frequently than low scorers in both 
conditions, this difference was rather small in the Non-Exposure Condition. Interestingly, on 
average, low scorers on the PP subscale lied less in the Exposure Condition than in the Non-
Exposure Condition while high scorers, on average, lied more in the Exposure Condition than in 
the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying frequency due to Conditions were 
marginally significant for participants scoring low on the PP subscale, t(64) = 1.819, p = .074, d 
= .226, indicating that these participants trended towards lying marginally less in the Exposure 
Condition compared to the Non-Exposure Condition. On the other hand, there was no significant 
difference due to Conditions for participants scoring high on the PP subscale, t(60) = -1.331, p = 
.188, d = -.171, indicating that these participants did not lie significantly more in the Exposure 
Condition relative to the Non-Exposure Condition. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of psychopathy on lying frequency was significant 
for the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(124) = -2.742, p = .007, d 
= -.488 and t(124) = -.695, p = .488, d = -.122, respectively. These results indicate that low 
scorers on the PP subscale did not statistically differ from high scorers in the Non-Exposure 
Condition but did statistically differ in the Exposure Condition, with high scorers lying more 
than low scorers. 
Overall, the results from the mixed ANOVAs partially support the hypothesis that 
individuals who scored higher on the psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures would lie more 
frequently than those who scored lower, as individuals who scored high on some measures (i.e., 
Mach-IV Total, LSRP Total and PP subscale) lied more frequently overall than those who scored 
low on the same measures. Interestingly, simple effect analyses revealed that individuals who 
scored high on the LSRP Total and PP subscale lied more than individuals who scored low in the 
Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition.
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Figure 3.5. Lying Frequency by Psychopathy (PP Subscale) and Degree of Exposure to 
Opponent 
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Lying Severity. For lying severity, based on the results from the correlational analyses 
and the hierarchical regressions, it was expected that individuals scoring high on the Mach-IV, 
LSRP, and PPI-R would lie to a greater degree or severity than those scoring low on these 
measures in the Exposure Condition but not the Non-Exposure Condition. Mixed design 
ANOVAS were run for each of the three measures in turn.  
For the Mach-IV, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, 
overall, participants lied to the same degree in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 124) = .061, p = .805, partial !2 = .000. There was a significant main effect of 
Machiavellianism, indicating that high Machs averaged higher on lying severity than low Machs, 
F(1, 124) = 4.259, p = .041, partial !2 = .033. The interaction effect was also significant, F(1, 
124) = 4.969, p = .028, partial !2 = .039, indicating that the effect of condition on lying severity 
was different for low Machs than it was for high Machs. The nature of this effect is displayed in 
Figure 3.6. As can be seen, on average, high Machs lied to a greater degree than low Machs in 
both the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions. Reflecting the pattern seen in the lying 
frequency results, on average, low Machs lied to a lesser extent in the Exposure Condition than 
the Non-Exposure Condition while high Machs lied to a greater extent in the Exposure Condition 
than the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying severity due to Conditions did not 
occur for low or high Machs, t(58) = 1.545, p = .128, d = .203 and t(66) = -1.601, p = .114, d = -
.196, respectively. These results indicate that lying severity for low Machs did not statistically 
differ in the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions; the same was also found for high Machs. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of Machiavellianism on lying severity was 
significant for the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(124) = -2.972, 
p = .004, d = -.536 and t(124) = -.628, p = .531, d = -.112. These results indicate that low Machs 
did not statistically differ from high Machs in the Non-Exposure Condition but did statistically 
differ from them in the Exposure Condition, with high Machs lying to a greater degree than low 
Machs. 
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Figure 3.6. Lying Severity by Machiavellianism (Mach-IV) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
 
For the LSRP, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, overall, 
participants lied to the same degree in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 124) = .041, p = .841, partial !2 = .000. There was a significant main effect of 
psychopathy, indicating that high scorers on the LSRP averaged higher on lying severity than 
low scorers, F(1, 124) = 4.070, p = .046, partial !2 = .032. The interaction effect was also 
significant, F(1, 124) = 4.104, p = .045, partial !2 = .032, indicating that the effect of condition 
on lying severity was different for low scorers on the LSRP than it was for high scorers. The 
nature of this effect is displayed in Figure 3.7. As can be seen, on average, high scorers on the 
LSRP lied to a greater extent than low scorers in both conditions. Again, reflecting the pattern 
observed in lying frequency, on average, low scorers on the LSRP lied to a lesser degree in the 
Exposure Condition relative to the Non-Exposure Condition while high scorers, on average, lied 
to a greater degree in the Exposure Condition compared to the Non-Exposure Condition.  
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Figure 3.7. Lying Severity by Psychopathy (LSRP) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
 
 
Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying severity due to Conditions did not 
occur for low scorers on the LSRP or high scorers, t(59) = 1.561, p = .124, d = .202 and t(65) = -
1.305, p = .196, d = -.161, respectively. These results indicate that lying severity for low scorers 
on the LSRP did not statistically differ in the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions; the same 
was also found for high scorers. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of psychopathy on lying severity was significant for 
the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(124) = -2.821, p = .006, d = -
.505 and t(124) = -.688, p = .493, d = -.123, respectively. These results indicate that low scorers 
on the LSRP did not statistically differ from high scorers in the Non-Exposure Condition but did 
statistically differ from them in the Exposure Condition, with high scorers lying to a greater 
degree than low scorers. 
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For the PPI-R, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, overall, 
participants lied to the same degree in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 125) = .013, p = .911, partial !2 = .000. There was also no significant main effect 
of psychopathy, indicating that, on average, high scorers on the PPI-R lied to the same degree as 
low scorers, F(1, 125) = .369, p = .545, partial !2 = .003. The interaction effect was significant, 
F(1, 25) = 6.865, p = .010, partial !2 = .052, indicating that the effect of Condition on lying 
severity was different for low scorers on the PPI-R than it was for high scorers. The nature of 
this effect is displayed in Figure 3.8. As can be seen, contrary to expectations but consistent with 
what was observed with the lying frequency results for the PPI-R, on average, low scorers on the 
PPI-R lied to a greater degree than high scorers in the Non-Exposure Condition while high 
scorers, on average, lied to a greater degree than low scorers in the Exposure Condition. Again, 
mirroring the pattern observed in lying frequency, on average, low scorers on the PPI-R lied to a 
lesser degree in the Exposure Condition relative to the Non-Exposure Condition while high 
scorers, on average, lied to a greater degree in the Exposure Condition compared to the Non-
Exposure Condition.  
Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying severity due to Conditions were 
marginally significant for low scorers on the PPI-R, t(58) = 1.737, p = .088, d = .227, and for 
high scorers, t(67) = -1.977, p = .052, d = -.240. These results indicate that lying severity for low 
scorers trended towards being marginally higher in the Non-Exposure Condition than in the 
Exposure Condition while for high scorers, lying severity trended towards being marginally 
higher in the Exposure Condition than in the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Analyses of the simple effect of level of psychopathy on lying severity was marginally 
significant for the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(125) = -1.869, 
p = .064, d =  -.337 and t(125) = .797, p = .427, d = .142. These results indicate that low scorers 
on the LSRP did not differ from high scorers on lying severity in the Non-Exposure Condition 
but trended towards being marginally lower than that of high scorers in the Exposure Condition. 
Additionally, given that the Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) subscale of the PPI-R 
correlated significantly with Lying Severity in the Exposure Condition and the Primary 
Psychopathy (PP) subscale of the LSRP correlated significantly with Lying Severity in both the 
Exposure and Non-Exposure Conditions, two 2 X 2 mixed design ANOVAs, one involving the 
ME subscale and the other involving the PP subscale, were also conducted. Specifically, level of 
 66 
Figure 3.8. Lying Severity by Psychopathy (PPI-R) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
 
psychopathy/Machiavellianism was the between subjects factor (i.e., high or low on the ME and 
PP subscales, dichotomized using a median split) and Condition (i.e., Non-Exposure and 
Exposure) was the within-subjects factor, with lying severity as the dependent variable. Mixed 
design ANOVAs comparing level of psychopathy (high vs. low) by Condition were conducted 
on the remaining subscales and these results can be found in Appendix S. 
For the ME subscale, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, 
overall, participants lied to the same degree in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 125) = .003, p = .953, partial !2 = .000. There was a significant main effect of 
Machiavellianism, indicating that high scorers on the ME subscale averaged higher on lying 
severity than low scorers, F(1, 125) = 4.291, p = .040, partial !2 = .033. The interaction effect 
was marginally significant, F(1, 125) = 3.450, p = .066, partial !2 = .027, indicating that the 
effect of condition on lying severity trended towards being different for low scorers on the ME 
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subscale compared to high scorers. The nature of this effect is displayed in Figure 3.9. As can be 
seen, on average, high scorers lied to a greater degree than low scorers in both the Non-Exposure 
and Exposure Conditions. Low scorers on the ME subscale, on average, lied to a lesser extent in 
the Exposure Condition than the Non-Exposure Condition while high scorers lied to a greater 
extent in the Exposure Condition than the Non-Exposure Condition.  
 
Figure 3.9. Lying Severity by Psychopathy (ME Subscale) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
 
Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying severity due to Conditions did not 
occur for low or high scorers on the ME subscale, t(58) = 1.281, p = .205, d = .167 and t(67) = -
1.346, p = .183, d = -.163, respectively. These results indicate that lying severity for low scorers 
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on the ME subscale did not statistically differ in the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions; the 
same was also found for high scorers. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of Machiavellianism on lying severity was 
significant for the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(125) = -2.783, 
p = .006, d = -.497 and t(125) = -.797, p = .427, d = -.142, respectively. These results indicate 
that low scorers on the ME did not statistically differ from high scorers in the Non-Exposure 
Condition but did statistically differ from them in the Exposure Condition, with high scorers 
lying to a greater degree than low scorers. 
For the PP subscale, there was no significant main effect of Condition, indicating that, 
overall, participants lied to the same degree in the Non-Exposure Condition as in the Exposure 
Condition, F(1, 124) = .001, p = .972, partial !2 = .000. There was a significant main effect of 
psychopathy, indicating that, on average, high scorers on the PP subscale lied to a greater degree 
than low scorers, F(1, 124) = 7.661, p = .007, partial !2 = .058. The interaction effect was 
significant, F(1, 24) = 4.876, p = .029, partial !2 = .038, indicating that the effect of Condition on 
lying severity was different for low scorers on the PP subscale than it was for high scorers. The 
nature of this effect is displayed in Figure 3.10. As can be seen, on average, high scorers lied to a 
greater degree than low scorers in both the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions. Low scorers 
on the PP subscale, on average, lied to a lesser extent in the Exposure Condition than the Non-
Exposure Condition while high scorers lied to a greater extent in the Exposure Condition than 
the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Simple effect analyses showed that differences in lying severity due to Conditions did not 
occur for low or high scorers on the PP subscale, t(64) = 1.531, p = .131, d = .191 and t(60) = -
1.609, p = .113, d = -.206, respectively. These results indicate that lying severity for low scorers 
on the ME subscale did not statistically differ in the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions; the 
same was also found for high scorers. 
Analyses of the simple effect of level of psychopathy on lying severity was significant for 
the Exposure Condition but not for the Non-Exposure Condition, t(124) = -3.603, p = .000, d = -
.640 and t(124) = -1.207, p = .230, d = -.215, respectively. These results indicate that low scorers 
on the ME did not statistically differ from high scorers in the Non-Exposure Condition but did 
statistically differ from them in the Exposure Condition, with high scorers lying to a greater 
degree than low scorers. 
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Overall, the results from the mixed ANOVAs partially support the hypothesis that 
individuals who scored higher on the psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures would lie to a 
greater degree than those who scored lower, as individuals who scored high on some measures 
(i.e., Mach-IV Total, LSRP Total and ME and PP subscale but not the PPI-R Total) lied to a 
greater degree overall than those who scored low on the same measures. Interestingly, simple 
effect analyses revealed that individuals who scored high on these measures lied to a greater 
degree than individuals who scored low in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition.  
 
Figure 3.10. Lying Severity by Psychopathy (PP Subscale) and Degree of Exposure to Opponent 
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Lying Frequency and Lying Severity Over Repeated Interactions 
In accordance with Wilson et al. (1996), who hypothesized that high and low Machs 
would behave differently over repeated interactions, and with anecdotal evidence involving 
psychopathic individuals (Babiak, 1995), it was hypothesized in the present research that higher 
scores on psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures would be associated with higher rates and 
greater severities in lying in later but not initial interactions in the Lying Game. Correlations 
between each of the three measure totals and the dependent variables for trials 1 and 10 of the 
Exposure and Non-Exposure Conditions are displayed in Table 3.14. As can be seen, 
correlational analyses revealed a significant positive relationship between the Mach-IV Total and 
Exposure Lying Frequency in the last trial (trial 10), r = .252, p = .004, but not in the first trial, r 
= .118, p = .188. The difference between these correlations (i.e., first vs. last) was significant 
(see Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992), Z = 2.317, p < .05. A significant positive correlation was 
also found between the LSRP Total and Exposure Lying Frequency in the last trial, r = .254, p = 
.004, but not in the first trial, r = .024, p = .793. However, the difference between these 
correlations was found to be not significant, Z = -1.220, p > .05. Interestingly, the correlation 
between the PPI-R and Exposure Lying Frequency in both trials 1 and 10 were not significant (r 
= .103, p = .248 and r = .145, p = .104, respectively). 
Correlational analyses also revealed significant positive relationships between Exposure 
Lying Severity and the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R for trial 10 (r = .254, p = .004; r = .198, p = 
.026; and r = .195, p = .028, respectively) but not for trial 1 (r = .169, p = .058; r = .074, p = 
.409; and r = .155, p = .082, respectively). The difference between the correlations for the Mach-
IV and the first trial and the Mach-IV and the last trial was significant, Z = -2.068, p < .05. As 
well, the difference between the correlations for the LSRP and the first trial and the LSRP and 
the last trial was also significant, Z = -2.318, p < .05. However, the difference between the 
correlations for the PPI-R and the first trial and the PPI-R and the last trial was not significant, Z 
= -.786, p > .05. Lastly, none of the measure totals were significantly correlated with any of the 
dependent variables in trials 1 or 10 of the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Thus, overall, the hypothesis that individuals who were higher on psychopathic 
tendencies would increase their frequency and severity of lying as trials progressed in the Lying 
Game relative to those who were lower on psychopathic tendencies was partially supported. 
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Table 3.14. Correlations Between Measure Totals and Lying Frequency and Lying Severity in the First and Last Trials of the Non-
Exposure and Exposure Conditions 
 
Mach-IV 
Totala 
LSRP 
Totala 
PPI-R 
Total 
NE Lying 
Frequency 
Trial 1 
NE Lying 
Frequency 
Trial 10 
E Lying 
Frequency 
Trial 1 
E Lying 
Frequency 
Trial 10 
NE Lying 
Severity 
Trial 1 
NE Lying 
Severity 
Trial 10 
E Lying 
Severity 
Trial 1 
NE Lying Frequency 
Trial 1 .066 .104 -.052 - 
      
NE Lying Frequency 
Trial 10 -.009 .006 -.124 .138 - 
     
E Lying Frequency 
Trial 1 .118 .024 .103 .184
* .234** - 
    
E Lying Frequency 
Trial 10 .252
** .254** .145 .227* .374** .359** - 
   
NE Lying Severity 
Trial 1 -.009 .072 .029 .802
** .162 .312** .301** - 
  
NE Lying Severity 
Trial 10 .036 .065 -.021 .139 .777
** .091 .277** .207* - 
 
E Lying Severity 
Trial 1 .169 .074 .155 .146 .135 .282
** .282** .194* .031 - 
E Lying Severity 
Trial 10 .254
** .198** .195* .140 .272** .851** .851** .257** .252** .227  
           
Note. NE = Non-Exposure; E = Exposure 
n = 127 except for an = 126. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Sex Differences 
No initial hypotheses were generated with respect to sex differences on the dependent 
variables. While the results from the hierarchical regressions did not find participant sex to be a 
significant predictor of the dependent variables, further analyses were necessary in order to 
clarify this relationship. To this end, correlations between all measure totals and dependent 
variables were run separately for females and males. These results are displayed in Tables 3.15 
and 3.16, respectively. 
With respect to the correlations amongst the three measures, these were all highly 
significant (ps < .01) and fell within the small to moderate range for females. For males, these 
correlations mostly fell within the moderate range and were highly significant (ps < .01), with 
the exception of the relationship between PPI-R and Mach-IV Totals, r = .221, p = .105. As well, 
the correlations amongst the three dependent variables were also all highly significant (ps < .01) 
and fell within the moderate to large range for both females and males, separately. 
  With respect to the correlations between measure totals and dependent variables, several 
were found to be significantly correlated, namely these tended to occur within the Exposure 
Condition. Specifically, Exposure Lying Frequency was significantly correlated with Mach-IV 
Total for males, r = .349, p = .015, but was only marginally significantly correlated for females, r 
= .204, p = .073. The difference between these correlations was not statistically significant, 
(Fisher’s) Z = -0.83, p = .407 (see Appendix T for a summary of all correlation comparison 
results). Exposure Lying Frequency was also significantly correlated with LSRP Total for males, 
r = .397, p = .005, but not for females, r = .159, p = .164. The difference between these 
correlations was not statistically significant, Z = -1.38, p = 0.168.  
 With respect to Exposure Lying Severity, it was significantly correlated with Mach-IV 
Total for females, r = .276, p = .014, but not for males, r = .234, p = .110. The difference 
between these correlations was not statistically significant, Z = 0.24, p = 0.810. Exposure Lying 
Severity was also marginally significantly correlated with LSRP Total for females, r = .202, p = 
.077, and for males, r = .277, p = .057. The difference between these correlations was not 
statistically significant, Z = -0.42, p = .675.  
 As for the other correlations between independent and dependent variables, only LSRP 
Total and Non-Exposure Lying Frequency was found to be marginally significant for males, r = 
.253, p = .083, but not for females, r = .079, p = .492. The difference between these correlations 
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Table 3.15. Correlations Between All Measure Totals and Dependent Variables for Females  
 Mach-IV 
Total 
LSRP 
Total 
PPI-R 
Total 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Severity 
LSRP Totala .614** -     
PPI-R Totala .376** .532** -    
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency .079 .079 -.028 -   
Exposure Lying Frequency .204 .159 .052 .633** -  
Non-Exposure Lying Severity -.057 -.004 -.080 .842** .575** - 
Exposure Lying Severity .276* .202 .135 .532** .889** .512** 
n = 78 except for an = 95. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.16. Correlations Between All Measure Totals and Dependent Variables for Males 
 Mach-IV 
Total 
LSRP 
Total 
PPI-R 
Total 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Severity 
LSRP Total .645**a -     
PPI-R Total .221a .471**a -    
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency .235b .253b -.001 -   
Exposure Lying Frequency .349*b .397**b .131 .457** -  
Non-Exposure Lying Severity .210b .234b .075 .894** .463** - 
Exposure Lying Severity .234b .277b .099 .401** .919** .409** 
n = 49 except for an = 55 and bn = 48. 
*p < .05. **p < .01
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was not statistically significant, Z = -0.95, p = .343. Of the remaining correlations, these were 
small and non-significant for both females and males, separately, and in a few instances for 
females and in one case for males, negative. As well, Fisher’s Z-tests did not reveal any 
significant differences between these correlations in males and females. 
Correlations between all of subscale totals and dependent variables were also computed 
separately for females and males. These results are displayed in Tables 3.17 and 3.18, 
respectively. With respect to the correlations amongst the subscales, many were statistically 
significant at p < .05 or p < .01 for females and males, though females and males differed 
somewhat with respect to which specific pairs were significantly correlated. As well, for females, 
correlations tended to fall within the small to moderate range while for males, correlations 
tended to fall within the moderate to large range.  
With respect to the correlations between the subscale totals and dependent variables, 
several were found to be significantly correlated, namely these tended to occur within the 
Exposure Condition. Specifically, Exposure Lying Frequency was significantly correlated with 
the Primary Psychopathy subscale for females, r = .274, p = .015, and for males, r = .383, p = 
.007. The difference between these correlations was not statistically significant, Z = -.065, p = 
.516 (see Appendix U for a summary of all correlation comparison results). Exposure Lying 
Frequency was also significantly correlated with Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) for males, r 
= .343, p = .016, but not for females, r = .109, p = .342. The difference between these 
correlations was not statistically significant, Z = -.132, p = .187. Additionally, Exposure Lying 
Frequency was significantly correlated with Blame Externalization (BE) for females, r = .229, p 
= .043, but not for males, r = .023, p = .877. The difference between these correlations was not 
statistically significant, Z = 1.12, p = .263. 
With respect to Exposure Lying Severity, it was significantly correlated with Primary 
Psychopathy for females, r = .336, p = .003, but only marginally significantly correlated for 
males, r = - .275, p = .059. The difference between these correlations was not statistically 
significant, Z = 0.36, p = .719. There was a marginally significant correlation between Exposure 
Lying Severity and Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) for females, r = .189, p = .098, and for 
males, r = .265, p = .066. The difference between these correlations was not statistically 
significant, Z = -0.43, p = .667. Additionally, Exposure Lying Severity was significantly 
correlated with Blame Externalization (BE) for females, r = .263, p = .020, but not for males, r = 
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-0.32, p = .829. The difference between these correlations was not statistically significant, Z = 
1.61, p = .107. 
 As for the rest of the correlations between subscale totals and dependent variables, 
marginally significant correlations were found for the following pairs: Primary Psychopathy and 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency, and Primary Psychopathy and Non-Exposure Lying Severity 
for males, r = .278, p = .056 and r = .265, p = .068, but not for females. The difference between 
these correlations was not statistically significant. As well, Exposure Lying Frequency was found 
to be marginally correlated with Stress Immunity for females, r = -.191, p = .095, but not for 
males. The difference between these correlations was not statistically significant. 
Of the remaining correlations, these tended to be small and non-significant for both 
females and males, separately, and in a few instances, negative. As well, Fisher’s Z-tests largely 
did not reveal any significant differences between these correlations in males and females, with 
the exception of three instances where correlations were marginally significantly different 
between the two. Specifically, the correlation between Secondary Psychopathy and Exposure 
Lying Frequency was marginally different in males and females, Z = -.167, p = .095, the 
correlation between Social Influence (SOI) and Exposure Lying Frequency was also marginally 
different in males and females, Z = 1.81, p = .070, and the correlation between Social Influence 
(SOI) and Exposure Lying Severity was also marginally different in males and females, Z = 1.88, 
p = .060.
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Table 3.17. Correlations Between All Subscale Totals and Dependent Variables for Females 
Measure/Scale PP SP ME RN BE CN SOI F STI C 
SP .345** -        
 
ME .657** .419** -       
 
RN .279** .335** .315** -      
 
BE .318** .454** .418** .133 -     
 
CN .244* .669** .343** .490** .249* -    
 
SOI .121 -.102 .171 .338** .102 .025 -   
 
F .071 .097 .045 .546** .149 .159 .424** -  
 
STI -.068 .040 -.120 .180 -.291** .072 .180 .218* - 
 
C .378** .343** .328** .229* .222* .508** -.046 .035 .071 - 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequencya .170 -.097 .031 -.013 .167 -.095 -.022 -.133 -.157 .032 
Exposure Lying Frequencya .274* -.086 .109 -.012 .229* -.044 .103 -.089 -.191 .054 
Non-Exposure Lying Severitya .098 -.162 -.033 -.094 .033 -.147 .051 -.177 -.052 -.076 
Exposure Lying Severitya .336** -.093 .189 .067 .263* .021 .148 -.046 -.182 .088 
Note. PP = Primary Psychopathy; SP = Secondary Psychopathy; ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; BE = 
Blame Externalization; CN = Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = Coldheartedness. 
n = 95 except for an = 78. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.18. Correlations Between All Subscale Totals and Dependent Variables for Males 
Measure/Scale PP SP ME RN BE CN SOI F STI C 
SP .321*a -        
 
ME .866**a .307*a -       
 
RN .075a .471**a .070 -      
 
BE .242a .643**a .241 .519** -     
 
CN .194a .730**a .179 .581** .513** -    
 
SOI -.017a -.329*a .089 .063 -.189 -.225 -   
 
F .050a -.059a .080 .385** .033 -.011 .395** -  
 
STI -.181a -.522**a -.227 -.113 -.306* -.217 .295* .273* - 
 
C .543**a -.042a .377** -.160 -.134 .024 -.131 -.092 .215 - 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency .278c .088c .076b .025b -.113b .067b -.153b -.101b -.085b .163b 
Exposure Lying Frequency .383**c .224c .343*b .111b .023b .124b -.231b -.047b -.047b .204b 
Non-Exposure Lying Severity .265c .069c .083b .124b -.121b .144b -.099b -.077b -.026b .134b 
Exposure Lying Severity .275c .143c .265b .087b -.032b .090b -.200b -.037b -.013 b .187b 
Note. PP = Primary Psychopathy; SP = Secondary Psychopathy; ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; BE = 
Blame Externalization; CN = Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = Coldheartedness. 
n =  56 except for an = 55, bn = 49, and cn = 48. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Self-Perceived Lying Behaviour 
Participants were asked to respond to several questions related to self-perceived lying 
behaviour on the Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 2. The majority of these questions were 
drawn directly from Klaver et al. (2007). Table 3.19 displays the frequency of responses for the 
first question: “Compared to others, how good are you at lying? As can be seen, “Average” was 
the most commonly endorsed response (29.5%), followed closely by “Below Average” (28.2%) 
and “Above Average” (28.2%). Question 2 asked participants: “How do you generally feel when 
you know that you have successfully deceived another person?” Participants were permitted to 
select more than one response. Table 3.20 displays the frequency of responses for this question. 
The most commonly endorsed affective response to the question was “Guilty.” Examples of 
feelings from those who endorsed the “Other” response included: “relieved,” “indifference,” 
“satisfaction,” “proud,” “content,” and “regretful.” 
For Question 3, participants were asked: “In general, how often do you lie in a week?” 
The most frequent response was “Rarely” (62.9%) followed by “Sometimes” (24.5%; see Table 
3.21). Interestingly, nine participants (6%) indicated that they “Never” lied in a week (Question 
3) and another ten participants indicated that they either lied “Often” or “Very Often” in a week. 
For exploratory purposes, cross tabulation frequencies for those who answered “Never” to 
Question 3 by Question 1 (“Compared to others, how good are you at lying?”) and for those who 
answered “Often” or “Very Often” to Question 3 by Question 1 are displayed in Appendix V. 
Results indicated that 2 of the 9 participants who “Never” lied in a week perceived themselves as 
having “Above Average” lying abilities. On the other hand, 7 of the 10 participants who “Often” 
or “Very Often lied in a week perceived themselves as having “Above Average” or “Very Much 
Above Average” lying abilities. 
Further, means and standard deviations for the psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures, 
as well as for the dependent variables for the “Never” group and “Often” or “Very Often” group 
are displayed in Appendix W and X, respectively. Participants in the “Never” group, on average, 
scored lower on all measures and dependent variables compared to the overall means reported in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.7 while participants in the “Often” or “Very Often” group scored higher, on 
average, relative to the overall means reported in the same tables.
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Table 3.19. Frequency of Responses for the Question: “Compared to others, how good are you at 
lying?” 
 
Frequency (n = 149) Percent 
Very Much Below Average 17 11.4 
Below Average 42 28.2 
Average 44 29.5 
Above Average 42 28.2 
Very Much Above Average 4 2.7 
 
 
Table 3.20. Frequency of Responses for the Question: “How do you generally feel when you 
know that you have successfully deceived another person?” 
 Yes (Percent) No (Percent) 
Excited 27 (17.9) 124 (82.1) 
Nervous/Anxious 67 (44.4) 84 (55.6) 
Scared/Worried 44 (29.1) 107 (70.9) 
Guilty 102 (67.5) 49 (32.5) 
Other 19 (12.6) 132 (87.4) 
n = 151 for each row 
 
 
Table 3.21. Frequency of Responses for the Question: “In general, how often do you lie in a 
week?” 
 
Frequency (n = 151) Percent 
Never 9 6.0 
Rarely 95 62.9 
Sometimes 37 24.5 
Often 9 6.0 
Very Often 1 0.6 
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 In order to examine the relationship between self-perceived lying behaviour and 
psychopathy/Machiavellianism, correlational analyses were conducted on both the measure and 
subscale totals and on the responses to the first 3 questions of the Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
– Part 2. Correlations between the measure totals and responses to the three questions are 
displayed in Table 3.22 while the correlations between the subscale totals and responses to the 
three questions are displayed in Table 3.23. 
 As shown in Table, 3.22, correlations amongst the responses to the three questions were 
in the expected direction. For example, higher self-perceived lying ability (Question 1) was 
positively and significantly related to feeling excited, r = .298, p = .001, but negatively and 
significantly related to feeling guilty, r = -.239, p = .003, after having successfully deceived 
others (Question 2). As well, higher self-perceived lying ability (Question 1) was also positively 
and significantly related to higher self-reported lying frequency over the course of a week 
(Question 3), r = .385, p = .015.  
Correlations between the responses to the three questions and the measures totals were 
also mostly in the expected direction. Higher scores on the psychopathy and Machiavellianism 
measures were positively and significantly related to higher levels of self-perceived lying ability 
(Question1); feeling excited but not guilty after having successfully deceived others (Question 
1); higher self-reported lying frequency over the course of a week (Question 3); and being male 
(as aforementioned, the sex variable was dummy coded with females = 0 and males = 1). The 
correlations between psychopathy/Machiavellianism totals and feeling nervous/anxious or 
scared/worried after having successfully deceived others (Question 2) were mostly positive and, 
in a few cases, significant, though they were also mostly of small magnitude.  
Intercorrelations amongst subscales (Table 3.23) were previously reported and thus will 
not be further discussed here. Correlations between the responses on the three questions and 
subscale totals showed patterns that were similar to that of the measure totals. That is, higher 
scores on subscales were mostly positively and significantly related to higher ratings on self-
perceived lying ability (Question 1); feeling excited but not guilty after having successfully 
deceived others (Question 2); higher self-reported lying frequency over the course of a week 
(Question 3); and being male. The correlations between subscale totals and feeling 
nervous/anxious or scared/worried after having successfully deceived others (Question 2) were 
mostly negative, non-significant, and of small magnitude.  
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Table 3.22. Correlations Between Responses on the Post-Experiment Questionnaire - Part 2, Gender, and All Measure Totals 
 
Q1 Excited 
Nervous/ 
Anxious 
Scared/ 
Worried Guilty Other Q3 
Mach-IV 
Total 
LSRP 
Total 
PPI-R 
Total 
Q1: Compared to others, how 
good are you at lying? -          
Q2: Excited .278**a -         
Q2: Nervous/Anxious .043a .001 -        
Q2: Scared/Worried .035a -.071 .395** -       
Q2: Guilty -.239**a -.230** .021 .102 -      
Q2: Other .198*a .084 -.299** -.243** -.462** -     
Q3: In general, how often do 
you lie in a week? .385
**a .300** .156 .118 -.142 .109 -    
Mach-IV Total .425**b .252**c .198*c .083c -.419**c .152c .292**c -   
LSRP Total .288**b .349**c .191*c .026c -.376**c .126c .354**c .645**c -  
PPI-R Total .311**a .258** -.075 .160* -.296** .250** .304** .391**c .523**c - 
Gender .354**a .214** -.134 -.191* -.288** .287** .191* .323**c .186*c .382** 
Note. Q2 = How do you generally feel when you know that you have successfully deceived another person? 
n = 151 except for an = 149, bn = 148, and cn = 150. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.23. Correlations Between Responses on the Post-Experiment Questionnaire - Part 2, Gender, and All Subscale Totals 
 
PP SP ME RN BE CN SOI F STI C Gender Q1 Q2: a Q2: b Q2: c Q2: d Q2: e 
SP .332**a -                
ME .784**a .357**a -               
RN .201*a .404**a .220** -              
BE .266**a .530**a .316** .295** -             
CN .254**a .692**a .294** .553** .351** -            
SOI .068a -.200*a .143 .219** -.010 -.070 -           
F .107a .038a .114 .490** .102 .130 .416** -          
STI -.023a -.191*a -.057 .104 -.280** .021 .233** .301** -         
C .504**a .145a .407** .078 .052 .304** -.059 .056 .243** -        
Gender .227**a .037a .254** .177* -.014 .202* .064 .230** .377** .321** -       
Q1 .300**b .141b .420**c .215**c .113c .185*c .114c .172*c .098c .148c .354**c -      
Q2: Excited (a) .311**a .252**a .370** .172* .221** .230** -.007 .039 -.009 .254** .214** .278*c -     
Q2: Nervous/ 
Anxious (b) .129
a .203*a .103 -.025 .086 .097 -.090 -.144 -.260** .027 -.134 .043c .001 -    
Q2: Scared/ 
Worried (c) -.030
a .104a -.023 -.050 .069 -.031 -.085 -.061 -.297** -.095 -.191* .035c -.071 .395** -   
Q2: Guilty (d) -.399**a -.171*a -.390** -.123 -.140 -.285** -.025 .007 -.075 -.341 -.288** -.239**c -.230** .021 .102 -  
Q2: Other (d) .137a .052a .135 .131 -.005 .242** .000 .064 .303** .256** .287** .198*c .084 -.299** -.243** -.462** - 
Q3 .325**a .242**a .430** .173* .176* .216** .129 .111 .000 .232** .191* .385**c .300** .156 .118 -.142 .109 
Note. PP = Primary Psychopathy; SP = Secondary Psychopathy; ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; BE = Blame Externalization; CN = Carefree 
Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = Coldheartedness. Q1 = Compared to others, how good are you at lying? Q2 = How do you 
generally feel when you know that you have successfully deceived another person? Q3: In general, how often do you lie/week? 
n = 151 except for an = 150, bn = 148, and cn = 149. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.24 displays the correlations between responses on the first 3 questions of the 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 2 and the dependent variables. Contrary to expectations, 
almost none of these correlations were highly significant or of sizable magnitude, with the 
exception of the negative and significant correlations between feeling “Guilty” after having 
successfully deceived others (Question 2) and Exposure Lying Frequency and Severity. Though 
the magnitude of these correlations was small, they were in the expected direction (i.e., the more 
likely one is to lie and to lie to a greater degree in the Exposure Condition, the less likely one is 
to feel guilty about doing so).
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Table 3.24. Correlations Between Responses on the Post-Experiment Questionnaire and Dependent Variables 
 
Q1 Excited 
Nervous/ 
Anxious 
Scared/ 
Worried Guilty Other Q3 
NE 
Frequency 
E 
Frequency 
NE 
Severity 
Q1: Compared to others, how 
good are you at lying? -          
Q2: Excited .278**a -         
Q2: Nervous/Anxious .043a .001 -        
Q2: Scared/Worried .035a -.071 .395** -       
Q2: Guilty -.239**a -.230** .021 .102 -      
Q2: Other .198*a .084 -.299** -.243** -.462** -     
Q3: In general, how often do 
you lie in a week? .385
**a .300** .156 .118 -.142 .109 -    
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency -.057b .007c .085c -.048c .046c -.072c -.006c -   
Exposure Lying Frequency .015b .089c -.012c .014c -.194*c .033c .105c .566**c -  
Non-Exposure Lying Severity .018b .012c .057c -.108c -.038c .027c -.006c .847**c .523**c - 
Exposure Lying Severity .020b .081c -.023c .024 -.242**c .058c .088c .461**c .892**c .467**c 
Note. Q2 = How do you generally feel when you know that you have successfully deceived another person? NE = Non-Exposure; E = Exposure. 
n = 151 except for an = 149, bn = 125, and cn = 127. 
*p < .05. **p < .01
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The present research examined the relationship between psychopathy and lying among 
university students who had met, or had not met, the other player in a modified Trust Game 
called the Lying Game. Specifically, lying frequency and lying severity were examined in the 
study. Overall, the results suggested that lying frequency and lying severity were related to 
psychopathy when participants were provided with the opportunity to see and interact with their 
opponents but not when they were not provided with such an opportunity. Differences between 
males and females on lying frequency and lying severity were not significant across the two 
conditions, though males obtained significantly higher scores on the psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism measures than females. The results on a post-experiment self-report measure 
also suggested that psychopathy was related to certain characteristics of self-perceived lying 
behaviour, though the latter was not related to lying behaviour in the Lying Game. 
Reliability and Validity of the Machiavellianism and Psychopathy Self-Report Measures 
Consistent with previous findings (Billings, 2004; Levenson et al., 1995; Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005; McHoskey et al., 1998), the present results provide further support for the 
validity and reliability of the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R. Specifically the uniformly high alphas 
across the measures indicated good internal consistency. The significant correlations between the 
LSRP and the PPI-R, and the conceptually meaningful intercorrelations amongst the measure 
subscales suggested satisfactory construct validity. As well, the substantive correlations amongst 
the Mach-IV, LSRP and PPI-R totals are consistent with the view that Machiavellianism is 
related to psychopathy (McHoskey et al., 1998). Further, the ability of the three measures to 
predict lying frequency and severity in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition 
suggested satisfactory criterion-related validity. Though this relationship was not initially 
hypothesized, it is consistent with aspects of the psychopathic personality as depicted in clinical 
writings. This relationship is further elaborated upon below.
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The Lying Game 
Lying Frequency 
As aforementioned, despite the popular claim that psychopathic individuals are prolific 
liars, lying frequency has not been previously examined using behavioural measures within the 
psychopathy research literature. The results of the present study, however, lend some support to 
this assertion. Specifically, Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Total scores were collectively found to 
predict lying frequency in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition. While these 
measures were developed with a dimensional rather than a categorical approach to interpretation 
in mind, psychopathy/Machiavellianism Total scores were dichotomized in the present research 
using a median split in order to obtain a crude assessment of differences between groups (i.e., 
high and low on psychopathy/Machiavellianism) within the two Conditions (Non-Exposure and 
Exposure).  
When the median split was applied and differences in lying frequency between 
individuals who were high and low on psychopathic/Machiavellian tendencies were examined, 
results suggested that individuals who were high on the Mach-IV and LSRP lied moderately 
more overall than those who were low on these measures. However, no significant differences 
were found between high and low scorers overall on the PPI-R. Thus, the hypothesis that 
individuals who were higher on psychopathic tendencies would lie more than those who were 
lower was partially supported by these results. The differential findings between lying frequency 
and the PPI-R compared to the Mach-IV and LSRP is notable and may be due to several factors. 
First, as aforementioned, a median split was used to dichotomize the 
psychopathy/Machiavellianism variable. Dichotomizing a variable generally causes significant 
alterations to the nature of the original information (Field, 2009), usually resulting in decreased 
variability in the data and thus a loss of precision. This may have been especially relevant in the 
case of the PPI-R Total scores. 
Second, compared to the Mach-IV and LSRP, the PPI-R is a longer and much more 
heterogeneous measure (as indicated by the modest intercorrelations) that assesses the many 
features of psychopathy using eight separate subscales. As such, any two individuals may have 
different elevations and declinations across subscales and still arrive at similar PPI-R Total 
scores. Thus, it is possible that different individual subscale or combination of subscale 
elevations (i.e., exhibiting varying levels of the different features of psychopathy) may be more 
 88 
relevant to the prediction of lying frequency than the sum of all subscale elevations (i.e., the PPI-
R Total). Descriptive analyses revealed that the highest correlation between the PPI-R subscales 
and lying frequency was that involving the Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME) subscale within 
the Exposure Condition. However, post hoc analyses did not find the ME subscale to be a 
significant predictor of lying frequency. Post hoc analyses also did not find any of the other PPI-
R subscales to be significant predictors of lying frequency. 
Thus, a third possible explanation for the differential findings between lying frequency 
and the PPI-R compared to the Mach-IV and the LSRP is simply that the PPI-R is a poorer 
predictor of lying frequency overall compared to the other two measures. Indeed, post hoc 
analyses pairing each of the three measures in turn found that when the Mach-IV and LSRP were 
each paired with the PPI-R separately, they each contributed uniquely to the prediction of lying 
frequency while the PPI-R did not. Interestingly, when the Mach-IV and LSRP were paired 
simultaneously, the unique variance disappeared suggesting that there is a fair amount of 
overlapping variance between the two measures in the prediction of lying frequency. Therefore, 
combining the three measures together may have obscured the unique variance contributions of 
the Mach-IV and LSRP. Additionally, when the Primary Psychopathy subscale of the LSRP was 
used in place of the LSRP Total, it was found to be a significant individual predictor of lying 
frequency in both the Exposure and Non-Exposure Conditions, suggesting that it has a greater 
impact on the prediction of lying frequency than any of the other measures. As well, this finding 
suggests that the affective and interpersonal aspects of psychopathy may be more important than 
the behavioural aspects in the prediction of lying frequency. It is also consistent with the notion 
that there may be different subtypes of the disorder (e.g., Hervé, 2003; Poythress & Skeem, 
2006).  
Indeed, traditional accounts of psychopathy (i.e., Cleckley, 1976) have focused on 
individuals who possess the core personality features (i.e., affective and interpersonal aspects) of 
the disorder (e.g., pathological lying, superficial charm, lack of empathy, etc.) but who have 
managed to refrain from or evade detection for engaging in serious antisocial behaviour. They 
are therefore more likely to score higher on Factor 1 of the PCL-R than on Factor 2 (Hare, 2003). 
Such individuals have been referred to in the clinical and research literature as “successful” 
psychopaths (Hall & Benning, 2006), “industrial psychopaths” (Babiak, 1995), “white-collar” 
psychopaths (Hare, 1993), “subclinical” psychopaths (Hare, 1993) or “primary” psychopaths 
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(Blackburn, 1998). According to Blackburn, primary psychopaths are dominant, confident, 
extroverted, and low to average in anxiety, whereas “secondary” psychopaths are withdrawn, 
socially anxious, and average to high in anxiety (Blackburn, 1998). Although it has been 
suggested that these (i.e., primary psychopaths) individuals could be found across many different 
walks of life, they appear to be drawn to occupations that are associated with power, authority, 
and prestige (e.g., business, law, military, etc; Hare, 1993). As such, future research should 
continue to investigate lying behaviour in individuals with psychopathic tendencies in the 
community in order to clarify which aspects of psychopathy and correspondingly which 
measures are predictive of lying frequency in this population. 
With respect to lying frequency overall, there were no significant differences between the 
Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions. However, individuals scoring low on the Mach-IV and 
LSRP Totals, and ME and PP subscales averaged lower rates of lying in the Exposure Condition 
relative to the Non-Exposure Condition, though these differences were not significant. On the 
other hand, individuals scoring high on each of these measures averaged slightly higher rates of 
lying in the Exposure compared to the Non-Exposure Condition, though these differences were 
also not significant. At first glance, this latter result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
individuals who are higher on psychopathic tendencies are just as likely to lie to an acquaintance 
as to a stranger. However, the weak trends toward slightly higher rates of lying for individuals 
scoring high on these measures and toward slightly lower rates of lying for individuals scoring 
low on these measures in the Exposure relative to the Non-Exposure Condition is notable. 
Further, it is these slight decreases and increases in lying frequency that contribute to the 
significant difference found between high and low scorers on the LSRP Total and PP subscale in 
the Exposure Condition but not in the Non-Exposure Condition.  
Differences in lying frequency between low and high scorers as a result of having seen 
and interacted with the other person compared to not having done so can be elucidated by 
findings from past research. Specifically, one possible reason for the slight decrease in the rate of 
lying from the Non-Exposure to the Exposure Condition for low scorers may be related to the 
concept of deindividuation, which refers to the idea that people tend to become more disinhibited 
or more likely to violate social norms when they are not seen as individuals (Festinger, Pepitone, 
& Newcomb, 1952). In the now classic study, Diener, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem (1976) studied 
the concept in child trick-or-treaters, who had been instructed to take only one piece of candy 
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from a bowel that had seemingly been left unattended. The researchers found that individuals 
who were in the nonanonymous/identified condition (i.e., had been asked to identify their name 
and where they lived) were significantly less likely (i.e., 7.5% vs. 21.4%) to steal extra candy 
than individuals in the anonymous condition (i.e., had not been asked any identification 
questions). Applying the idea of deindividuation to the present study, it is possible that the low 
scorers may have inhibited their lying behaviour in the Exposure Condition relative to the Non-
Exposure Condition due to the condition of anonymity in the latter but not in the former.  
Alternatively, another possible reason for the slight decrease in lying rates in low scorers 
from the Non-Exposure to the Exposure Conditions can by illustrated by the results of a study by 
Bohnet and Frey (1999). They found that individuals playing non-zero-sum games were more 
likely to allocate more money to the other player when they had seen and learned something 
about them (i.e., their name, university major, hobby, birth place) compared to when they played 
the game anonymously. The former appeared to elicit empathy in the allocator by decreasing 
“social distance” between the two players while the latter did not. Given these findings and the 
consistent (clinical and empirical) observation that individuals who are higher on psychopathic 
and Machiavellian tendencies exhibit lower levels of empathy than those who are lower on such 
tendencies (Blair et al., 2005; Montagne et al., 2005), it is plausible that seeing and interacting 
with their opponent activated empathy in low scorers, but not high scorers, causing the former to 
lie less frequently relative to when they were not provided with the opportunity to see and 
interact with their opponent.  
On the other hand, although high scorers did not statistically differ on rates of lying from 
one condition to the other, there was a weak trend toward slightly higher rates of lying in the 
Exposure Condition compared to the Non-Exposure Condition. Previous research has found that 
high Machs were more likely than low Machs to excel in situations where they were able to 
communicate with and observe those with whom they were interacting, likely because this 
allowed them to assess social cues (Christie & Geis, 1970). Past research has also found that high 
Machs were more likely than low Machs to take advantage of trusting individuals (Harrel & 
Hartnagel, 1976).  
These findings are also consistent with what one would expect from individuals who are 
higher on psychopathic tendencies given the interpersonal and affective features associated with 
the disorder (e.g., glibness/superficial charm, manipulativeness, lack of remorse and empathy). 
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They may also explain why previous studies examining lying ability have failed to find 
significant differences between psychopathic and nonpsychopathic individuals, as they have 
largely been non-interactive in design (i.e., instructing individuals to lie on video and leaving 
them uninformed with respect to who their target audience is). This would seem to prevent the 
ability of psychopathic individuals to tailor their lies or appropriately “turn on the charm,” 
consequently diminishing, perhaps, their effectiveness or credibility to the target. Further, the 
lack of interaction in previous studies disregards the importance and influence of the other side 
of the equation: the characteristics of the target him/herself. That is, they failed to consider the 
possibility that psychopathic individuals may appear to be more successful at lying simply 
because they may be more likely to take advantage of or better at selecting vulnerable targets or 
favourable circumstances in which to direct their dissimulations than nonpsychopaths. 
Although not explicitly examined, there appears to be some evidence to support this 
claim in the present study. Specifically, while both the Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions 
allowed participants to interact with their opponents or “targets,” the Exposure Condition 
allowed participants the opportunity to observe and size up their opponent. Perhaps in so doing, 
high scorers assessed him/her to be an easy target, prompting them to increase their rate of lying 
for possible self-benefit. A cursory review of participants’ open-ended descriptions of their 
opponent in the Exposure Condition revealed that common descriptors for both the male and 
female “opponent” (i.e., confederate) included such adjectives as “honest,” “friendly,” “kind,” 
“nice,” and “trusting.” Unfortunately, participants were not also asked to report their inferences 
on the characteristics of their opponent in the Non-Exposure Condition and thus these could not 
be reported for comparison. 
Lying Severity 
Although rates of lying have previously been examined in psychopathic individuals using 
a self-report measure, lying severity has apparently never been previously examined empirically 
in this population. However, based on research from the Machiavellianism literature, which has 
found that high Machs are more willing and likely to tell bigger lies than low Machs (Geis et al., 
1970), it was hypothesized in the present research that individuals scoring high on 
psychopathic/Machiavellian tendencies would also lie to a greater degree than those scoring low 
on such tendencies. This hypothesis was partially supported by the results of the present study. 
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Specifically, Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Total scores were collectively found to predict lying 
severity in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition.  
As with lying frequency, dichotomized psychopathy/Machiavellianism Total scores were 
also used to obtain a crude assessment of differences between groups (i.e., high and low on 
psychopathy/Machiavellianism) within the two Conditions (Non-Exposure and Exposure) on the 
lying severity variable. Results pertaining to lying severity were similar to those obtained for 
lying frequency. Specifically, results suggested that individuals who were high on the Mach-IV 
and LSRP Totals, and the ME and PP subtotals were significantly more likely to lie to a greater 
degree overall than those who were low on these measures. In contrast, no significant differences 
were found between high and low scorers overall on the PPI-R. Thus, the hypothesis that 
individuals who were higher on psychopathic tendencies would lie to a greater degree than those 
who were lower was partially supported by these results. The differential findings between lying 
severity and the PPI-R compared to the Mach-IV and LSRP are likely due to the same factors 
described above for lying frequency. 
Interestingly, post hoc analyses conducted to examine the relative impact of the three 
measures and a few of the subscales on the prediction of lying severity were also quite similar to 
that of parallel analyses conducted with lying frequency. Specifically, post hoc analyses 
suggested that Mach-IV and LSRP each contributed uniquely to the prediction of lying severity 
while the PPI-R did not when measures were paired in turn. Post hoc analyses also suggested 
that there was a fair amount of overlapping variance between the Mach-IV and LSRP in the 
prediction of lying severity and that combining the three measures together may have obscured 
the unique variance contributions of these two measures. A similar pattern was also found when 
the ME subscale was paired with the Mach-IV and LSRP separately, suggesting that there may 
be a substantial amount of shared variance among these three measures in the prediction of lying 
severity. Additionally, when the Primary Psychopathy subscale of the LSRP was used in place of 
the LSRP Total, it was found to be a marginally significant individual predictor of lying severity 
in the Exposure Condition and a significant individual predictor of lying severity in the Non-
Exposure Condition. This suggests that the PP subscale may have a greater impact on the 
prediction of lying severity than any of the other measures. Again, these finding are consistent 
with indications that there are different subtypes of psychopathy (e.g., Hervé, 2003; Poythress & 
Skeem, 2006). 
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With respect to lying severity overall, there were no significant differences between the 
Non-Exposure and Exposure Conditions. However, individuals scoring low on the Mach-IV, 
LSRP, and PPI-R Totals and the ME and PP subtotals lied to a lesser degree overall in the 
Exposure Condition relative to the Non-Exposure Condition, though these differences were not 
significant. On the other hand, individuals scoring high on each of these measures lied to a 
greater degree overall in the Exposure compared to the Non-Exposure Condition, though these 
differences were also not significant. Initially, this latter result appears to suggest that individuals 
who are higher on psychopathic tendencies lie to a similar degree to acquaintances and strangers 
alike. However, the weak trends toward slightly greater degrees of lying for individuals scoring 
high on these measures and slightly lesser degrees of lying for individuals scoring low on these 
measures in the Exposure relative to the Non-Exposure condition is noteworthy. Further, it is 
these slight decreases and increases in lying severity that contribute to the significant difference 
found between high and low scorers on the Mach-IV, LSRP, and PPI-R Totals and on the PP and 
ME subscales in the Exposure Condition but not in the Non-Exposure Condition.  
The same reasons suggested for the differences in lying frequency across the two 
conditions between high and low scorers on the psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures may 
also account for the parallel differences observed in lying severity. Specifically, seeing and 
interacting with their opponent may have activated empathy in low scorers, but not high scorers, 
causing them to lie to a lesser degree relative to when they were not provided with the 
opportunity to see and interact with their opponent. On the other hand, high scorers may have 
sized up their opponent in the Exposure Condition as an easy target, prompting them to lie to a 
greater degree relative to the Non-Exposure Condition where they were not provided with any 
such cues. 
Lying Frequency and Lying Severity Over Repeated Interactions 
Babiak (1995) observed that psychopathic individuals tend to make favourable initial 
impressions but with prolonged interaction their manipulative and deceitful nature becomes 
evident to others around them. The same has been suggested of Machiavellians (Wilson et al., 
1996). The results from the present research, however, were only partially consistent with these 
observations and hypotheses. While higher scores on the psychopathy/Machiavellianism 
measures were significantly related to higher rates of lying in the last trial but not the first trial of 
the Exposure Condition for the Mach-IV and LSRP but not the PPI-R, direct comparisons 
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between the correlations for trial 1 and 10 were significant for the Mach-IV but not the LSRP. As 
well, while higher scores on the psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures were significantly 
related to a greater degree of lying in the last trial but not the first trial of the Exposure Condition 
for all three measures, direct comparisons between the correlations for trial 1 and 10 were 
significant for both the Mach-IV and LSRP but not for the PPI-R. Nevertheless, these findings 
suggest that lying frequency and severity in individuals who are higher on psychopathic 
tendencies may be influenced by the nature of the interaction (i.e., face-to-face vs. 
blind/anonymous; short vs. long) and the likelihood of facing negative repercussions. 
Additionally, results revealed that none of the correlations between the measure totals and the 
first and last trials were significant for the Non-Exposure Condition (nor were the differences 
between the correlations), possibly for the same reasons proposed above (see previous section).  
Given the myriad recent examples in the media of prominent, high-functioning 
individuals in the business world who have defrauded others out of billions of dollars over many 
decades (e.g., Bernie Madoff), the length of an interaction is an important variable of study in the 
context of lying behaviour. While the present study employed a repeated game to assess lying 
behaviour over time in order to provide participants with ample opportunities to lie, it did not 
examine lying frequency and severity over a single interaction. Thus, the results from these two 
situations could not be compared. Future research should examine the lying behaviour of 
Machiavellians/psychopathic individuals over both single and repeated interactions in order to 
allow for direct comparisons between the two situations. 
 Similarly, Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003) found that trust and reciprocity were 
reduced in single (as opposed to repeated), anonymous (as opposed to face-to-face) Trust Games 
when participants played both roles (i.e., P1s offered less money and P2s were less likely to split 
the tripled amount) relative to when participants played only one role. The authors suggested that 
participants may have been more inclined to act in a self-interested manner in the former relative 
to the latter situation, as they recognized that their counterparts would have multiple 
opportunities to recuperate losses on subsequent rounds with a different opponent. Thus, they 
had a sense of “reduced responsibility” (Burks et al., 2003, p. 196). While it has been suggested 
that psychopathic/Machiavellian individuals generally act in a self-interested manner and possess 
a competitive and exploitative worldview (Blackburn, 2006), it is unknown how playing both 
roles in the present study would affect lying frequency and severity in more 
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psychopathic/Machiavellian compared to less psychopathic/Machiavellian individuals. Thus, 
future studies should directly compare situations where participants play only one role to 
situations where participants play both roles. 
Sex Differences 
Consistent with previous findings, the results of the present research suggested that males 
were more Machiavellian and psychopathic than females. However, males and females varied 
somewhat on which aspects of psychopathy (i.e., which subscale measures) were significantly 
related to lying frequency and severity, though differences were not statistically significant (e.g., 
the Blame Externalization subscale was significantly related to Exposure Lying Frequency and 
Exposure Lying Severity for females but not for males). As well, males and females were not 
found to differ significantly on lying frequency or lying severity. These findings are in line with 
those of Aoki et al. (2010) who also did not find differences in lying frequency (lying severity 
was not investigated nor were psychopathic tendencies) between males and females in a different 
non-zero-sum game. Thus, while males in the study were found to be more Machiavellian and 
psychopathic than females, they did not significantly differ on lying frequency or severity. One 
possibility for the null findings in the present research may be that the small sample size used 
failed to detect the effect, which, in actuality, may also be of small magnitude. Another 
possibility for the lack of sex differences found may be that the iPod was differentially 
motivating for males compared to females. Perhaps if the prize consisted of a more 
stereotypically gender-biased item (e.g., Ultimate Fighting Championship tickets, etc), an 
emergence in sex differences on lying frequency and severity may have become apparent. Yet 
another possibility for these results may be that the males in the sample may not actually have 
been more Machiavellian or psychopathic than the females; rather, their higher scores may 
perhaps reflect a slightly exaggerated sense of bravado. 
Self-Perceived Lying Behaviour 
Results from the Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Part 2, which included questions 
derived from Klaver et al. (2007), revealed that certain characteristics of self-perceived lying 
behaviour were significantly related to higher scores on the psychopathy and Machiavellianism 
measures. Specifically, individuals scoring higher on psychopathic/Machiavellian tendencies 
were significantly more likely to perceive themselves as better liars compared to others and to 
report higher rates of lying over the course of a week. Higher scores on the 
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psychopathy/Machiavellianism measures were also significantly related to a higher tendency to 
report feeling excited and a lower tendency to report feeling guilty after deceiving another 
person. These findings are consistent with clinical accounts of psychopathic individuals as 
grandiose, callous/lacking in empathy, lacking in remorse or guilt, and having a propensity to lie 
and deceive (i.e., pathological lying), and further deriving enjoyment from such behaviours (also 
known as “duping delight;” Ekman, 2009). The latter may also explain why participants who 
scored higher on psychopathic/Machiavellian tendencies lied more frequently and to a greater 
degree than those who scored lower in the Exposure but not in the Non-Exposure Condition. 
That is, perhaps high scorers lied more frequently and severely in the Exposure but not in the 
Non-Exposure Condition than low scorers because they found it more thrilling or obtained more 
of a “rush” from knowing or seeing who it was they were deceiving. 
Klaver et al (2007) also found that higher psychopathy scores were related to higher self-
perceived lying ability. However, in contrast to the present research, they did not find higher 
psychopathy scores to be related to higher self-perceived lying frequency. While the researchers 
found that psychopathic offenders reported feeling less nervous or anxious after successful 
deception compared to their nonpsychopathic counterparts, they also found that no psychopathic 
offenders reported feeling “excited” and that there were no differences between psychopathic 
and nonpsychopathic offenders in their reporting of feeling “guilty” after successful deception. 
The differences in findings between the present research and that of Klaver et al. (2007) may 
have been due to dissimilarities in methodology between the two studies including the use of 
different lying tasks (non-zero-sum game versus telling truthful and falsified accounts of 
previous offenses), different samples (student versus offenders), and different measures of 
psychopathy (LSRP and PPI-R versus the PCL-R).  
In the present research, self-reported lying behaviour was not found to be related to lying 
behaviour in the game, with the exception of feeling “guilty” after successful deception, which 
was negatively related to lying frequency and severity in the Exposure Condition (i.e., 
individuals who were more likely to report feeling “guilty” after successful deception were less 
likely to lie and to lie to a lesser degree when they had seen and interacted with their opponent 
prior to playing the game). These results are consistent with the “attitude-behaviour gap” (i.e., 
that there is a discrepancy between what people say they do or would do and what they actually 
do) often observed when general attitudes/intentions are measured and used to predict specific 
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behaviours (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). The reason for the discrepancy is because the relationship 
is influenced by individual differences and situational context (Azjen & Fishbein, 2005). In the 
case of the present research, two individuals may both report lying “often,” but one may lie in 
the Lying Game while the other may not due to a variety of reasons (e.g., one may have wanted 
to win the “iPod” and thus lied more frequently in the game while the other may not have found 
the iPod to have been a sufficiently motivating incentive to warrant lying. Or one may have been 
more psychopathic than the other and derived enjoyment from lying while the other may not 
have, etc.). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations to the present research. First, the sample size was relatively 
small and consisted of a disproportionately higher number of females compared to males, thus 
reducing the generalizability of the results and the statistical power to detect significant effects, 
particularly with respect to the examination of sex differences. Second, the present research used 
undergraduate students, mostly from Introductory Psychology classes, and not offenders or 
psychiatric patients, who typically evidence a higher prevalence of clinical levels of 
psychopathy. However, the results of the present study are theoretically consistent with clinical 
descriptions of psychopathy and particularly with those involving the “successful” and “white-
collar” subtype of the disorder (i.e., individuals who lie in a business or employment context in 
order to secure financial or material gain). Thus, in this regard, one could argue that it may be 
more appropriate to use a nonforensic sample rather than a forensic one. Third, most participants 
received course credit simply for presenting at the laboratory at the scheduled time for the study 
and thus may not have been sufficiently motivated to play the game or complete the 
questionnaires in an attentive manner. However, the inclusion of the draw to increase participant 
motivation and elicit thoughtful participation in the game, as well as the removal of participant 
data based on inconsistent responding on the self-report measures was expected to diminish the 
effects of possible participant indifference on the results.  
Fourth, participants in the present research observed and were introduced to their 
“opponents” in the Exposure Condition via webcam rather than in the actual physical presence of 
one another due to practical reasons (i.e., to circumvent difficulties in recruiting a sufficient 
number of confederates). This served to increase experimental control by disallowing 
participants and opponents/confederates the opportunity to engage in a back-and-forth dialogue. 
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However, it simultaneously reduced external validity. Thus, researchers conducting comparable 
studies in the future may wish to consider examining the nature of the face-to-face interaction in 
a different way (e.g., allowing participants to meet in-person; allowing for varying durations of 
verbal exchanges, etc.). 
The above limitations notwithstanding, the findings of the present research have made a 
valuable contribution to the study of lying behaviour in individuals with psychopathic 
tendencies. In particular, they have provided an initial empirical basis for the widespread clinical 
observation that individuals who are higher on psychopathic tendencies exhibit a higher 
propensity towards engagement in lying behaviour and are more likely to derive enjoyment from 
such behaviour compared to individuals who are lower on such tendencies. They have also 
provided a more nuanced understanding of the nature of lying behaviour in individuals with 
psychopathic individuals than is generally depicted in clinical writings. That is, the present 
findings suggest that individuals with psychopathic tendencies may not lie as indiscriminately as 
generally perceived, but rather their rate and degree of lying may be influenced by the nature of 
the interaction (i.e., face-to-face vs. blind/anonymous; short vs. long). Given that psychopathic 
individuals are also purported to be masterful liars in the clinical literature, empirically supported 
knowledge about lying frequency in this population is vital to enhancing the accuracy of lie 
detection, which is of notable importance within forensic and clinical contexts where matters of 
public safety are of primary concern.  
Specifically, as previously suggested, the results of the present study are particularly 
germane to the context of white-collar/corporate crime and our understanding of its nature and 
process. Such understanding seems especially relevant and invaluable in the midst of the 
numerous recent high profile business scandals (e.g., Enron) that have been visible in the media 
and further, projections that corporate crime may be on the rise (Boe, 2010). Moreover, the 
present results are pertinent to augmenting our understanding of the lying behaviour of the 
“successful” or “subclinical” psychopath, who may not engage in behaviours that are illegal per 
se but rather in those that may still cause harm because they violate social norms or the rights of 
others (e.g., academic misconduct, sexual infidelity, etc). A major criticism of the current state of 
the psychopathy literature is that it has focused primarily on the criminal psychopath despite 
suggestions and clinical observations that psychopathy does not necessarily lead to serious 
antisocial behaviour or criminal deviance (Cleckley, 1976; Hall & Benning, 2006). Thus, as 
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aforementioned, future research should continue to explore the base rate of lying in individuals 
who are higher on psychopathic tendencies not only in clinical and forensic samples but also in 
subclinical and nonforensic samples, as the present investigation and others (e.g., Billings, 2004) 
have found personality profiles and patterns of lying behaviour in the latter that are consistent 
with that of clinical descriptions of the disorder. Additionally, nonforensic samples will likely be 
associated with a more heterogeneous spectrum of demographics, compared to offender samples, 
which tend to contain a high prevalence of individuals with cognitive and learning disabilities 
and are typically from low socioeconomic backgrounds (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Samuelsson, 
Herkner, & Lundberg, 2009). Thus, employing such samples in future research would contribute 
to a more comprehensive understanding of the disorder overall. 
 In addition to the above, much research is still needed to discern the factors that affect the 
base rate and the severity of lying in individuals with psychopathic tendencies, such as the nature 
of the interaction (e.g., face-to-face versus blind/anonymous; short versus long) and the 
characteristics of the target/victim/lie detector (e.g., appearing overly trusting), as the present 
findings have suggested. Other factors in this category should include further exploration of sex 
differences and cultural differences. While the latter was not investigated in the present research, 
culture has been noted to play an important role in the manifestation of and one’s motivation to 
engage in lying behaviour (Aune & Waters, 2002; Vrij & Winkel, 1991), as well as in the 
prevalence of psychopathy itself (Sullivan & Kosson, 2006). Thus, it merits considerable 
empirical attention. Moreover, as aforementioned, future research should focus on which aspects 
of psychopathy (i.e., interpersonal versus behavioural) are better associated with lying frequency 
and lying severity, and accordingly which measures best predict such behaviours, as the present 
findings have suggested differences across both. In pursuing these research questions, it has been 
shown in the present study that examination of lying conduct using non-zero-sum games can 
provide a meaningful analogue for and valuable insight into the complex nature of real-world 
lying behaviour.  
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APPENDIX A: LSRP 
 
Please read each statement and consider your level of agreement. Rate each statement using the 
following scale and record your answers by circling the answer under each statement that is most 
representative of how you feel.  
 
0. Disagree Strongly – I disagree completely with this statement  
1. Disagree Somewhat – I disagree with this statement but not entirely 
2. Agree Somewhat– I agree with this statement but not entirely 
3. Agree Strongly – I agree completely with this statement  
 
1. Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about the losers. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
2. For me, what's right is whatever I can get away with.  
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
3. In today's world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get away with to succeed. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
4. My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as I can. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
5. Making a lot of money is my most important goal. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
6. I let others worry about higher values; my main concern is with the bottom line. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
7. People who are stupid enough to get ripped off usually deserve it. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
8. Looking out for myself is my top priority. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
9. I tell other people what they want to hear so that they will do what I want them to do. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
10. I would be upset if my success came at someone else's expense. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
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11. I often admire a really clever scam. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
12. I make a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit of my goals. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
13.1 enjoy manipulating other people's feelings. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
14. I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone else to feel emotional pain. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
15. Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, I wouldn't lie about it. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
16. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to others. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
17. I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time after time. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
18. I am often bored. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
19. I find that I am able to pursue one goal for a long time. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
20. I don't plan anything very far in advance. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
21. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
22. Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just don't understand me. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
23.  Before I do anything, I carefully consider the possible consequences. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
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24. I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people.  
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
25. When I get frustrated, I often "let off steam" by blowing my top. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
 
26. Love is overrated. 
0---------------------1-----------------------2-------------------------3 
   disagree strongly disagree somewhat agree somewhat       agree strongly 
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APPENDIX B: MACH-IV SCALE 
 
Below are twenty statements. Please read each one and consider your level of agreement. Rate each 
statement using the following scale and record your answers by circling the answer under each statement 
that is most representative of how you feel.  
 
1. Strongly Agree – I agree completely with this statement  
2. Somewhat Agree – I agree with this statement but not entirely  
3. No Opinion – I have no opinion about this statement  
4. Somewhat Disagree – I disagree with this statement but not entirely  
5. Strongly Disagree – I disagree completely with this statement  
 
1) The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
2) When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather 
than giving reasons which might carry more weight.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
3) Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
4) It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
5) Honesty is the best policy in all cases.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
6) It’s safe to assume that all people have a vicious streak that will come out when they are given a 
chance.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
7) Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
8) One should take action only when sure it is morally right.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
9) It is wise to flatter important people.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
10) All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
11) Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a sucker born every minute.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
12) People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
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13) It is possible to be good in all respects.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
14) Most people are basically good and kind.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree 
 
15) There is no excuse for lying to someone else.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
16) Most people forget more easily the death of their parent than the loss of their property.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
17) Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
18) Generally speaking, people won’t work hard unless they are forced to do so.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
19) The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to  
get caught.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion 4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree  
 
20) Most people are brave.  
1. Strongly Agree  2. Somewhat Agree  3. No Opinion  4. Somewhat Disagree  5. Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX C: POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE – PART 1 (PILOT TESTING) 
 
 
1. In the first 10 computer trials, you were Player 1 ____ Player 2 ____ (check one). 
 
2. In a sentence or two, please state your view of what is being investigated in this study. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Did you know any of the other participants in the waiting room prior to today’s experiment? 
 
Yes____ No_____ (check one) 
 
If so, who? _______________________________ 
 
4. (a) During the first 10 computer trials, were you able to deduce any characteristics about the 
other participant? Please describe in a sentence or two. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 (b) During the second 10 computer trials, were you able to deduce any characteristics about the 
other participant? Please describe in a sentence or two. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant Information: 
 
5. Age:  ____   
 
 
6. Gender:  M___ F___   (check one)
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APPENDIX D - POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE – PART 2 (PILOT TESTING) 
 
1. Please circle the number that best describes your response to the following question:  
Compared to others, how good are you at lying? 
 
           1-------------------2---------------------3-----------------------4--------------------5 
   Very Much         Below Average             Average                 Above Average         Very Much       
Below Average                                                                                Above Average 
 
2. How do you generally feel when you know that you have successfully deceived another 
person?  
Check all that apply: 
(a) excited 
(b) nervous/anxious 
(c) scared/worried 
(d) guilty 
(e) other (please specify): _________________________ 
 
3. In general, how often do you lie in a week? 
 
            1-------------------2---------------------3-----------------------4--------------------5 
         Never                    Rarely                 Sometimes                       Often                Very Often 
 
4. Is your response to question 3 one of those times that you lie? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX E: CONSENT FORM (PILOT TESTING) 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled The Effect of Gender and 
Personality on Individual Judgement and Decision-Making. Please read this form carefully, 
and feel free to ask questions you might have. 
 
Researcher(s):  
Student Researcher: Kate Pan, Ph.D. Student, Department of Psychology, Arts Building, Room 
69A, University of Saskatchewan. Phone: (306) 966-6719. Email: kate.pan@usask.ca 
 
Researcher Supervisor: J. Stephen Wormith, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Arts Building, 
Room 180, University of Saskatchewan. Phone: (306) 966-6818. Email: s.wormith@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of gender and 
personality on individual judgement and decision-making. Participation in this study is voluntary 
and consists of playing a series of computer game trials and completing several personality 
measures. The study is expected to take between 45 to 60 minutes to complete. You will receive 
two research credits for your participation, as well as the opportunity to enter into a draw for an 
8GB iPod Music Player. The findings from this study will be written up in the form of a Doctoral 
thesis. It is also anticipated that the findings from this study will be presented at academic 
conferences and submitted for publication to a peer-reviewed scientific journal. All data 
collected will be reported in aggregate or summarized form, thus your identity will be kept 
confidential.  
 
Potential Benefits: While there are no direct benefits for participating beyond learning about the 
process of psychological research, your participation in this study will assist researchers in their 
effort to better understand the influence of gender and personality on individual judgement and 
decision-making behaviour.  
 
Potential Risks: There are no physical or mental health risks associated with participating in the 
study. However, some of the measures are designed to examine aspects of your personality, 
behaviour, and how you view the world in general. While the measures are not designed to make 
you feel uncomfortable, they may cause some personal embarrassment as you answer the 
questions. Thus, you are free to answer only those questions that you feel comfortable answering 
and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty by verbally informing the 
researcher. Further, you may request that your data be removed from the data set at any time, 
which will also result in the immediate destruction of the data that you have contributed. If you 
do experience any stress, or have concerns or questions at any time throughout the data 
collection period and/or after you finish participating, you are encouraged to discuss them with 
the student researcher or her researcher supervisor. Please contact the researchers using the 
information provided above. Alternatively, you may decide to contact Student Counseling 
Services (306-966-4920). 
 
 116 
Storage of Data: The data collected today will be kept in secure location in a locked filing 
cabinet Dr. J. Stephen Wormith’s research lab for a minimum of five years, after which the data 
will be destroyed beyond recovery.  
  
Confidentiality: All information collected is entirely confidential. Please do not put your name 
on the measures and questionnaires. Confidentiality will be maintained by identifying 
questionnaire data using only a numerical identification code generated by the researcher, so that 
no one will be able to connect your name to your responses. Computerized data will similarly be 
identified by the same numerical identification code, stored on a password-protected computer 
until such time that it can be burned onto a CD, deleted from the computer, and stored in a 
locked filing cabinet, separate from the consent forms. Further, only aggregate data will be 
included in the final reporting of the results, any personal or identifying information will not be 
included. Additionally, you should be aware that the researcher will be obligated to report any 
intent to harm one’s self or another person to the authorities (e.g., if you tell the researcher that 
you plan on finding John Doe and verbally or physically assaulting him). 
 
Right to Withdraw:  Your participation is voluntary, and you can answer only those questions 
that you are comfortable with. There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from your 
involvement. The information that is shared will be held in strict confidence and discussed only 
with the research team. You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time, 
without penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study you will still receive the 
research credits and the opportunity to participate in the draw associated with participating in this 
study. If you withdraw from the research project at any time, any data that you have contributed 
will be destroyed at your request. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the research project, please feel free to ask at 
any point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided if you have other 
questions. This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on April 14, 2009. Any questions regarding 
your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the Ethics Office (966-
2084).  Out of town participants may call collect.  
 
Follow-Up or Debriefing: You will be provided with a debriefing sheet at the end of the 
experiment, or in the event that you choose not to participate. The debriefing sheet will provide 
some background to the study and specify the aims of the study. Information concerning the 
results of the study may be arranged (following the study’s completion) via Kate Pan or Dr. 
Wormith at the contact address above.  
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. I consent to participate in the 
research project, understanding that I may withdraw my consent at any time. A copy of this 
Consent Form has been given to me for my records. 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
 117 
APPENDIX F: INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED $10 TRUST GAME – CONDITION 1 
 
Instructions for Player1 
You have been asked to participate in a psychology experiment. You will be playing a 
series of games on a computer. Please read these instructions carefully and ask any questions 
prior to the start of the experiment, as the researcher may not be available once the game has 
begun.  
 
You have been designated to be Player 1 in this experiment. You will be paired with 
another participant who will be designated as Player 2. At no point before, during, or after the 
experiment will you be told who the other participant is. 
 
You will be playing a game wherein you and the other player are each given $10 of 
virtual money. As Player 1 (P1), you can give Player 2 (P2) any dollar amount between $0 and 
$10; any amount you give to P2 will triple for him/her. P2 can then decide to either split this 
tripled amount with you or keep it all to him- or herself. Please note: you do not have to give P2 
the amount that you said you would; you can give him/her more or less. P2 will base his/her 
decision on what you have told him/her; s/he will not know what you have actually given 
him/her until after s/he has made his decision to split the money with you or not.  
 
As you can see on the computer monitor, you have been given $10 in virtual money to 
begin (Player 2’s screen will also display $10 in virtual money to start). To begin, you will have 
the opportunity to give any dollar amount between $1 and $10 of your virtual money to Player 2 
(see diagram below) or you may decide not to give any money at all, in which case the game 
ends and you both end up with the $10 you began with. However, if you do give money to Player 
2, each dollar you give will be tripled. For example, if you give $2, it will triple to become $6. 
Player 2 will decide whether or not s/he will split this tripled amount evenly with you. If s/he 
decides to split the money evenly with you, for example if the tripled amount is $6, you will end 
up with $11 (i.e., $3 + what remains of your original $10, which is $8) and s/he will end up with 
$13 (i.e., $3 + his/her original $10).  
 
As noted above, you do not have to give P2 the amount you said you would; you can give 
him/her more or less. The amount that you are telling P2 that you are giving will be entered into 
the “disclosed amount” box on the computer screen. You will notice that there is also a box for 
the “actual amount.” This is the amount of money that you actually want to give to P2. To 
clarify, both the “disclosed amount” and “actual amount” can be the same or different (i.e., more 
or less). Player 2 will decide whether to split or not split any money with you based only on the 
“disclosed amount” you enter. S/He will not see the “actual amount” you enter until after s/he 
has made this decision. 
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 Once Player 2 makes his/her decision, the trial ends. You will play this game with Player 
2 10 times. The computer will tally up your earnings and this will be displayed in the top portion 
of your screen at the end of all 10 games. Each dollar amount you earn will be equivalent to one 
entry into a draw for an iPod music player (e.g., if you earn $10, your name will be entered into 
the draw 10 times). 
 
 When you have finished playing the 10 games, please notify the researcher. 
P1 
$10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
$10 - X (P1) 
3($X) +10 (P2) 
3X/2 + (10-X) (P1) 
3X/2 + 10 (P2) 
Split $ 
P2 
Don’t Give $ Can lie or tell truth about 
amount of $ given 
Decides whether to split tripled 
amount with P1 or not 
3($X) 
Don’t Split $ 
Give $ 
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APPENDIX G: INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED $10 TRUST GAME – CONDITION 1 
 
Instructions for Player2 
You have been asked to participate in a psychology experiment. You will be playing a 
series of games on a computer. Please read these instructions carefully and ask any questions 
prior to the start of the experiment, as the researcher may not be available once the game has 
begun.  
 
You have been designated to be Player 2 in this experiment. You will be paired with 
another participant who will be designated as Player 1. At no point before, during, or after the 
experiment will you be told who the other participant is. 
 
You will be playing a game wherein you and the other player are each given $10 of 
virtual money. Player 1 (P1) can give you as Player 2 (P2) any dollar amount between $0 and 
$10; any amount s/he gives to you will triple. You can decide to either split this tripled amount 
with him/her or keep it all to yourself. Please note: P1 does not have to give you the amount that 
s/he said s/he would; s/he can give you more or less. You will base your decision on what s/he 
has told you; you will not know what s/he has actually given you until after you have made your 
decision to split the money with him/her or not.  
 
As you can see on the computer monitor, you have been given $10 in virtual money to 
begin (Player 1’s screen will also display $10 in virtual money to start). To begin, P1 will have 
the opportunity to give any dollar amount between $1 and $10 of his/her virtual money to you 
(see diagram below) or s/he may decide not to give any money at all, in which case the game 
ends and you both end up with the $10 you began with. However, if s/he does give money to 
you, each dollar s/he gives will be tripled. For example, if s/he gives $2, it will triple to become 
$6. You will decide whether or not you will split this tripled amount evenly with him/her. If you 
decide to split the money evenly with him/her, for example if the tripled amount is $6, s/he will 
end up with $11 (i.e., $3 + what remains of his/her original $10, which is $8) and you will end 
up with $13 (i.e., $3 + your original $10).  
 
As noted above, P1 does not have to give you the amount s/he said s/he would; s/he can 
give you more or less. The amount that s/he tells you that s/he is giving will be entered into the 
“disclosed amount” box on the computer screen. There is also a box for the “actual amount” on 
P1’s screen. This is the amount of money that s/he actually wants to give to you. To clarify, both 
the “disclosed amount” and the “actual amount” can be the same or different (i.e., more or less). 
You will decide whether to split or not split any money with P1 based only on the “disclosed 
amount” s/he enters. You will not see the “actual amount” s/he enters until after you have made 
this decision. 
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 Once you make your decision, the trial ends. You will play this game with Player 1 10 
times. The computer will tally up your earnings and this will be displayed in the top portion of 
your screen at the end of all 10 games. Each dollar amount you earn will be equivalent to one 
entry into a draw for an iPod music player (e.g., if you earn $10, your name will be entered into 
the draw 10 times). 
 
 When you have finished playing the 10 games, please notify the researcher. 
P1 
$10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
$10 - X (P1) 
3($X) +10 (P2) 
3X/2 + (10-X) (P1) 
3X/2 + 10 (P2) 
Split $ 
P2 
Don’t Give $ Can lie or tell truth about 
amount of $ given 
Decides whether to split 
tripled amount with P1 or 
not 
3($X) 
Don’t Split $ 
Give $ 
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APPENDIX H: RESEARCHER’S SCRIPT (CONDITION 1 PRECEDES CONDITION 2) 
PILOT TESTING 
 
At the end of Condition 1 
 
R(eseacher): Ok, participant’s name, now I have to go check on the other participants in the 
experiment. I’m going to bring you to a waiting room for a bit while I get organized and set up 
for the next part of the study. 
 
(Arriving at the waiting room, where the three confederates are already waiting) 
 
R: Participant’s name, this is _________ (confederate 1). 
 
Confederate 1: Hi 
 
R:  this is __________ (confederate 2). 
 
Confederate 2: Hi 
 
R: and this is __________ (confederate 3) 
 
Confederate 3: Hi 
 
R: Participant’s name, you are going to be playing _________ (confederate 1) in the first game, 
where you’ll be Player 1 and s/he’ll be Player 2. Then, in the second game, you’ll play 
__________ (confederate 2). In that game, s/he’ll be Player 1 and you’ll be Player 2.  
 
Alright, I’m going to leave you now to check up on the others and set up the computers. I will be 
back in a few minutes to get you two (i.e., participant and confederate 1) set up first. 
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APPENDIX I: INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED $10 TRUST GAME – CONDITION 2 
 
Instructions for Player1 
You have been asked to participate in a psychology experiment. You will be playing a 
series of games on a computer. Please read these instructions carefully and ask any questions 
prior to the start of the experiment, as the researcher may not be available once the game has 
begun.  
 
You have been designated to be Player 1 in this experiment. You will be paired with 
another participant who has been designated as Player 2.  
 
You will be playing a game wherein you and the other player are each given $10 of 
virtual money. As Player 1 (P1), you can give Player 2 (P2) any dollar amount between $0 and 
$10; any amount you give to P2 will triple for him/her. P2 can then decide to either split this 
tripled amount with you or keep it all to him- or herself. Please note: you do not have to give P2 
the amount that you said you would; you can give him/her more or less. P2 will base his/her 
decision on what you have told him/her; s/he will not know what you have actually given 
him/her until after s/he has made his decision to split the money with you or not.  
 
As you can see on the computer monitor, you have been given $10 in virtual money to 
begin (Player 2’s screen will also display $10 in virtual money to start). To begin, you will have 
the opportunity to give any dollar amount between $1 and $10 of your virtual money to Player 2 
(see diagram below) or you may decide not to give any money at all, in which case the game 
ends and you both end up with the $10 you began with. However, if you do give money to Player 
2, each dollar you give will be tripled. For example, if you give $2, it will triple to become $6. 
Player 2 will decide whether or not s/he will split this tripled amount evenly with you. If s/he 
decides to split the money evenly with you, for example if the tripled amount is $6, you will end 
up with $11 (i.e., $3 + what remains of your original $10, which is $8) and s/he will end up with 
$13 (i.e., $3 + his/her original $10).  
 
As noted above, you do not have to give P2 the amount you said you would; you can give 
him/her more or less. The amount that you are telling P2 that you are giving will be entered into 
the “disclosed amount” box on the computer screen. You will notice that there is also a box for 
the “actual amount.” This is the amount of money that you actually want to give to P2. To 
clarify, both the “disclosed amount” and “actual amount” can be the same or different (i.e., more 
or less). Player 2 will decide whether to split or not split any money with you based only on the 
“disclosed amount” you enter. S/He will not see the “actual amount” you enter until after s/he 
has made this decision. 
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 Once Player 2 makes his/her decision, the trial ends. You will play this game with Player 
2 10 times. The computer will tally up your earnings and this will be displayed in the top portion 
of your screen at the end of all 10 games. Each dollar amount you earn will be equivalent to one 
entry into a draw for an iPod music player (e.g., if you earn $10, your name will be entered into 
the draw 10 times). 
 
 When you have finished playing the 10 games, please notify the researcher. 
P1 
$10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
$10 - X (P1) 
3($X) +10 (P2) 
3X/2 + (10-X) (P1) 
3X/2 + 10 (P2) 
Split $ 
P2 
Don’t Give $ Can lie or tell truth about 
amount of $ given 
Decides whether to split tripled 
amount with P1 or not 
3($X) 
Don’t Split $ 
Give $ 
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APPENDIX J: RESEARCHER’S SCRIPT (CONDITION 2 PRECEDES CONDITION 1) 
PILOT TESTING 
 
After providing participants with the instructions to the game and prior to beginning the $10 
Trust Game 
 
R(esearcher): Ok, participant’s name, now I have to go check on the other participants in the 
experiment. I’m going to bring you to a waiting room for a bit while I get organized and set up 
the study. 
 
(Arriving at the waiting room, where the three confederates are already waiting) 
 
R: Participant’s name, this is ___________ (confederate 1). 
 
Confederate 1: Hi 
 
R:  this is ____________ (confederate 2). 
 
Confederate 2: Hi 
 
E: and this is ____________ (confederate 3) 
 
Confederate 3: Hi 
 
R: Participant’s name, you are going to be playing ___________ (confederate 1) in the first 
game, where you’ll be Player 1 and s/he’ll be Player 2. Then, in the second game, you’ll play 
________ (confederate 2). In that game, s/he’ll be Player 1 and you’ll be Player 2. 
 
Alright, I’m going to leave you now to check up on the others and set up the computers. I will be 
back in a few minutes to get you two (i.e., participant and confederate 1) set up first. 
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APPENDIX K: INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED $10 TRUST GAME – CONDITION 2 
 
Instructions for Player2 
You have been asked to participate in a psychology experiment. You will be playing a 
series of games on a computer. Please read these instructions carefully and ask any questions 
prior to the start of the experiment, as the researcher may not be available once the game has 
begun.  
 
You have been designated to be Player 2 in this experiment. You will be paired with 
another participant who has been designated as Player 1.  
 
You will be playing a game wherein you and the other player are each given $10 of 
virtual money. Player 1 (P1) can give you as Player 2 (P2) any dollar amount between $0 and 
$10; any amount s/he gives to you will triple. You can decide to either split this tripled amount 
with him/her or keep it all to yourself. Please note: P1 does not have to give you the amount that 
s/he said s/he would; s/he can give you more or less. You will base your decision on what s/he 
has told you; you will not know what s/he has actually given you until after you have made your 
decision to split the money with him/her or not.  
 
As you can see on the computer monitor, you have been given $10 in virtual money to 
begin (Player 1’s screen will also display $10 in virtual money to start). To begin, P1 will have 
the opportunity to give any dollar amount between $1 and $10 of his/her virtual money to you 
(see diagram below) or s/he may decide not to give any money at all, in which case the game 
ends and you both end up with the $10 you began with. However, if s/he does give money to 
you, each dollar s/he gives will be tripled. For example, if s/he gives $2, it will triple to become 
$6. You will decide whether or not you will split this tripled amount evenly with him/her. If you 
decide to split the money evenly with him/her, for example if the tripled amount is $6, s/he will 
end up with $11 (i.e., $3 + what remains of his/her original $10, which is $8) and you will end 
up with $13 (i.e., $3 + your original $10).  
 
As noted above, P1 does not have to give you the amount s/he said s/he would; s/he can 
give you more or less. The amount that s/he tells you that s/he is giving will be entered into the 
“disclosed amount” box on the computer screen. There is also a box for the “actual amount” on 
P1’s screen. This is the amount of money that s/he actually wants to give to you. To clarify, both 
the “disclosed amount” and the “actual amount” can be the same or different (i.e., more or less). 
You will decide whether to split or not split any money with P1 based only on the “disclosed 
amount” s/he enters. You will not see the “actual amount” s/he enters until after you have made 
this decision. 
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 Once you make your decision, the trial ends. You will play this game with Player 1 10 
times. The computer will tally up your earnings and this will be displayed in the top portion of 
your screen at the end of all 10 games. Each dollar amount you earn will be equivalent to one 
entry into a draw for an iPod music player (e.g., if you earn $10, your name will be entered into 
the draw 10 times). 
 
 When you have finished playing the 10 games, please notify the researcher.
P1 
$10 (P1) 
$10 (P2) 
$10 - X (P1) 
3($X) +10 (P2) 
3X/2 + (10-X) (P1) 
3X/2 + 10 (P2) 
Split $ 
P2 
Don’t Give $ Can lie or tell truth about 
amount of $ given 
Decides whether to split 
tripled amount with P1 or 
not 
3($X) 
Don’t Split $ 
Give $ 
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APPENDIX L: DEBRIEFING FORM 
 
We are interested in examining the relationships between lying and gender, and between lying 
and certain personality traits/dimensions, such as, degree of emotional involvement when 
interacting with others, ambitiousness, and competitiveness. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether gender and certain personality traits are associated with the tendency to favour the use 
of lying in interpersonal interactions. Although there is a growing literature on lie detection and 
nonverbal indicators of lying, there is a paucity of research examining the effect of gender and 
specific personality styles on the use of lying. 
 
We want to thank you for your participation in this study. You have provided us with much 
valuable information. We hope that with your participation we will gain a deeper understanding 
into the nature of lying behaviour. 
 
If you would like to receive a summary of the results for this study, please contact Kate Pan at 
kate.pan@usask.ca or (306) 966-6719 or Dr. J. Stephen Wormith at s.wormith@usask.ca or 
(306) 966-6818. If participation in this study raises any emotional and/or psychological concerns 
for you, you are encouraged to contact Student Counselling Services at (306-966-4920). 
 
There are two final points we would like to mention. First, your responses will remain absolutely 
confidential. Your data is identified only by a numerical identification code generated by the 
researcher, so no one will be able to connect your name to your responses. Second, we ask that 
you not tell others about the details of this study. The reason for this is that if potential 
participants knew what this study is about, this information will influence their responses, and 
we would obtain misleading information from them. Therefore, it is important that you do not 
talk about this study to your friends or to other people who may be in the experiment in the 
future, or allow them to read this debriefing sheet. Please also do not tell others who may have 
contact with potential participants. Thank you very much. 
 
Consent to Use Data: I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. I understand that 
participation is voluntary and that I can decline consent without penalty of any sort. A copy of 
this form has been given to me for my records. 
 
 I consent to the researchers using the data that I have contributed. 
 
 I do not consent to the researchers using the data that I have contributed. 
 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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APPENDIX M: POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE – PART 1 (MAIN STUDY) 
 
1. In a sentence or two, please state your view of what is being investigated in this study. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Did you know any of the other participants prior to today’s experiment? 
 
Yes____ No_____ (check one) 
 
If so, who? _______________________________ 
 
3. (a) Were you able to deduce any characteristics about the participant in the first video clip? 
Please describe in a sentence or two. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 (b) Were you able to deduce any characteristics about the participant in the second video clip? 
Please describe in a sentence or two. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant Information: 
4. Age:  ____   
 
5. Gender:  M___ F___   (check one) 
 
6. Ethnicity (please check all that apply): 
Aboriginal ____    Asian ____         Black/African ____     Hispanic or Latino ____ 
White (Caucasian) ____  Other (please specify) ________________________________ 
7. Year of university study:  1st ___      2nd ___       3rd ___      4th ___      5th +___      
 
8. Major area of study (e.g., Arts and Science, Business, etc): __________________________ 
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APPENDIX N: CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS FROM THE PSYCHOLOGY POOL 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled The Effect of Gender and 
Personality on Individual Judgement and Decision-Making. Please read this form carefully, 
and feel free to ask questions you might have. 
 
Researcher(s):  
Student Researcher: Kate Pan, Ph.D. Student, Department of Psychology, Arts Building, Room 
69A, University of Saskatchewan. Phone: (306) 966-6719. Email: kate.pan@usask.ca 
 
Researcher Supervisor: J. Stephen Wormith, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Arts Building, 
Room 180, University of Saskatchewan. Phone: (306) 966-6818. Email: s.wormith@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of gender and 
personality on individual judgement and decision-making. Participation in this study is voluntary 
and consists of playing a series of computer game trials, completing several personality 
measures, and recording a short video greeting. The study is expected to take between 45 to 60 
minutes to complete. You will receive two research credits for your participation, as well as the 
opportunity to enter into a draw for an 8GB iPod Music Player. The findings from this study will 
be written up in the form of a Doctoral thesis. It is also anticipated that the findings from this 
study will be presented at academic conferences and submitted for publication to a peer-
reviewed scientific journal. All data collected will be reported in aggregate or summarized form, 
thus your identity will be kept confidential.  
 
Potential Benefits: While there are no direct benefits for participating beyond learning about the 
process of psychological research, your participation in this study will assist researchers in their 
effort to better understand the influence of gender and personality on individual judgement and 
decision-making behaviour.  
 
Potential Risks: There are no physical or mental health risks associated with participating in the 
study. However, some of the measures are designed to examine aspects of your personality, 
behaviour, and how you view the world in general. While the measures are not designed to make 
you feel uncomfortable, they may cause some personal embarrassment as you answer the 
questions. Thus, you are free to answer only those questions that you feel comfortable answering 
and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty by verbally informing the 
researcher. Further, you may request that your data be removed from the data set at any time, 
which will also result in the immediate destruction of the data that you have contributed. If you 
do experience any stress, or have concerns or questions at any time throughout the data 
collection period and/or after you finish participating, you are encouraged to discuss them with 
the student researcher or her researcher supervisor. Please contact the researchers using the 
information provided above. Alternatively, you may decide to contact Student Counseling 
Services (306-966-4920). 
 
Storage of Data: The data collected today will be kept in secure location in a locked filing 
cabinet Dr. J. Stephen Wormith’s research lab for a minimum of five years, after which the data 
will be destroyed beyond recovery.  
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Confidentiality: All information collected is entirely confidential. Please do not put your name 
on the measures and questionnaires. Confidentiality will be maintained by identifying 
questionnaire data using only a numerical identification code generated by the researcher, so that 
no one will be able to connect your name to your responses. Computerized data (including the 
video greeting) will similarly be identified by the same numerical identification code, stored on a 
password-protected computer until such time that it can be burned onto a CD, deleted from the 
computer, and stored in a locked filing cabinet, separate from the consent forms. Further, only 
aggregate data will be included in the final reporting of the results, any personal or identifying 
information will not be included. Additionally, you should be aware that the researcher will be 
obligated to report any intent to harm one’s self or another person to the authorities (e.g., if you 
tell the researcher that you plan on finding John Doe and verbally or physically assaulting him). 
 
Right to Withdraw:  Your participation is voluntary, and you can answer only those questions 
that you are comfortable with. There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from your 
involvement. The information that is shared will be held in strict confidence and discussed only 
with the research team. You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time, 
without penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study you will still receive the 
research credits and the opportunity to participate in the draw associated with participating in this 
study. If you withdraw from the research project at any time, any data that you have contributed 
will be destroyed at your request. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the research project, please feel free to ask at 
any point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided if you have other 
questions.  This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on August 4, 2010. Any questions regarding 
your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the Ethics Office (966-
2084).  Out of town participants may call collect.  
 
Follow-Up or Debriefing: You will be provided with a debriefing sheet at the end of the 
experiment, or in the event that you choose not to participate. The debriefing sheet will provide 
some background to the study and specify the aims of the study. Information concerning the 
results of the study may be arranged (following the study’s completion) via Kate Pan or Dr. 
Wormith at the contact address above.  
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. I consent to participate in the 
research project, understanding that I may withdraw my consent at any time. A copy of this 
Consent Form has been given to me for my records. 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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APPENDIX O: CONSENT FORM FOR MALES OUTSIDE OF THE PSYCHOLOGY POOL 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled The Effect of Gender and 
Personality on Individual Judgement and Decision-Making (S2). Please read this form 
carefully, and feel free to ask questions you might have. 
 
Researcher(s):  
Student Researcher: Kate Pan, Ph.D. Student, Department of Psychology, Arts Building, Room 
69A, University of Saskatchewan. Phone: (306) 966-6719. Email: kate.pan@usask.ca 
 
Researcher Supervisor: J. Stephen Wormith, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Arts Building, 
Room 180, University of Saskatchewan. Phone: (306) 966-6818. Email: s.wormith@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of gender and 
personality on individual judgement and decision-making. Participation in this study is voluntary 
and consists of playing a series of computer game trials, completing several personality 
measures, and recording a short video greeting. The study is expected to take approximately 60 
minutes to complete. As part of your participation, you will receive the opportunity to enter into 
a draw to win an 8GB iPod Music Player or two regular season tickets to a Saskatchewan 
Roughriders game (the total value of the tickets will be of approximately the same value as the 
iPod Music Player. The findings from this study will be written up in the form of a Doctoral 
thesis. It is also anticipated that the findings from this study will be presented at academic 
conferences and submitted for publication to a peer-reviewed scientific journal. All data 
collected will be reported in aggregate or summarized form, thus your identity will be kept 
confidential.  
 
Potential Benefits: While there are no direct benefits for participating beyond learning about the 
process of psychological research, your participation in this study will assist researchers in their 
effort to better understand the influence of gender and personality on individual judgement and 
decision-making behaviour.  
 
Potential Risks: There are no physical or mental health risks associated with participating in the 
study. However, some of the measures are designed to examine aspects of your personality, 
behaviour, and how you view the world in general. While the measures are not designed to make 
you feel uncomfortable, they may cause some personal embarrassment as you answer the 
questions. Thus, you are free to answer only those questions that you feel comfortable answering 
and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty by verbally informing the 
researcher. Further, you may request that your data be removed from the data set at any time, 
which will also result in the immediate destruction of the data that you have contributed. If you 
do experience any stress, or have concerns or questions at any time throughout the data 
collection period and/or after you finish participating, you are encouraged to discuss them with 
the student researcher or her researcher supervisor. Please contact the researchers using the 
information provided above. Alternatively, you may decide to contact Student Counseling 
Services (306-966-4920). 
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Storage of Data: The data collected today will be kept in secure location in a locked filing 
cabinet Dr. J. Stephen Wormith’s research lab for a minimum of five years, after which the data 
will be destroyed beyond recovery.  
  
Confidentiality: All information collected is entirely confidential. Please do not put your name 
on the measures and questionnaires. Confidentiality will be maintained by identifying 
questionnaire data using only a numerical identification code generated by the researcher, so that 
no one will be able to connect your name to your responses. Computerized data (including the 
video greeting) will similarly be identified by the same numerical identification code, stored on a 
password-protected computer until such time that it can be burned onto a CD, deleted from the 
computer, and stored in a locked filing cabinet, separate from the consent forms. Further, only 
aggregate data will be included in the final reporting of the results, any personal or identifying 
information will not be included. Additionally, you should be aware that the researcher will be 
obligated to report any intent to harm one’s self or another person to the authorities (e.g., if you 
tell the researcher that you plan on finding John Doe and verbally or physically assaulting him). 
 
Right to Withdraw:  Your participation is voluntary, and you can answer only those questions 
that you are comfortable with. There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from your 
involvement. The information that is shared will be held in strict confidence and discussed only 
with the research team. You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time, 
without penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study you will still receive the 
research credits and the opportunity to participate in the draw associated with participating in this 
study. If you withdraw from the research project at any time, any data that you have contributed 
will be destroyed at your request. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the research project, please feel free to ask at 
any point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided if you have other 
questions. This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on August 4, 2010. Any questions regarding 
your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the Ethics Office (966-
2084).  Out of town participants may call collect.  
 
Follow-Up or Debriefing: You will be provided with a debriefing sheet at the end of the 
experiment, or in the event that you choose not to participate. The debriefing sheet will provide 
some background to the study and specify the aims of the study. Information concerning the 
results of the study may be arranged (following the study’s completion) via Kate Pan or Dr. 
Wormith at the contact address above.  
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. I consent to participate in the 
research project, understanding that I may withdraw my consent at any time. A copy of this 
Consent Form has been given to me for my records. 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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APPENDIX P: RESEARCHER’S SCRIPT (CONDITION 1 PRECEDES CONDITION 2) 
MAIN STUDY 
 
 
R(eseacher): Ok, participant’s name, to give you a sense of who you’re playing next. I’ve got a 
video greeting that I just recorded with another participant to show you. 
 
(Participant views pre-recorded personal greeting of confederate) 
 
(Confederate’s script: Hello, my name is __________.  I was born and raised in Saskatoon. I’m 
in my first year of Arts and Science. In my spare time, I like to _______________ (watch 
movies, especially action movies/do something active, like go swimming or running). 
 
R: Participant’s name, so now I’d like to ask you to record a short personal greeting for 
________ (name of confederate) as well.  
 
(Participant records greeting on computer webcam and then plays a set of 10 computer trials. 
After this, participant will be shown another personal video greeting of a different opponent 
(confederate 2) and asked to play another set of 10 computer trials. The script for the second 
confederate will be identical to the first except for name and interest. The participant will be told 
that their previously recorded personal greeting will be shown to their new opponent 
(confederate 2)) 
 
 134 
APPENDIX Q: RESEARCHER’S SCRIPT (CONDITION 2 PRECEDES CONDITION 1) 
MAIN STUDY 
 
After providing participants with the instructions to the game and prior to beginning the $10 
Trust Game 
 
R(eseacher): Ok, participant’s name, to give you a sense of who you’ll be playing. I’ve got a 
video greeting that I just recorded with another participant to show you. 
 
(Participant views pre-recorded personal greeting of confederate) 
 
(Confederate’s script: Hello, my name is __________.  I was born and raised in Saskatoon. I’m 
in my first year of Arts and Science. In my spare time, I like to _______________ (watch 
movies, especially sci-fi/do something active, like go swimming or running). 
 
R: Participant’s name, so now I’d like to ask you to record a short personal greeting for 
________ (name of confederate) as well.  
 
(Participant records greeting on computer webcam and then plays a set of 10 computer trials. 
After this, participant will be shown another personal video greeting of a different opponent 
(confederate 2) and asked to play another set of 10 computer trials. The script for the second 
confederate will be identical to the first except for name and interest. The participant will be told 
that their previously recorded personal greeting will be shown to their new opponent 
(confederate 2))
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APPENDIX R: MIXED ANOVAS FOR REMAINING PSYCHOPATHY SUBSCALES BY 
CONDITION ON LYING FREQUENCY 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Secondary Psychopathy (SP) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .489 .004 .486 
SP Subscale 1 .570 .005 .452 
Condition * SP Subscale 1 2.108 .017 .149 
Error 124 (4.391)a (16.550)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Rebellious Nonconformity (RN) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .115 .001 .736 
RN Subscale 1 .008 .000 .927 
Condition * RN Subscale 1 .335 .003 .564 
Error 125 (4.567)a (16.499)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Blame Externalization (BE) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .163 .001 .687 
BE Subscale 1 .936 .007 .335 
Condition * BE Subscale 1 .536 .004 .466 
Error 125 (4.560)a (16.377)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects.  
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ANOVA for Condition and Carefree Nonplanfulness (CN) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .162 .001 .688 
CN Subscale 1 1.683 .013 .197 
Condition * CN Subscale 1 .258 .002 .612 
Error 125 (4.570)a (16.281)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Social Influence (SOI) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .146 .001 .703 
SOI Subscale 1 .000 .000 .986 
Condition * SOI Subscale 1 .301 .002 .584 
Error 125 (4.568)a (16.500)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Fearlessness (F) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .167 .001 .684 
F Subscale 1 3.156 .025 .078 
Condition * F Subscale 1 .322 .003 .571 
Error 125 (4.568)a (16.094)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects.  
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ANOVA for Condition and Stress Immunity (STI) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .154 .001 .696 
STI Subscale 1 1.283 .010 .259 
Condition * STI Subscale 1 .527 .004 .469 
Error 125 (4.560)a (16.332)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Coldheartedness (C) Subscale on Lying Frequency 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .301 .002 .584 
C Subscale 1 .144 .001 .705 
Condition * C Subscale 1 2.736 .021 .101 
Error 125 (4.481)a (16.481)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
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APPENDIX S: MIXED ANOVAS FOR REMAINING PSYCHOPATHY SUBSCALES BY 
CONDITION ON LYING SEVERITY 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Secondary Psychopathy (SP) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .095 .001 .759 
SP Subscale 1 1.824 .014 .179 
Condition * SP Subscale 1 3.366 .026 .069 
Error 124 (119.089)a (324.000)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Rebellious Nonconformity (RN) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .009 .000 .924 
RN Subscale 1 .401 .003 .528 
Condition * RN Subscale 1 1.016 .008 .315 
Error 125 (124.183)a (343.156)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Blame Externalization (BE) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .001 .000 .979 
BE Subscale 1 .182 .001 .670 
Condition * BE Subscale 1 .419 .003 .519 
Error 125 (124.774)a (343.755)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects.  
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ANOVA for Condition and Carefree Nonplanfulness (CN) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .000 .000 .988 
CN Subscale 1 .219 .002 .641 
Condition * CN Subscale 1 .300 .002 .585 
Error 125 (124.893)a (343.655)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Social Influence (SOI) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .007 .000 .934 
SOI Subscale 1 .106 .001 .745 
Condition * SOI Subscale 1 .039 .000 .844 
Error 125 (125.153)a (343.963)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Fearlessness (F) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .005 .000 .945 
F Subscale 1 2.400 .019 .124 
Condition * F Subscale 1 1.905 .015 .170 
Error 125 (123.13)a (337.771)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects.  
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ANOVA for Condition and Stress Immunity (STI) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .000 .000 .998 
STI Subscale 1 .000 .000 .984 
Condition * STI Subscale 1 1.861 .015 .175 
Error 125 (123.356)a (344.255)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
 
ANOVA for Condition and Coldheartedness (C) Subscale on Lying Severity 
Source df F Partial !2 p 
Condition 1 .012 .000 .912 
C Subscale 1 .525 .004 .470 
Condition * C Subscale 1 2.384 .019 .125 
Error 125 (122.850)a (342.816)b  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  
a = Error term for the test of within-subjects effects and b = Error term for the test of between-
subjects effects. 
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APPENDIX T: COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURE TOTALS AND 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES IN MALES AND FEMALES 
 
 
 
Mach-IV Total LSRP Total PPI-R Total 
 
Fisher’s Z (p value) Fisher’s Z (p value) Fisher’s Z (p value) 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency -0.85 (.395) -0.95 (.343) -0.14 (.889) 
Exposure Lying Frequency -0.83 (.407) -1.38 (.168) -0.43 (.667) 
Non-Exposure Lying Severity -1.44 (.150) -1.29 (.197) 0.20 (.407) 
Exposure Lying Severity 0.24 (.810) -0.42 (.675) 0.19 (.849) 
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APPENDIX U: COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURE SUBSCALE TOTALS 
AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES IN MALES AND FEMALES 
 
 
PP SP ME RN BE CN SOI F STI C 
 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Fisher’s Z 
(p value) 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Frequency 
-0.60 
(.548) 
-0.98 
(.327) 
-0.24 
(.810) 
-0.20 
(.842) 
0.07 
(.131) 
-0.87 
(.384) 
0.71 
(.477) 
-0.17 
(.865) 
-0.39 
(.697) 
-0.71 
(.478) 
Exposure  
Lying Frequency 
-0.07 
(.516) 
-1.67 
(.095) 
-1.32 
(.187) 
0.26 
(.509) 
1.12 
(.263) 
-0.90 
(.368) 
1.81 
(.070) 
-0.23 
(.818) 
-0.78 
(.435) 
-0.82 
(.412) 
Non-Exposure 
Lying Severity 
-0.92 
(.358) 
-1.23 
(.219) 
-0.62 
(.535) 
-1.17 
(.242) 
0.83 
(.407) 
-1.56 
(.119) 
0.80 
(.423) 
-0.54 
(.589) 
-0.14 
(.889) 
-1.13 
(.259) 
Exposure 
Lying Severity 
0.36 
(.719) 
-1.26 
(.208) 
-0.43 
(.667) 
-0.11 
(.912) 
1.61 
(.107) 
-0.37 
(.711) 
1.88 
(.060) 
-0.05 
(.960) 
-0.91 
(.363) 
-0.54 
(.589) 
           
Note. PP = Primary Psychopathy; SP = Secondary Psychopathy; ME = Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN = Rebellious Nonconformity; BE = 
Blame Externalization; CN = Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI = Social Influence; F = Fearlessness; STI = Stress Immunity; C = Coldheartedness.
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APPENDIX V: QUESTION 3 (“NEVER”) BY QUESTION 1 CROSS TABULATION & 
QUESTION 3 (“OFTEN” OR “VERY OFTEN”) BY QUESTION 1 CROSS TABULATION 
 
 “How Often Do you Lie in a Week?” 
 Never (n = 9) 
Very Much Below Average 1 
Below Average 3 
Average 3 
Above Average 2 
Very Much Above Average 0 
 
 
 
 
 “How Often Do you Lie in a Week?” 
 Often (n = 9) Very Often (n = 1) 
Very Much Below Average 0 0 
Below Average 0 0 
Average 3 0 
Above Average 5 0 
Very Much Above Average 1 1 
 144 
APPENDIX W: MEANS OF ALL MEASURE TOTALS AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO ANSWERED “NEVER” TO QUESTION 3 
 
 
 
 “How Often Do You Lie 
in a Week?”  
 
Never (SD) 
(n = 9) 
Overall (SD)a 
(n = 150) 
Mach-IV Total 51.11   (7.11) 52.67 (10.09) 
LSRP IV Total 38.89   (5.42) 47.35   (9.32) 
PPI-R total 297.67 (27.66) 315.40 (33.81) 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency 2.71   (2.63)b 3.61   (3.27)c 
Exposure Lying Frequency 2.00   (3.11)b 3.70   (3.19)c 
Non-Exposure Lying Severity 9.92  (10.46)b 15.63 (15.20)c 
Exposure Lying Severity 7.14  (12.28)b 15.53 (15.32)c 
a = Overall means and standard deviations reproduced from Tables 3.3 and 3.7 for comparison 
purposes. 
bn = 7. cn = 127.
 145 
APPENDIX X: MEANS OF ALL MEASURE TOTALS AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO ANSWERED “OFTEN” OR “VERY OFTEN” TO QUESTION 3 
 
 “How Often Do You Lie 
in a Week?”  
 
Often or Very Often (SD) 
(n = 10) 
Overall (SD)a 
(n = 150) 
Mach-IV Total 58.80 (12.70) 52.67 (10.09) 
LSRP IV Total 54.30 (12.49) 47.35   (9.32) 
PPI-R total 332.10 (31.94) 315.40 (33.81) 
Non-Exposure Lying Frequency 4.00   (3.13) 3.61   (3.27)b 
Exposure Lying Frequency 4.20   (3.94) 3.70   (3.19)b 
Non-Exposure Lying Severity 16.70 (14.21) 15.63 (15.20)b 
Exposure Lying Severity 17.00 (17.78) 15.53 (15.32)b 
a = Overall means and standard deviations reproduced from Tables 3.3 and 3.7 for comparison 
purposes. 
bn = 127. 
